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Abstract of Introductory Essay 
An essay defines and explores the strengths and limits 
of the Axiomatic Analysis of Legal/Institutional Issues, 
and then derives guidelines for the use of axiomatic work 
in papers prescribing policies. 
Abstract of Chapter I 
Given certain fundamental assumptions, it is possible to 
engage in economic analysis of costly interactions 
between the government and individuals. Such an 
analysis must necessarily focus upon a potential rule's 
effect on governmental behavior. Various models of 
governmental behavior are either borrowed or developed, 
...... ·and· these models are· then independently analyzed,· 
Economic efficiency suggests that a particular immunity 
rule should be adopted with regard to certain models. 
In the case of other models, however, rigorous economic 
analysis is impossible; in such cases, suability is 
chosen over immunity on the basis of fairness and com-
parative utility. Based upon this analysis, three po-
tential governmental immunity rules are formulated, and, 
based largely on considerations of administrative costs 
and fairness, the indicated rule is that the government 
should be suable in tort for monetary damages. 
iv 
Abstract of Chapter II 
The limitations of Multicriteria Choice Processes are 
analyzed by examining the Federal Communications 
Commission's initial broadcast license comparative 
hearings. A possibility theorem, developed especially 
for comparative hearings, shows that the FCC must use 
an illegal process. This fundamental problem helps 
to explain previous criticisms of the comparative 
hearings' practical defects and to separate sufficiently 
effective reform suggestions from ineffective 
proposals. 
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INTRODUCTORY ESSAY ON THE AXIOMATIC 
ANALYSIS OF LEGAL/INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
A legal/institutional issue involves the effects 
of law upon interactions between private and institutional 
actors. The following two papers axiomatically analyze 
legal/institutional issues. This short essay defines the 
general axiomatic analysis paradigm, explores its powers 
and limitations, and derives guidelines for the use of 
axiomatic work in papers prescribing policies. 
I. Definition of the Axiomatic Analysis of Legal/Insti-
tutional Issues 
A paradigmatic Axiomatic Analysis of a Legal/ 
Institutional Issue (hereinafter "AA") starts with the 
----~-~~-,s~e.l~e_c~tion of an appropriate issue. This issue must 
involve interactions between the legal environment, 
private actors and institutions. Next, the researcher 
must model the issue by choosing an axiom set that 
characterizes the actions and interactions of the 
institutional actors, private actors, and their envi-
ronment (the positive axiom set). The analyst generates 
answers -- in the form of theorems -- to the problems 
posed by the issue, and then mathematically shows that 
the axioms prove (or are insufficient to prove) the 
theorems. This process often requires the analyst to 
substitute alternative axioms into the model and redo 
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the answers. Last, the analyst deduces an appropriate 
policy for the model generally some change in the 
legal environment -- by using explicit ethical postulates 
to choose the policy prescription. The model's policy 
prescription, deduced in strict Aristotelian fashion from 
positive axioms and ethical postulates, provides the 
foundation for the analyst's policy prescriptions for 
society. 
A. The synthetic process of answering the questions 
The process begins with the analyst choosing 
positive axiom sets and trying to get some initial 
results. Since the ultimate appeal of his policy recom-
mendation will rest upon the appeal of the individual 
axioms, the analyst naturally will be led to examine 
alternative axiom sets to generate alternative answers 
to the issue's questions, he reinterprets both the basic 
issue and the observed phenomena. Although logically 
distinct from this process, the analyst occasionally 
checks possible ethical postulates and corresponding 
policy prescriptions, balancing the flamboyance of the 
resulting policy prescription against the importance of 
the phenomena neglected by the positive axiom set. Each 
time he substitutes new axioms into the positive axiom 
set, the analyst goes through this "checking" procedure. 
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B. The resulting model 
The resulting model may contain widely varied 
private parties and environments, but the institutional 
actors will always include a body that prescribes legal 
rules. For example, the following two pRpers employ models 
with widely varying economic environments. The model of 
governmental immunity uses conditions on production 
functions, capital and labor markets, etc., while the 
FCC paper assumes that broadcast licensees can make a high 
enough return on investment to make applying for the 
license a rational activity, plus the applicability of 
the governing statutory schemes (the US Constitution and 
the FCC Act). Similarly, although neither of the 
· f-e-l-h:>w-i-n<3 ···• f'!Ci~f>E:-I'.-s~f.G.c;.u.s.e.s~o-n~ptl.\l.a_te~a_c~t_o_r_s_, i,,..,.t=--..,,,i=s'-----------~ 
necessary to characterize their behavior, and they occupy 
vastly different roles in the two works. In the immunity 
piece private actors eat wheat, take train rides and farm. 
In the FCC piece the private actors -- the applicants --
apply. Both papers include courts as institutional actors. 
The FCC paper characterizes the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeal (along with the FCC), while the 
immunity paper uses a generalized court (and a government 
bureau). 
c. Developing a full appreciation of the model's 
inner workings 
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By the time the analyst arrives at a resultant 
model, he understands the interactions between his three 
axiomatized sectors. He has worked for so long with the 
axioms in an attempt to characterize the observed 
phenomena, that later data observations are understood 
within the axiomatic framework. 
Axiomatizing institutions provides much of the 
intellectual challenge in these pieces. Because there is 
no generally accepted theory of institutional behavior, 
the analyst must generate models applicable to his 
legal/institutional setting. Also, institutions are 
complex, contradictory creatures whose behavior evades 
quick and easy axiomatization. For example, virtually 
plausibility of 
characterizing the DC Circuit's behavior with a set of 
mutually inconsistent axioms, while the immunity paper 
analyzes alternative axiomatic approximations to a 
generalized bureau's behavior. 
D. The derived, basic results 
Hopefully, the simultaneous interaction of the 
institutions, private parties, and environment produces 
some economic result. For example, in the FCC paper 
the DC Circuit was attempting to influence the legal 
environment (which in turn affected the FCC) in an 
impossible manner. Analogously, in the immunity paper, 
an agency acting as a Product-Maximizing Budget Consumer 
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must be suable for society to arrive on the prodpction 
possibilities frontier. Unfortunately, many sets of 
appealing axioms allow no deductions, thereby denying the 
analyst positive results with which to work and necessi-
tating the use of much stronger ethical postulates to 
prescribe policies. For example, in the immunity paper a 
Malevolent Entity's behavior cannot be completely 
characterized under suability or immunity. Therefore, 
instead of prescribing suability as a means of maximizing 
consumer satisfaction, the paper relies on fairness and 
comparative utility -- much stronger ethical assumptions--
to prescribe suability for that model. 
E. Ethical postulates 
By .. the Eim e ·we anal y s-t rra-s::-:d-E!-:ri-Y·e=-a~t-he-mod·e-1----~--­
an d its basic results, he has most likely chosen his 
ethical postulates and the ~odel's accompanying policy 
prescription. The desire to get striking results has 
probably led him, during the synthesis of a model, to 
consider alternative ethical postulates. If the ultimate 
recommendation is to be appealing, the analyst must 
provide convincing arguments in favor of each assumption. 
These arguments force the analyst to understand why he 
prefers one policy or institutional action to some 
other and require widely varying degrees of attention. 
For example, the complex ethical foundations of the 
I . 
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sovereign immunity paper require extensive discussion, 
--
while the FCC's simple statement that an institution 
should not be subject to contradictory requirements 
needs almost no defense. 
F. Prescribing policy recommendations based on an AA 
The use of an AA to prescribe societal policies 
provides the AA's ultimate test. The policy recomrnenda-
tion's appeal will reflect the degree to which the axioms 
match observed data, the sensibility of the model's basic 
results, and the ethical postulates' normative appeal. 
Only if the analyst performs his AA with care will this 
step seem natural. (See Section IV of this essay) . 
II. Power and potential of an AA 
an AA is its ability, within the domain described by the 
axiom sets, to make precis~, powerful statements. For 
example, previous papers dealing with the FCC's initial 
broadcast license comparative hearings had noted the slo~, 
confused, expensive, and intellectually bankrupt nature 
of the process. By axiomatizing the process, my paper 
detected an impossibility in the constraints on the FCC's 
behavior. In general, the AA can make use of strict 
"if, then" statements. By choosing precise axioms to 
satisfy the "if," the "then" can be made correspondingly 
exact. Thus, just as the ability to state precisely 
7 
the basic impossibility gives the FCC paper its ~ppeal, 
so, in general, an AA's ability to make precise statements 
gives the AA its general appeal. 
An AA also allows the analyst to focus on a 
particular aspect of a legal/institutional issue. By 
changing axioms regarding a single actor (or other 
phenomenon) the analyst can effectively direct attention 
to that actor (or other phenomenon). For example, the 
immunity piece focuses attention upon the importance of 
the governmental bureau's motivations by varying 
assumptions regarding the bureau's behavior. 
Selecting the positive axioms forces the 
analyst to learn thoroughly about his issue. Every set 
that leads to positive results must leave out some 
salient and intuitively im~ortant element of the legal/ 
institutional issue. Institutions and individuals 
exhibit ambiguous, contradictory behavior in difficult 
situations. Mathematically precise axioms (given the 
language of mathematics) cannot capture all of these 
behaviors. When the analyst chooses the axioms he must 
consider, for each axiom, the importance of the neglected 
phenomena and the changes that would result from replacing 
the axiom by another. By going through this process for 
each axiom, the analyst must map the boundaries con-
8 
straining his ability to make positive statement~. 
(Similarly, when selecting ethical postulates, the analyst 
must dwell upon the ethical foundations supporting his 
policy prescriptions). 
For example, in the FCC paper Axiom IV states 
that no absolute scales or weights are used in the 
initial broadcast license comparative hearing choice 
process. This axiom partially neglects language in FCC 
Reports which terms preferences "large," "moderate," 
"slight," etc. However, because of basic ambiguities in 
these terms, the FCC's many failures to give any indication 
of preference size, and some language plainly hostile to 
the concept of absolute scales, the neglected phenomea 
The substitution of an axiom 
allowing absolute scales would neglect these ambiguities, 
failures, and hostilities, and such an axiom would destroy 
the paper's basic results. For all of these reasons, I 
concluded that Axiom IV is an acceptable constraint on 
the FCC paper's ability to get results. Similar judgments 
are academic in any attempt to axiomatize real-world 
processes. 
III. Limitations of the axiomatic approach 
The AA's problems and limits derive from its 
tendency to highlight any weaknesses in one's work, the 
unsuitability of many legal/institutional issues to the 
9 
analysis, and the lack of an audience trained in .both legal 
and social scientific schools of thought. 
A. Highlighting weaknesses 
The AA is plagued by two basic tradeoffs. 
First, the axiom set's general applicability varies 
inversely with the analyst's ability to get results. For 
example, the model of sovereign immunity in tort might 
have used hypothetical factor markets that could be com-
petitive or noncompetitive -- assuming noncompetitive 
markets allows wider applicability than postulating 
competitive markets. Unfortunately, the wider assumption 
prevents the analyst from proving that a fixed job/cost 
minimizer should be suable in tort. As a general matter, 
more specific assumption th~n allowing competitive and 
noncompetitive factor markets, neglects phenomena such 
as the oil and copper cartels, and is correspondingly less 
appealing. Since the analyst wants to get some positive 
results, he will be strongly tempted to use a specific 
(i.e. not generally applicable) and unappealing axiom. 
Although these basic tradeoffs plague virtually all ana-
lytical styles, the AA guides a reader in subjectively 
appraising each assumption, thereby greatly increasing the 
probability that he will raise objections where the axioms 
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grate on his intuition. Hence, the first, and most basic 
limitation is a writer's decreased ability to slip any-
thing suspect past a reader. Note that this limitation 
is dictated by the same considerations that result in a 
thoroughly explored model (part of the strength of an 
AA). 
B. Unsuitable issues 
Given the limits of current social scientific 
theory, there are many important legal/institutional 
issues which very probablycannot profitably be attacked 
with an AA. This is generally because the types of 
questions involved do not sufficiently resemble para-
digmatic economic issues. For example, the issue of a 
H•W ......... pe!-s0n's c:::r:il1linal. sanity would nc:it se!Tl .. to be easily ana...; 
lysed with the axiomatic approach. Assuming that 
deterence is the object of the criminal law, the insanity 
issue, in economic terms, involves separating rational 
actors from other actors. In almost all economic 
theories both of these actors would be undefined, non-
derived concepts. Although it is possible that a clever 
axiomatic application of current economic theory could 
help classify criminally insane individuals, it is so 
unlikely that a researcher should start attacking the 
problem with another analytical style. 
C. Audience 
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At present, works containing an AA are read by 
formally trained social scientists 'or lawyers. While the 
lawyers have a far greater grasp of which problems or 
legal/institutional issues are interesting, they do not 
have the basic tools to understand all of an AA. Con-
versely, the social scientists can understand all of the 
AA but do not always understand the context of the 
problem, and therefore cannot assess the usefulness of the 
analysis or the aptness of its policy prescriptions. 
Therefore, the writer must be careful to explain the 
context of the issue and the limitations placed on pro-
spective prescriptions for the social scientists and to 
recount the basic nature and workings of the AA for the 
lawyers. Since the contextual explanations are also 
·· · neecrea· Sy 
in English also aids social scientists, the writer's 
time is well spent. 
There is another problem centering on the legal 
audience. Typical legal analysis does not force one to 
think very hard about exactly which elements the 
analysis contains or omits. Conversely, an AA contains 
within itself explicit consideration of neglected phe-
nomena. When attorneys, an extremely sceptical and argu-
mentative group, are forced to focus on an argument's 
defects, they will naturally tend to reject the argument. 
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IV. Implications of the power and limitations of an AA 
for writing an article 
The analyst must first carefully pick a 
legal/institutional issue that will benefit strongly from 
an AA because he cannot depend on an AA to help analyze 
all legal/institutional issues. Next, since the 
axiomatic analysis will highlight his assumptions' 
shortcomings, he must carefully choose the individual 
postulates. 
The power and limits of an AA have deeper 
implications for the scope of an article using an AA and 
for the philosophy of making policy recommendations with 
an AA. 
Since often only narrow axiom sets get results, 
a paper's scope must often be drawn too narrowly for 
adequate policy prescription if it is restricted to these 
narrow axiom sets. A full treatment of a problem may 
require the analyst to treat facets of an issue that 
cannot be analyzed axiomatically. It is important to let 
one's sense of the overall problem determine the scope of 
a paper. For example, the sovereign immunity piece 
derived no positive results for any of the nonrnaximizing 
models. Nevertheless, immunity was prescribed on the 
basis of fairness and comparative utility. At that point 
13 
the article departed from the basic AA and engagBd in 
traditional linguistic argumentation. In this manner, 
an AA may support only part of a paper's reconunendations. 
B. Philosophy of using an AA to make policy 
reconunendations 
Every potent axiom set both neglects important 
phenomena and highlights that neglect. The AA's tendency 
to highlight its own limits or shortcomings can tempt one 
to totally reject making policy reconunendations based on 
an AA. Discouraged by the obvious shortcomings of the 
axioms, the analyst may choose instead analytical styles 
which do not emphasize their own excluded phenomena. 
Analysts can prescribe policies derived from nonaxiomatic 
--~---~~~a-na-l-y-t-iG-a-1-S-t-Y-l-es~mo-i;.e-ea.s-i-l-y~beca-u-s-e...,.,,,.the-.,weaJc.n-es.s.es~._-~--~~~ 
the formulation on which they are based are not so glar-
ingly exposed. 
Every style of analysis has its own defects. 
For example, a traditional, linguistic, fairness-oriented 
analysis of tort law has two main drawbacks. First, such 
an analysis generally neglects the economic effects of 
choosing alternative tort rules. Since slick verbal 
arguments relating to the morally-anchored norm of the 
reasonable man may appeal to the reader far less once 
it is demonstrated that the "fair" rule is inefficient, 
a pure fairness-oriented analysis is generally incomplete. 
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Second, to the extent that such an analysis does_ consider 
economic effects, they are loosely ·derived -- perhaps 
merely assumed -- with virtually no attention paid to 
basic postulates. The economic conclusions may thus be 
based on untenable postulates which are embedded in an 
implicit, unworkable model. If the analyst dwells upon 
the basic truth that defects permeate all analytical 
styles, he will be led to consider, for any given 
problem, the defects associated with analyzing the 
problem with any particular style. These drawbacks should 
be compared and evaluated within the problem's context, 
and the analyst should accordingly choose the most 
appropriate analytical technique. In this vein, rather 
than just reject every AA because of revealed defects, 
the analyst should consider making axiomatic policy 
recommendations within the following framework. 
Policy recommendations based on axiomatic work 
follow from a short (often implicit) argument containing 
two propositions: 
1. The formal AA and its recommendation. 
2. The real world looks enough like the axiom set 
in the AA to warrant using the recommendation, even 
though the recommendation cannot be strictly supported. 
To evaluate proposition 2, look at the 
neglected phenomena and ask if there is anything left out 
15 
which obviously and unacceptably weakens the model. 
Then ask if the model contains enough of the elements 
one would expect in complete legal and economic analyses. 
This task requires evaluating the axioms, results, and 
neglected phenomena against the analyst's sense of legal 
and economic aesthetics. Ultimately, it is the analyst's 
sense of economic and legal aesthetics which will guide 
him in using any analytical style. 
16 
CHl\PTER ONE 
An Economic Analysis of Sovereign 
Immunity in Tort 
Tort law is a system of reallocating the costs of accidents. 1 When one of the 
parties in an accident is the government, sovereign immunity in tort may 
preclude any reallocation. 2 Hence, the government and private citizens face 
different structures of incentive to be careful (or to take risks). This Note will 
assess the desirability of sovereign immunity through an examination of the 
economic consequences of presenting the government and private citizen 
with alternative incentive structures. 3 
Like the analysis of private accidents, prediction of the overall effect of a 
liability rule for public sector/private sector accidents is very sensitive to 
assumptions about the parties' motivations. 4 Although some commentators 
--~---~~-~-~--~ehalle-nge-the-.-cost~minimizer-rnodel .. wllich...posits_thaLp.ai:.ti~s_aJ1em11,.,...,t.,,_to~------= 
Tl'l.inl m 1ze o veial Ccosis.::::Of 1 neoena-vkif or pfiva te-ind iv ia ua1 s irrda.ma.ging 
I. G. CALABRESI. THE COSTS of ACCIDENTS (1970); Brown. Toward an Economic Theory 
of Liability, 2 J .. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1973); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 
(1973). 
2. Ste w. PROSSER, HANDBOOK of the.LAW of TORTS 970 (4th ed. 1971); Borchard. 
Govtmment Liability in Tor1 (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 129, 229 (1924); Borchard, Government 
Liability in Tor1 (pts. 4-6), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926); Borchard, Government Liability in 
Ton (pts. 7-8), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 577, 734 (1928); Davis, Ton Liability of Govtmmtntal Units, 
40 MINN. L. Rev. 751 (1956); Symposium-Governmental Ton Liability, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 179 (1942). 
3. Fleming James, Jr., attempted an analysis of this subject, but his treatment was 
incomplete. Set James, Ton Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI L. 
Rev. 610 (1955). 
4. Although the subject of this paper is governmental immunity in tort, the style of 
analysis may easily be applied to the charitable inmunities. For a description of charitable 
immunity doctrines, see W. PRosseR, supra note 2. at 992-96. For general background on the 
issue of governmental immuniry in tort, see James, supra note 3; sources cited note 2. 
Sinct many footnoted propositions are suppor1ed by formal, mathtmatical proofs. rtaders 
less inttrtsttd in rigorous mathematics may find it helpful to ignort footnotes on initial rtading. 
Wherever possible, sources of general application art footnoted. 
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situations,5 the model has been widely accepted, however, as a close 
approximation of private economic behavior. Moreover, since no widely 
accepted model for governmental behavior in the accident context exists, one 
must construct or borrow a variety of plausible models before proceeding with 
analysis. This Note will use ten such models. Within each model, govern-
mental tort immunity will be evaluated according to an explicit set of goals by 
adopting the following variation of economic tort scholar's approach to 
private party accidents: 6 
( 1) Assume that all private parties involved are cost minimizers, and 
that the government entity behaves in accord with one of nine specific 
models; 
(2) Assume that there is some unbargained-for costly interaction be-
tween the parti·es; 
(3) Insert either immunity or suability into the situation and determine 
the expected behavior of each party; 
( 4) Pick an immunity rule on the basis of some predetermined criteria 
(such as minimization of the sum of accident costs). 
To aid the exposition, the following example will be used throughout 
------------~-""'"'t'"'"'h""iso,...-=.N'"""o'""'"te~. ''-,..."-A;.-.. government-ovvned railroad travels next to. wheat farms. 7 Its 
railroad engines periodically emicsparkswhich serwh·e·arfieldsafire;the 
amount of burned crops is a function of the technology adopted by the railroad 
(e.g., spark arresters. type of engine used, type of track and wheels used)8 
and of the adjustment of wheat-planting practices to the technology used by 
the railroad (e.g., planting further from the tracks). 
I. OVERVIEW OF GOVERNMENT TORT IMMUNITY 
A rule on governmental tort immunity can be synthesized from basic 
assumptions and principles; no intricate knowledge of modern governmental 
tort immunity law is required. Nevertheless, since some acquaintance with 
existing rules is necessary to appreciate the scope of the inquiry, the broad 
outlines of the immunity doctrine are sketched below. 
Governmental entities are often immune from liability for :my damages 
S. Set F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW of TORTS 740-41 (1956); Epstein, A Theory of 
Strict Uability, 2 J. LEGAL Sruo. IS I, 152 (1973); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Ton Theory. 
BS HARV. L. REV. S37 (1972). 
6. Ste, e.g .. G. CALABRESI, supra note I. 
7. Prosser notes that enterprises similar to a government-owned railroad would probably 
be suable in tort. Nevertheless, the example is useful as an analytical tool. W. PROSSER, supra 
note 2, al 979-82. 
8. Assume tha1 engine efficiency is inversely related to crop protection. 
l8 
that they cause under circumstances which would make a private party liable. 9 
The doctrine's basic premise is that a government must consent before it can 
be sued. 10 The government's failure to consent makes it completely immune 
to tort suit, thereby mooting any inquiry into the merits of the claim. 
The immunities of the United States government are defined in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 11 where the federal government is made generally 
liable 
for money damages ... for injury or Joss of property, or personal 
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission 
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope 
of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United 
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant .... 12 
There are three principal exceptions to this general rule of suability. First, the 
government is absolutely immune from suit for torts occurring while it is 
engaged in a set of specific tasks. including collecting taxes and fighting 
wars. 13 Second, the government is granted immunity from a set of causes of 
action, including "any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprison-
ment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." 14 Third, the 
United States may escape liability if it can show that the acts or omissions 
complained of were "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
------~----~-.~ .."=a-=g.,,.,en=-cc=-=y.,..· . -=o~r_,a=n,.-.. =em=ployee. of]h-e--<lovern:rn:e11r;-:-whether-:or-:riot-:the-:discretion·--------~ 
involved be abused. " 15 
State and local government tort immunities are found in state constitu-
tions, 16 statutes, 17 and court rulings. 18 In most states tort immunity attaches to 
9. See W. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 970. 
10. Id. at 971. 
JI. Federal Tori Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. H 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401-240:. 
2411-2414, 2671-2680 ( 1970), as amended /Jy Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. 93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50. 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(hl (Supp. IV 1974). 
12. Id. § 1346(b). In other words, the federal government has. in general, consenled to be 
sued. 
13. Id. § 2680. 
14. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (West Supp. 1976); stt note 61 infra. 
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). 
16. E.g., ALA. CONST. art I,§ 14. 
17. E.g., CAL. Gov'T CoDE §§ 810 et seq. (West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. G 4-141 et 
seq. (West 1969); lowA CODE ANN. G 25A. l-22 (West Supp. 1976). 
18. E.g., Jackson v. City of Florence, 294 Ala. 592, 320 So. 2d 68 (1975) (abolishing 
municipal tort immunity in Alabama); Lorence v. Hospital Bd., 294 Ala. 614, 320 So. 2d 631 
( 1975) (denying immunity to county entities); Shellhorn&. Hill v. Delaware, SS Del. 298. 187 A.2d 
71 (1962) (upholding state tort immunity). 
19 
all judicial or legislative actions. 19 The immunity is generally extended to 
"the exercise of an administrative function involving a basic policy deci-
sion.' ' 20 Very few generalizations can be made about state tort immunities 
since the law varies widely. 
II. ASSUMPTIONS 
Because a very large number of assumptions are necessary in this analysis of 
governmental immunity in tort, it is important to identify and scrutinize them 
openly. Although every positive economic assumption used in this analysis is 
in some sense "false" (i.e., there exist counterexamples in daily life), the 
assumptions collectively capture enough essential f ea tu res of the problem to 
give them appeal. To the extent that the assumptions do not, however, the 
analysis is inadequate. 
Several important "ethical" 21 assumptions are used in this analysis. 22 
First, given several states of society it is assumed that some states of society 
are better than others. 23 This choice from among alternative states of society is 
19. For a set of references on state and local tort immunity, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS, Special Note to the Institute Regarding H 8959 & 895C, at 12-22 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 
1973). 
20. Id. § 895B(3)(a). 
21. These assumptions represent widely accepted notions of good and bad, i.e., what 
ou~hr to be the goals of a rule on governmental immunity in tort. Taken as a whole, they probably 
place this Note in the "economic efficiency" group. Set note 22 infra. 
---~--------------~i-i!~T-hcre-are-three-main-ethical-schools.in-the.tor:t..law_loday_,_Qi;:1,e_s_c~h"'oo""--'--I t,_,,e,,,a;;.;ch"'e'-"s'-'t.:.;.h:::at;...:_ tc:;:o.:.:rt:__ _______ ~ 
. rule·s-should be frameO wi!tireffrcnce to ideas of naturaljustice:Stt G.CAt;;ABRESJ,-supra note 1. 
at 24-26 (the first goal of accident law is justice, i.e., justice acts as a constraint on the 
acceptability of a sy5tem of tort law); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151. 
152 (1973) (a theory of justice based upon causal paradigms in the English language); Fletcher, 
Fairness and Utility in Tor1 Theory. 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 ( 1972) (a just system of tort law is one 
which gives recompense for damage incurred from nonreciprocal risk-producing activity). 
A second school seeks to compensate accident victims and spread the burdens of compensa-
tion. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, PROTECTION for theTRAFFJCVJCTtM I IS (1967)("First, we 
want to be sure that each deserving victim is compensated .... Second. we want to distribute 
fairly the burdens of compensating victims."); James, supra note 3, at 614, 620. 639. 
A third school asserts that ton law should promote economic efficiency. Su G. CALABRESI, 
supra note 1, at 26-31 (arguing that tort law should minimize the sum of accident costsl: 
Ellickson. Alttrnatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 
40 u. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973). 
23. This Note assumes that there exists a social welfare function (denoted "W"). W gives 
an ordering over various possible states of society. If one state of society is "better" than another 
state of society, then W attaches a higher social preference (represented by a higher numerical 
ranking) to the first state than to the second. W can be thought of as a type of moral ordering. and 
may be a function of all that is imaginable. For example, W may be affected by the weather. 
foreign policy, and the number of blades of grass in Alumni Park. The level of spark emission by 
the governmental railroad is assumed to be in the argument of W. 
Wis assumed everywhere twice differentiable. Differentiability of W implies that there is no 
amount of spark emission for which the state of the world suddenly skips from one level to 
another with no possibility of constructing a state of the world which is between the two levels 
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based on the preferences (or happiness levels) of the citizens. 24 If the citizens 
unanimously pref er one state of society over a second, then the former state is 
better than the latter. 25 Finally, if nothing can be rigorously said about the 
unanimous happiness of the citizens, 26 alternatives are judged on the bases of 
fairness and comparative utility. 27 
just by varying the level of spark emission a slight bit This continuity assumption adds a certain 
"smoothne~s·· to the moral order; in other words, there are no kinks or sharp points. Since one 
may approximate a kinked function as closely as desired by a smooth function, however, this is 
not a critical feature of the argument. For a more rigorous explanation, see Assumptions I and 2 
and sources cited note 4-0 infra. 
24. Formally, this Note assumes that society's preference can be represented by: 
W(U 1(c 11 (a), c21 (a)).. , Un(C 1n(a), c 2n(a))) 
where U, is the utilit} function of the ith individual, c 11 is the amount of the first commodity 
consumed by the ith individual, c 2, is the amount of the second commodity consumed by the ith 
individual. a is the level of spark emission by the governmental railroad. and n is the number of 
individuals in society. 
A utility function is a ranking, in ordinal terms. of an individual's preferences. For example. 
if an individual prefers an ice cream cone to a sandwich, then his utility function will evaluate an 
ice cream cone at a higher value than that of a sandwich. It makes no difference what the numbers 
are. as long as the number associated with the ice cream cone has a higher value. It is not 
necessary to assume that these functions actualiy exist, but only that an individual's preferences 
may be represented in this manner. Ste Definitions 7, 8 note 47 infra. 
25. Technical!;, this Note assumes that the social preference, W, is positively responsive. 
This means that the value of W increases if one of W's arguments increases while the rest of its 
arguments are held constant. Conversely, w·s value decreases if one of its arguments decreases 
while the rest of its arguments are held constant. Su Assumption 12, note 42 infra. 
---------------~~-~Eo.sitL-<e...r,e.sponsh.:e.ne.ss_is_an.u.natt[a_c_t,iY.e_<t!iS_Um(1tion for one who feels that there are some 
···· -individuals who should be tortured: Alternatively, one may feel that there are some people who 
just do not count. i.e., a change in the way an individual feels should not affect what "society" 
prefers. This last position is a plausible conceptualization of the morals behind slavery. 
26. It is possible. for example, that the state of societ} engendered by immunity is 
preferred over the state of society in which the government is suable by all but one citizen. In that 
case, one would prefer to knov. how strongly the various citizens feel about the respective states 
of society before choosing an immunity rule. If the unhappy citizen does not care very much, it 
might be better for society if he would "give in." Without such data, however, it is impossible to 
draw such a conclusion It is likely that any attempt to gather this information would be very 
expensive and. due to changes in citizen preferences, quickly outdated. Thus. rather than 
assuming that a particular citizen ought to "give in" under certain circumstances, this Note will 
resort to other criteria in choosing an immunity rule. Su text accompanying notes 27-30 infra. 
27. The following additional ethical assumptions will be used in this Note: 
(a) W has a global maximum with respect to spark emissions by the government railroad. 
This means that it is better to have a few sparks than no sparks, but that it is also better to have 
only a few sparks than a continuous torrent of sparks. There is some number of sparks which is 
optimal. Set Assumption 4, note 40 infra. 
(b) Given two alternative legal rules on governmental immunity and two associated states of 
the world, the legislature should adopt the legal rule which generates the state of societ} to whic1' 
W assigns the higher value. This is also the method for choosing between immunity and no 
immunity within each model of governmental behavior. This criterion will be denoted "W-max." 
Ste Assumption 3, note 4-0 infra. 
(c) This Note assumes a highly technical restriction on the shape of W. Stt Assumption 2 
note 4-0 infra. 
21. 
The fairness and comparative utility criteria strongly suggest thal the 
government should be suable. Two fairness considerations mandate such a 
result. First, wherever there are no alternative avenues of compensation, and 
where there are no rigorously provable economic benefits from immunity, 
suability prevents capricious redistribution of wealth. Insofar as random 
wealth redistributions are unfair, suability will help minimize the unfair-
ness. 28 Second, there is a normal expectation that injurers meet their victims 
in a court of law. Wherever a citizen is prevented from suing the government, 
the citizen is bound to be frustrated and indignant: the _government is 
supposed to aid citizen interests. Absent a compelling economic justification, 
it is fairer to spare the citizen this added trauma, since he reasonably expects 
that the courts will provide an avenue of compensation should he be tortiously 
harmed. 29 
Wherever economic production will not vary much between suability 
and immunity, a comparative utility argument further supports suability. 
Assuming it h possible to measure intensities in preferences and to compare 
individuals' preferences, the notion of comparative utility suggests that the 
aggregate utility of a group of individuals may be increased by taking a small 
amount of goods and services from all individuals to compensate an injured 
individual. 30 Therefore, whenever it is impossible to select an immunity rule 
on the basis of rigorous economic analysis, it will be assumed that the 
government should be suable in tort. 
-------~~~----~. ~ ..~~ §f!..-f!r:cil:::t~c:bT1ic:aJ::-and-::crn:<l:lytjc:at'il:sscrmptt<Yn-s .. will .. also ... oe· .. usea:::i1flni s. 
Note. First, it is assumed that the government and its citizens will not or 
cannot resolve their dispute by bargaining. 31 Second, it is assumed that the 
efficiency of a liability rule can be determined from a simplified model in 
which only two goods exisr 32 and in which each citizen prefers to have more of 
28. Su, e.g .. Michelman, Property. Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" La...-. 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1182-83 (1967) (wealth 
redistributions, otherwise arbitrary, may be justified if accompanying an efficient program); id. 
at 1212 (collective allocational decisionmaking, attended by capricious redistributions. may be 
unacceptable for reasons stemming from Hume's theory of property). 
29. Borchard, Go1•emmtnt Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. t (1924). 
30. For a rigorous analysis of interpersonal awegation and comparability, see A. SEN, 
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 89-104 (1970). 
31. Set Assumption IS, note 47 infra. This assumption is generally valid in the context of 
interactions with governmental entities because it may be illegal for a government to accept 
money in return for alteration of conduct. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970); set Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960) (analyzing the analosous problem in the private sector when 
there is bargainins between the parties). 
32. This is implicit in the form of W assumed in note 40 infra, and has been used in 
legal-economic literature before. Set Coase. The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &. ECON. I 
(1960). 
each good than less of each good. 33 This model restricts the number of 
variables that require consideration and insures that "more is better ... 34 
Third, for the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that all relevant models of 
governmental behavior are presented. 35 This assumption is needed only in the 
synthesis of a comprehensive governmental immunity rule: the analytical 
results within each model remain valid without this assumption. Finally, the 
governmental immunity rule is created under a presumption that the legal 
system works costlessly, focusing the inquiry on the importance of govern-
mental accident costs-as opposed to the cost of running the legal system. 36 
33. This assumption is termed nonsatiation of consumers. Su Assumption 10, note 47, 
infra. 
34. Although there may be some goods for which a saturation point is quickly reached. 
these goods are probably the exception rather than the rule over the range of production and 
consumption in modern society. 
35. This assumption is only needed for a rigorous derivation of the necessary conditions for 
sovereign immunity. Since all of the obvious or currently accepted models of governmental 
behavior are included in this analysis. future advances in sociology or political science must 
provide any additional relevant paradigms. 
36. The following additional assumptions of a more technical nature are used in this Note, 
but are not listed in the text. 
(a) Within a given model of governmental behavior, the only options are to grant or deny 
governmental immunity; there is no third choice. This assumption is not very confining because 
the court will be permitted to characterize the government's behavior with respect to each 
accident. A given governmental entity could be granted immunity from suit for damage in one 
situation while the same entity could be liable in other situations. Su note 79 infra. 
---~----~~--~----~l<¥bl4-. ..-.1.T,,!Jh!.!Oeure;,,Ji~s,,!'o'll!nl)' one governmental entity-the railroad-and it has control over the level of 
spark emissions:This assumption may be relaxed in certain places. Su Assumption 9, note <11·----------~ 
infra. 
(c) There is a competitive market in consumer goods. The assumption of competitive 
markets may miss the essence of such things as cartels, labor unions, efficiencies of scale. or 
barriers to entry. Grafting these phenomena onto the model, however, is extremely difficult. 
Currently. this type of "grafting" represents frontier work in the social sciences and economics. 
E.g., Hendricks, The Effect of Regulation on Collective Bargaining in Electric Utilities, 6 BELL J. 
ECON. 451 (1975); Spence. Monopoly, Quality and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON. 417 (1975); see 
Assumption 12. note 47 infra. 
(d) There is a fixed supply of capital and labor. This assumption is more appealing in a 
shortrun, static approach than in a longrun, dynamic approach. Since people can enter the labor 
market at any time, and capital can be created, this assumption fails to take into account ability to 
change long term behavior patterns. Su Assumption I I, note 47 infra. 
(e) There exist competitive markets in labor and capital, which are the only two inputs w 
production. The assumption that inputs can be grouped as labor and capital is not an unusual one. 
The assumption that the market in each input is competitive, however, may miss the essence of 
the sociological and political phenomena mentioned in (c) above. Su Assumption 12, note 47 
infra. 
(f) There is full utilization of all capital and labor in society. In other words, there are no 
productive resources which are unused. This is partly unappealing because the unemployment 
rate in our society is probably higher than the frictional rate of unemployment. In addition, there 
may be excess productive capacity in society (because of unused hammers or drills, for example). 
Stt Assumption I I, note 47 infra. 
(g) All private citizens are profit maximizers. The assumption that there exist only profit 
maximizers is obviously limited, because people may act out of motivations that appear to be 
altruistic, or satisficing. Stt Assumption 14, note 47 infra. 
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Ill. FORMULATION OF AN IMMUNITY RULE 
Employing nine models of governmental activity, this section will undertake 
an economic analysis of public sector/private sector accidents. 37 The behavior 
of cost-minimizing private parties and a governmenl entity acting in accord-
ance ·with each of the models examined will be determined under both 
immunity and suability rules. Thus, either immunity or suability will be 
chosen on the basis of either economic efficiency or fairness and comparative 
utility. 
There is no agreement on a single. clearly accepted model of govern-
mental behavior. An examination of the literature reveals models of both 
maximizing ("rational-actor")38 and nonmaximizing~9 varieties. The first six 
models examined in this section can be classified as maximizing models. 
These models assume that the governmental entity has a goal and is trying to 
do as well as it can to promote that goal (i.e., maximize). 40 The last three 
(hl The rule of liability is either strict. strict with contributory negligence. negligence with 
contributor} negligence. negligence. or strict liabilit}· with dual contributory negligence. Thi~ 
assumption is made because the'>e liability rules repre~ent a set which has been analyzed in the 
context of accidents between private parties. Su Brown, supra note I: Assumption 16, note 47 
infra. 
(i) The production function for private goods is separable Separability is a technical term 
which means that the level of cost effective preventive measures that can be taken by the private 
wheat farmer is invariant ~ith respect to changes in the government's behavior. The way in which 
this Note models damage awards in tort law requires this assumption. Su Definition IS. note 47 
supra . 
. 37 .. H FoLanalogous analyt1caLstyle appllca Jo the dcase or-private s1:ctor accidents, see_ 
Brown. supro note I 
38. E g .. G. ALI.ISO!', ESSENCE OF DECISION 10-13 (1971). 
39. E.g., W. N1Sl\,A.l'FN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 48 ( 1971 l 
(the demand-constrained bureau). 
40. This Note contains a set cir assumptions and definitions common to the proof of 
theorems relating to the Welfare-Ma~imizer, Product-Satisf1cmg-Budget-Consumer. F1xed-
Job/Cost-Minimizer. and Profit-Maximizer models. The assumptions and definitions which are 
unique to each theorem will be presented immediately prior to its statement. 
Common Assumptions and Definitions 
Assumption I There exists a social welfare function, W(a1,. . ,a0 ), W:R"-R. which maps an 
n-tuple of real numbers a into a real number. Each a1 represents a governmental variable. !For a 
discussion of the implications of the use of a social welfare function and restrictions upon its 
form. see Berg'>on. A Reformulation of Ctrtain Asptcts of Wt/fart Economics, Q.J. Ecoi-;. 
310-34 ( 1938). A general discussion of the concepts underlying social welfare functions may be 
found in P. SAMUELSON. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 219-28 (Atheneum ed. 19741] 
Assumption 2 W is twice differentiable in every variable. 
Assumption 3 Given two alternative rules on governmental immunity, two associated states of 
the world, and that W assigns a value to each , the legal rule that W assigns the higher value 
is preferred 
Assumption 4 W ha\ a global maximum in governmental variables. This is a "bliss point" 
assumption. It follows from characterizing the a
1 
as technologies which have external effects 
(i.e .. fire~). Without these e~ternal effects the assumption of a global maximum would be far less 
appealing 
Definition I If C i' a suhset of R". l:C ..... R. and a t R. then Li{al [ x t CI f(x) s a J. 
lnlinition 2 Given ) E c. y is a stationary point of r if ~f()) = 0. 
lnfinition 3 G1 = [ a ER I L1 (a) .,, d> ]. 
lnflnilion 4 The poir.t tc> sci mapping. L1(a). is strictly lower semicontinuous (slsc) at point at G1 
if and only if v. he never x E L1(a) and !here exists a sequence (a'] E G1 such that a•- a, there exists a 
natural number K. a sequence [~']. and a real number ~xl > 0 such that 
x' f Lr[a' - l":xlllx' - xi!]. i=K. K + I, K + 2 .. ' .. 
and ~· ..... x. 
Now. assume L. (a) is strictly lower semicontinuous at ii whenever i is a stationary point and 
- W(x) = a. 
The following theorem has been proved: 
THEOREM I Let f be a real function on Ca subut ofR" and let x € C. f(x) =a. Suppose f is 
diff erentiahle at x and Lr(a) is stnctly loi. er semicontinuous at a. If xis a stationary point off, then 
it is also a global minimum nf f on C. I. Zang & M A vriel, On f-unct1ons Whose Stationary Points 
Are Global M mi ma 5 (Center for Operations Research & Econometrics. Core Discussion Paper 
No. 7502, Jan. 1975) 
This theorem guarantees th~, _ 
-{a, !x) = 0 for each i. I s i s n. 
implies that i: is a global minimum of - W which further implies that xis a global maximum of W 
Thi'> means that the following is true. 
Corollary. If the rate of change of !'.Ocial v.elfare. W, with respect to an incremental change in 
e1·er)' governmental variable. a,, one at a lime. is um at some g1•en set of governmental activi1y 
levels. Iha! set of governmental activity level\ is a maximum of social welfare 
Assumption 5 There are n governmen1al hureau.,, and each bureau controls. directly or indirect· 
ly. only one governmental activity This assumption ensures that * = 0 for each I s i, j s n. i '1' j. 
J 
[This a''>umption may be relaxed so long as the latter condition holds. II a, and al' i'r' j, are under 
the control of a single bureau, then it is more likely that 
~--~~----~~~~~--~~~-·-·-··~···---·-··---···-·-··-··-··~-.. -.---.. -.. -... -.. --~~· ~~:-t~~~--... -.. ~.--------------~----~------------------~ 
This i' the analog of 1he assump11on of competing economic entities in economic theory. SetJ. 
HENDERSOI- & R Qt'ANDT. MICROECONOMIC THEORY 105 (~d ed. 1971).J 
Assumption 6 Each go•ernmental bureau is under the control of a person whose preferences can 
be represented by a !utilily) function 
Delinition 5 A "game .. 1~ comprised of persons !players). strategies (what persons do). and 
outcomes llhe situations which result from the juxtaposition of all the player's strategies) For 
example. a game of chess is a "game'' according to this definition There are two persons 
involved in the chess game. The strategy which each person selects is the sequence of moves that 
he chooses for his ches'> pieces. Three outcomes of the game are possible: the first person wins 
and the second lo\es, the firs! person loses while the second wim, or the two players draw. The 
outcome of the game is totally determined once the precise strategy of each player is known 
Luce and Raifla provide a more precise formulation of a "game": 
There are n players each of whom is required to make one choice from a well-
defined set of possible choices. and these choices are made without any knov. J. 
edge as 10 the choices of the other players. The domain of pmsible choices for a pla> er 
may include as elements such things as "playing an ace of spades .. or "producing tanks 
instead of auiomobiles." or more important, a strategy covering the actions to be taken 
in all po~sible eventualities .... Given the choices of each of the players, there is a 
certain resulting outcome which is appraised by each of the players according to his 
own peculiar tastes and preferences. The problem for each player is: what choice 
should he make in order that his partial influence over the outcome benefits him most~ 
R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMF.S AND DECISIONS 5-6 (1957). 
In the following proofs, a series of games will be constructed. The players will be either 
bureaucrats or private parties. The strategies will involve amounts and techniques of production. 
Outcomes will be total states of the economy (or alternatively. states of. society). The players 
have preferences over sets of different possible outcomes in the manner described within each 
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models do not assume maximizing behavior on the part of the governmental 
entity. No important motivational thread, except for lack of goal orientation, 
runs between them. 
A. THE SIMPLE WELFARE-MAXIMIZING MODEL 
This first paradigm of government behavior assumes that the governmental 
entity wants only to do the best that can be done for the citizens. 41 Neither 
proof. By changing the rule on governmental immunity, the structure of the game under 
consideration will be changed. A given set of strategics may result in different outcomes given 
different rules on governmental immunity in tort. 
In order to make predictions concerning the outcome of a fully defined game. a solution 
concept must be used. This solution concept, termed a Nash equilibrium, is that knowledge of the 
other players' strategies should not cause a player to change his own. More formally. in the 
context of a 2-person game, define a 1 to be the first player's ith strategy choice, while {31 is the 
second player's jth strategy choice, and O,; is the outcome associated with I choosing strategy i 
and 2 choosing strategy j. To Luce and Raiffa, 
(i)t seems plausible that, if a theory offers a., and f3io as suitable strategies, the mere 
knowldge of the theory should not cause either of the players to change his choice: just 
because the theory suggests /3io to player 2 should not be grounds for player I to choose 
a strategy different from a 10 ; similarly, the theoretical prescription of a 10 should not 
lead player 2 to select a strategy different from f3io· Put in terms of outcomes. if the 
theory singles out (a . /3iol• then: 
i. No outcome O,'° should be preferred by I to 010'°. 
ii. No outcome 0 101 should be preferred by 2 to 01010 • 
Any a, and f3 satisfying condition (i) and (ii) arc said to be in tqui/ibrium. and the a 
priori ~emand made on the theory is that the pairs of strategies it singles out shall be in 
equilibrium. 
Id. at 63. 
An example illustrates the applicability of game theory to the bureaucratic setting. Assume 
that there are only two bureaus. each a simple welfare maximizer. The first bureau has the job of 
distributing the main course of a dinner to its only citizen, Prof. Baker. The second bureau is in 
-------~~-~-----~charge-of-distributing·dc-s!icrt·to·Prof-:-Bakcr:-'Fhe-first-bureau-i:;an-give-~of~Bake-r-eithe-r-2-.-3,-4 . .-------~~~ 
<:>a>servfrissofthe main course Ttieseconifl:iurcaii caiigive Prof. Baker 2.3. 4 ;s;or6scoops 
of ice cream for dessert. Prof. Baker's preferences, which arc identical with social welfare (he is 
the only citizen). are listed in figure I below. 
FIGURE I. Bureau 2 
Scoops or Ice Cream 
2 3 4 5 6 
2 20 25 30 60 40 
Bureau I 3 30 40 45 85 50 
Servings of Main 4 70 80 95 100 95 
course 5 60 70 90 90 85 
6 88 60 80 85 70 
The listed numbers represent only an ordering or his preferences. Any other set of numbers 
that preserves the given ranking could be used. Note that. Prof. Baker prefers most to have 4 
servings of the main course with 5 scoops of ice cream for dessert. As long as Bureau I believes 
that Bureau 2 will serve 5 scoops then Bureau I will serve 4 servings. Conversely. as long as 
Bureau 2 believes that Bureau I will serve 4 servings or the main course, then Bureau 2 will serve 
5 scoops. Thus, 4 servings and 5 scoops is an equilibrium for this game. So too, 6 servings and 2 
scoops. 
41. Welfare maximizing models have been the dominant models of bureaucratic behavior 
in traditional sociology. Set M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 
124 (1947); R. Noll, Government Administrative Behavior and Technoloaical Innovation 10-16 
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immunity nor suability will affect its production activities, for the entity will 
do the best it can regardless whether it is suable in tort. For example. suppose 
that a person in charge of the government-owned railroad wants to satisfy. as 
much as possible, all of the citizens. Suppose further that he knows how much 
each of the citizens likes wheat (as opposed to train rides) and he wants only to 
pick the level of spark emission that makes the citizens as happy as possible. 
In such a situation, the person running the railroad will choose the same 
optimal level of spark emission under a suability rule as he would under 
immunity. Since immunity and suability are thus equally efficient, Simple 
Welfare Maximizers42-the railroad, for example-should be suable on the 
(Cal. Inst. Tech. Soc. Sci. Working Paper No. 62, Oct. 1974) But su W. NISKANEN, JR .. supra 
note 39, at 36 n.2, 39 (declaring that this model should be regarded as "impossible"). 
Welfare-Maximizing models of governmental behavior may be auacked as simplistic and 
naive. First, bureaucrats may not be very concerned with social welfare. They may be more 
concerned about such factors as budget~. politics, graft, friendship, and tenure. Second, even if a 
bureaucrat is intere~ted in welfare, it would be virtually impossible for the bureaucrat to assemble 
needed data: information on consumer preferences is so difficult to obtain and so quickly 
obsolete that the bureaucrat would be effectively precluded from pursuing his goals. Nonethe-
less, since some governmental entities may approximate this behavioral model, it must be 
considered in formulating an immunity rule. 
Welfare Maximizer models actually include two types of governmental entities. Ste note 78 
infra. First, there are bureaus which are run by social welfare maximizing individuals who are 
afraid of tort judgments. These entities may be designated Welfare-Tort Balancers. This type of 
bureau is considered at notes 73-75 and accompanying text. infra. 
There may be bureaus, on the other hand, which are run by individuals who do not fear tort 
judgments. This type of bureau is considered at this juncture. 
42. For the general assumptions and definitions, su note 40 supra. 
---:---------~~-~----~--------SIMELE..-WELEt.IJE MAXIMIZER MODEL 
· Specific Assumptions and Definitions 
Definition 6 A bureaucrat is a Simple Welfare Maximizer if his utility function is written U = 
U(W) 
For purposes of this proof every bureaucrat will be assumed to be a Simple Welfare 
Maximizer. 
Assumption 7 Each bureaucrat wants, other things held constant, to make society better off. Jn 
other words, where U, is the utility function of the ith bureaucrat, 
au · W > 0 for every i. 
THEOREM 2 A Simple Welfare Ma:rimiur performs optimally undu either suability or 
immunity. 
Proof. The bureaucrats are assumed to be in a game of simultaneous utility maximization. 
At an equilibrium of this game,~= (a1, a2, ••• , an}, the rate of change of each bureaucrat's 
utility with respect to a change in the level of governmental activity which that bureau controls is 
zero. In other words, for every j. 
(l) 
au, aw aa, +. 
aw ao1 aa, 
auj aw aa, 
+------+. 
aw aa, oaj 
au, aw aan 
.+---=O. 
aw aa. aa, 
Since the levels of tort judgments do not enter into this equation, it holds under either immuruty or 
suability. 
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basis of fairness and comparative utility. 43 
B. FIVE RATIONAL ACTOR MODELS 
The next five models are all of the rational-actor family, but each assumes that 
the goal being maximized is something other than general social welfare. An 
analysis of each of the models indicates that immunity should be denied if a 
governmental entity is found to be acting in accordance with any of the 
models. 
l. Product-Maximizing Budget Consumer 
Assume that the entity is given a fixed budget. Further, assume that the 
government is run so as to (I) exhaust the budget allocation, and (2) produce 
as much as possible. 44 In the railroad example, the objectives would be to use 
all of the railroad's budget while producing as many daily train trips as 
possible. 
If the entity is immune from tort liability, the bureau will respond only to 
internal costs, and not to the social costs of its actions. In attempting to 
maximize production, the bureau will look for the cheapest methods of 
production. If the legal system does not force the bureau to consider the social 
costs of its actions, the bureau will act as if these costs did not exist. Thus, in 
Since assumption~. note 40 supra, indicates that each bureau controls (directly or indirectly) 
only one activity, i.e., 
aa, 0 f . . - = or every 1 .. J, 
~~~====~-=:::=:=-:=-======--==~~~-:--~~:----~~-;---:--~---.-~a~a1~ 
·· · and since the rate of change of.any .act1v1tyw1tJi re~pecrro-irselHs-always-oneT"i,t~·..-.-~~~~-~~~~~~~ 
~ = I for every j: aal 
line ( t) mean; that for each bureaucrat the product of the marginal utility of social we If are time~ 
the rate of change of social welfare with respect to a change in that bureau's activity level is zero 
at equilibrium In other words, ' 
(2) au aw 
-' - ('~:)=0. 
aw aa
1 
By assumption 8, supra. each bureaucrat wants, other things being equal. to make society 
better off. Thus. aU 
av.: ) o. 
But this mean; that at equilibrium the rate of change of social welfare with respect to a change in 
an)· activity level is zero. Thus, 
~ (X) = 0 for all j. 
aa1 
This is the condition needed to satisfy assumption S, supra note 40, so the equilibrium, X, is a 
global ma,.,imum of W. 
43. Stt text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. 
44. The entity may want to make certain that the budget is consumed so that it will not be 
reduced in the next fiscal period. Product maximization may occur because the entity is following 
orders, because the person in charge believes that he will get good publicity. as a means to achieve 
budget maximization, or for other reasons. This model is actually Niskanen's "budget con· 
strained" bureau. W. NISKANEN, supra note 39, at 46-47, 57. 
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his desire to maximize the number of train trips, the railroad manager will 
allow the engines to emit too many sparks. By denying immunity to the 
government, society can, through the judgment process, force the railroad to 
consider the social value of burned crops. 43 Once the railroad adjusts its 
behavior to reflect the cost of tort judgments, society will be better off because 
the citizens will be able to consume greater quantities of goods and services 
(wheat and train rides). 46 Therefore, a Product-Maximizing Budget Con-
sumer should be suable in tort. 47 
45. In some jurisdictions, general revenue funds are used to pay tort judgments agains1 
governmental enlities. See, t.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2672. 2677, 2678(1970) 
(allowing agency compromise of claims up to 52,500, but requiring payment of larger claims from 
a general fund). Other jurisdictions require the offending entities to pay the judgment from their 
own budgets. E.g .. C..,L. Gov'r CODE§§ 970-.6 (West 1966). 
The analyses of the Product-Maximizing Budget Consumer, Fixed-Job Cost Minimizer, and 
Profit Maximizer depend upon the satisfaction of tort judgments against a government agency by 
that entity's budget. Where the judgments are satisfied from general revenue funds. the analysis 
of the three models can no longer rest on economic efficiency grounds. Instead, suability would 
be recommended on the basis of fairness and comparative utility, leaving this Note's overall 
results unchanged. Su text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. 
It appears nonetheless, on the basis of economic efficiency, that public entities should pay 
tort judgments out of budget allocations. Payment of tort awards from general revenue funds 
precludes the possibili1y of economically adjusting externalities due to government activity. It is 
only by charging budgets that the Product-Maximizing Budget Consumer, Fixed-Job Cost 
Minimizer, and Profit Maximizer can be directly forced to consider the social costs of their 
actions. Of course. indirect pressures could be brought to bear upon an offending agency through 
the budgeting process where budget increases and other favors arc threatened to be withheld 
unless preventative measures are taken. This is especially so with smaller, local governments 
---~---~~--~~~-~~w•he~e,__an_y~elLecl in general is more acutely felt by individual agencies 
- - - - H46.-· Technically; it may be necessary to readjust the.railroad'.s budgeuoach1evc theseuwi"'c,....,.-~--~----~~ 
results. This readjustment is needed for the same reasons that redistributing wealth is needed in 
the Profit-Maximizer model and varying the job is required in the Fixed-Job-Cost-Minimizer 
model. 
47. For general definitions and assumptions, see note 40 supra, 
PRODUCT M ... XIMIZING BUDGET CONSUMER 
Specific Assumptions and Definitions 
Definition 7 U 1 is the utility furktion of the jth citizen. [This use is different from that in the 
Welfare Maximizer theorem.] 
Definition 8 c, 1 is the amount of the first good or service consumed by the ith individual. c,: is the 
amount of the second good or service consumed by the ith individual. <The distinction between 
goods and services is irrelevant in this context ) 
Definition 9 a is a measure of the level of some governmental activity {such as spark emission) 
which has injury-producing side-effects. 
Definition 10 
W = W(U 1(c 11(a),c 12(a)), ... , Um<Cm1(a),Crni(a))) 
Assumption 8 W is positively responsive: 
aw > 0 for all i everywhere. 
ilU, 
In other words. whenever an individual hccomcs happier, while all other individuals stay at least 
as happy, social welfare increases. (This condition is similar to but weaker than Arrow's 
condition P. Su K. ARROW' Soct ... L CHOICE AND INDIVIDU ... L v ALU ES 96 (1963) (a Pareto· 
efficiency criterion).) 
Assumption 9 There arc onl} two goods or services (including the one produced hy the 
government) and the technology used in governmental production interfere$ with production h) 
the private party. [The assumption of a two-good world has been used in the lcg;il-economic 
literature before. E.g .• Coasc, Tht Probltm of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960).) 
Definition 11 Kr is the amount of capital used in production of the government good or service 
Definition 12 Lr is the amount of labor used in production of the government good or service 
Definition 13 The government production function is of the form f = f<Kr. L1. a). f ha\ the 
following properties: 
(i) fK, > 0 everywhere 
{ii) ft... > 0 everywhere 
(iii) for any K , L there exists a such that 




= fr.,.-= fa, t!/C. 
aK1 aa 
Assumption JO Consumers are never satiated with respect to any good or service. In other words. 
~> 0 for i = I, 2, and for every j. 
ac1, 
[This assumption is often used in proofs of the existence of compemion equilibrium. See J. 
QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK, INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY AND WELFARE 
ECONOMICS 100-02 (19681.] 
Definilion IS The prh·ate production function is of the form q = q(Kq.Lq.a) where Kq and Lq are 
defined analogously to K1 and L,. The function q has the properties: 
(i) q
0 
is less than 0 everywhere. 
(ii) a:q aiq 
aKqaa = aLqaa·= O everywhere (separability). 
Assumption II The total supplies of capital and labor are both fixed and totally utilized. Thus 
---~----~-------~~Kr~Kq = K= CJ?.1JSJa11L~aJ:td~!.1..±.J..,q =L =constant._______ ___ ___ _ __ __ _ __ _ 
----- ·Assumption 12 Therearecompetitivemarketsincapital;labor;and the private good or service,=-: 
Definition 16 Pq is the price of the private good or service (wheat). (The private parties believe 
that Pq is constant.) 
Definition 17 r is the interest rate on capital. 
Definition 18 w is the wage rate of labor. 
Assumption 13 All parties arc assumed to believe that rand w arc constant. [For a description of 
the underlying assumptions of a competitive market, sec J. HENDERSON & R. QL1ANDT, Mtc. 
ROECONOMIC THEORY 104-05 (197t).J 
Assumption 14 The private producer is a profit maximizer. 
Assumption IS No bargaining is possible between the government and the private party. 
Assumption 16 The rule of liability is strict with a contributory negligence defense. The rule of 
liability may also be strict liability if f is separable. In other words. if 
..!!:.. (K1, Lt, 0) = !.!_ (Kt, Lt. a) for all K,. Lt. and a; aK1 aKt 
and if similar conditions hold for L,. If f is separable, the rule may also be strict liability with dual 
contributory negligence, negligence with contributory negligence, or negligence. This Note use< 
strict liability with contributory negligence because it aids the exposition. In addition. dcfinit1_•n 
of negligence for a governmental agency may be difficult, for the final good or service may not be 
distributed with a pricing system. For a profit maximizing entity, negligence presumably exists if 
there i~ some cost effective preventive measure which is not undertaken. In other words. if 
af ar , _ 
Pt aK, <Kt. L,. a) < r, or Pr aL, <Kt. '""!• a) < w, 
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the entity is negligent. The lack of Pq makes defining negligence difficult for the government. 
Perhaps the entity's failure to use the a which is socially maximal, i.t., satisfies equations (4) end 
(.5) would be a satisfactory way of identifying negligence. 
Derivation of production efficiency conditions: In deriving the production efficiency condi-
tions for society. the goal is to maximize the production off subject to the constraint that q = q
0 
= 
constant Set£ = f + A(q - q0 ) and differentiate. Still using the convention that 
a£ -- -£ •. ill.i .... 
the following results are obtained: 
£u = ft.. + Aqt.. aLq = ft.. - Aqi... = 0 
aL1 
£K, = f K1 - AQK., = 0 
£ 0 = fa - Aqa = 0 
fa = q - q0 =0. 
By combining these equations. the production efficiency conditions are obtained. First. the 
ratio of the marginal productivities of labor to capital must be the same in the public and private 
sectors. In other words. 
(3) ~=~ 
f K1 qi<. 
Second. the product of the marginal productivity of the productive technology to the government 
and the marginal productivity of la':lor (or capital\ to the private producer plus the product of the 
unproductivity of the government's technology to the private producer end the marginal 
productivity of labor (or capital) to the government equals zero. In other words, 
(4) f 0 qi., + q.,.f i., = 0 
(5) f 0 q;;,, + qJK, = 0. 
THEOREM J In a socitty consisting of ont Product Maximizing Budgtt Consumer and ont 
pri~·att individual. social .,..ti/are (W) will be maximiztd if and only if tht government is suable in 
ton. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Proof~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
lemm·a· !· All maxi.ma of"W lie or the production possibllities curve for societ}:. [For a 
derivation and description of the production possibilities curve, see J. Qu1RK, MATHEMATICAL 
NOTES TO INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS JQ} (1976).] 
Proof of Lemma /: Pick any point in the space of total societal output which is not on the 
production possibilities curve This point cannot be a global maximum of W (see figure 21. 
FIGURE 2 
q 
Call this point interior point A. There is a point on the production possibilities cur•e. B, at which 
more of everything is produced. Ir all of the increase in production U.t., f 1 - f0 andq 1 - q0 \are 
given to any individual, that individual will be strictly happier according to assumption l l, supra 
By assumption 9, note 42 supra, this means that W assigns higher value at B than at A. Therefore, 
A cannot be a maximum of the social welfare function.U 
Lt>mma 2: Society will not produce on the production possibilities curve if the government is 
immune. 
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Proof nf Lemma 2: Consider gran1ing immunity to the government. Given a hudge1. B. 1hr 
governmenl will maximize production subjecl to the budge! constrain!. Set up a Lagrang1.111 
npre~~ion represenling governmental immunily, E = f(K 1.L1,a) + J.. 1 (rK 1 + wL1 - Bl. anJ 
differen1iate 
(6) EK, = rK, + A1r = 0, 






(9) E~, = rK 1 ~ 1.1.L1 - B = 0. 
Equal ion (8) stales thal the marginal productivity of the government's technolog~ I\ zero ~1 
equilibrium Since ii is assumed thal the marginal produc1ivity of either labor or capital to the 
government i~ nonzero and that the marginal unproductivity of the government's technolog: to 
the priva1e producer is nonzero, it is impossible for either production efficiency condition <4J or 
(5) to hold.ti 
Lemma .1: Society will produce on the production possibilities curve if the governmen1 1~ 
suable in lort. 
Pmnf nf Lemma J: Consider making the government suable in tori. The measure of damage~ 
"'ill be taken as pqq! Kq• Lq. 0) - pqq\Kq• Lq. a) and will be assessed against the governmen1al 
entity. In these circumstances, the Lagrangian expression should be written 
E = f<K 1. L1• al+ g<rK1 + wL1 + Pqlq(Kq.L~,Ol - q!Kq.Lq.al) - Bl 
where g is a Lagrangian multiplier. Differentiating, the following results are obtained: 
(10) _ + ( aKq aK ] EK, - fK, g r + pq[qK.. !Kq,Lq,O)~ - qK.. !Kq.Lq,al~] 
= f "'1 + gr = 0 by cletin·1 \ion 15, 
= f1..i + gw = 0 by assump11on 15, 
. (f2) f.
0 
= f~ .::gp·qq~ -' O; 
(13\ E, = rK 1 + wL1 + Pq lq<Kq.Lq.Ol - q(Kq.Lq,ol) = B. 
Combining equaiions ( 10), ( 11 ). and ( 12), !he governmental equilibrium conditions are 
oblained. First. lhe ratio of the maginal productivity of capital to labor in governmental 




Second, the ratio of the marginal productivity of capital (or labor) to the government 10 the 
marginal productivity of the technology (i.e., spark emissions) to the governmenl equals the ra110 
of the in1erest rate (or wage rate) to the value of the marginal productivity of the technology 10 the 
privale party. 
f K1 - r 
(15)-;- =-- and 
la Pqqo 
(16) f1..i "' t.= Pqq• 
Consider the incenlives of the private producer who is operating under a contribu1or~ 
negligence rule and is !Tying to maximize profits. Total revenues (TRl will include damage a1.1. ard; 
if he is not guilty of conlributory negligence and will include only sales revenues if he is. V.'1thout 
contributory negligence. 
TR = pqq + pqq(K,L,0) - pqq!K,L,o), 
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2. Fixed-Job Cost Minimizer 
Assume that the government has a certain fixed job to do and is structured in 
such a way as to minimize the costs of doing the job. 48 For example. the 
railroad might have its schedule fixed at ten trips per day and might be 
instructed to minimize the cost of making those ten trips per day. 
A Fixed-Job Cost Minimizer will respond only to internal costs, and not 
to the social costs of its actions; if immune, the railroad will choose the level 
of spark emissions that makes running the railroad as inexpensive as possible, 
and with contributory negligence, 
TR = pqq. 
The producer will presumably be found contributorily negligent if and only if the value of the 
marginal productivity of capital or labor (in accident prevention activities) is greater than the cost 
of capital or labor. In other words, 
!17) PqqK(a) > r. 
or 
(l~l pqqJal > ~. 
Sublemma. The private producer will always engage capital and labor to the point where the 
values of their marginal productivities are equal, respectively, to the interest and v.age rates 
!pqqK(o) = rand pqqLCal = w.) 
Proof of ~ublemma: [Case 1) Assume that the private producer has decided to be contributor-
ily negligent-he does not count on being compensated. Then he will maximize a profit function 
which is the difference between the revenues from his sales and his costs due to hiring input~. 
(Profit = rr = pqq( o) - rK - wL.) To maximize his profit he must use inputs to the point that the 
value of their marginal productivity is equal to their cost. !pqqK(a) = rand pqqL(a) = w.) 
[Ca~e ~)If the producer decides to be nonnegligent, then he will maximize the same prof11 
function with damages added. ("TT= pqq(a) - rK - wL + (pqq(O) - pqq(a))). This will lead the 
producer to u~e inputs to the point that the value of their marginal productivity. given that the 
----~--~~~~~-~~~~. -.l.!,inucte~rf.,l...e~r.,l..in!.! 1gL!..'te,_..,c:..!.'h'.'.)n.='.o~log) is unu~ed, equalstheir cost. By Definition 15, supra, this condition is 
· · equivalenHo hiring inputs until the value of.their marginalproductiYity (with.techlloJog~· at1ts 
true leYel) equals their cost. Thus. by definition 15, 
and 
arr 
aL = p'qqL(O) - w = 0 = pqqL(a) - w. 
Bt:cause the sublemma is true under either case (pqqK(a) = rand PqqL(a) = w). the sublemma is 
proYed.i 
By substituting pqqK(a) for rand pqqL(a) for win equilibrium equations (14!, ( i 5). and ( 16). 
the production efficiency conditions are obtained, thereby proYing Lemma 3.U 
Combining Lemma 2 ( .. only if .. ) and Lemma 3 ("if .. ) results in an "if 'Ind only if .. 
proposition, and adding Lemma I ( .. production possibilities curYe .. ). and a judicious choice of 
the government's budget, Theorem 3 is proved. The choice of budget is needed because the 
maximum of W lies on the production possibilities curve, but its exact location is not specified. 
By controlling the goYernment's production (through its budget), society may reach the mo:.t 
desirable production point. Q. E.D. 
Since assumption 3. note 40 supra, mandates the choice of the liability rule which leads to an 
optimal state of society, Theorem 3 prescribes suability. 
48. An example of this model is a subcontractor with a lump-sum payment for services 
rendered. 
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without regard to the value of the Jost crops. If immunity is denied, the 
government railroad will be forced through the judgment process to inter-
nalize the social costs that it imposes. 49 Once the government takes these 
social costs into account, it will adjust its behavior in such a manner that 
society will be better ,50 i.e. , the citizens will be able to consume more 
satisfying amounts of goods and services (wheat and train rides). 51 The ref ore. 
a Fixed-Job Cost Minimizer should be suable. 52 
3. Profit Maximizer 
Profit maximization, a commonly used model of private behavior, can be 
used lo describe governmental motivation. The term "Profit Maximizer" 53 is 
used because the government seeks to make the difference between its costs 
and revenues as large as possible. In the context of a railroad, the assumption 
is that the person in charge of the entity will sell tickets to citizens, drive the 
trains, and choose the level of spark emissions, with the single goal of making 
money. 
If a profit-maximizing governmental entity is granted immunity from 
tort suits, it will ignore the social costs of its actions when making internal 
production decisions. The railroad will not care about the acres of wheat that 
are Jost in fires it has caused and will therefore select the level of spark 
emission at which internal production costs are minimized. Denying the 
49. See note 45 supra. 
50. For an explanation of the reasoning behind this step. see note 52 infra. 
------~~~--~--~--~. S-l.,.......-l=echnic;ally,B-Fede-f.inition-of.the-f.ixed-iob.ma.y.be-needed.to.achie..v,c..stric.t..[es.ults_J:.C>,,___ ___________________ ~ 
ane-X.planaiioOoftnisfei:fuir-eme·ncsti riote 52-infra~- -· · · - ---
52. For the general assumptions and defmitinns. see note 40 supra 
FIXEL>-JOB COST MINIMIZER 
The formal economic analysis of this model 1s so similar to the analysis of the Product-
Maximizing Budget Consumer that it will not be fully presented. See note 4'7 supra. Instead. the 
model will be briefly described. 
Specific Definitions and AssumptionJ 
All of the assumptions and definitions used in the Product-Maximizing Budget Consumer are also 
used here, with the exception that the governmental bureau is assumed IJ have a fi'o:ed job to dn !f 
= f0 ), and its costs (depending upon the rule of immunity) are either the cost of inpu1~ or tht ccst 
of inputs plus the cost of tort judgments. (rK + wL, or rK + wL - pqq(o) + pqq<O).) In either cw.e. 
the government minimizes the cost of production while producing the fixed amount (/.1: .. The 
Lagrangian expression is either t = rK + wL + >-.(f - f0}or t = rK + wL - pqq(o) + pqq(O) • /\! f -
f0 ).) Following differentiation, the analysis of the Fixed-Job Cost Maximizer is, line for hne. 
virtually identical with that of the Product-Maximizing Budget Consumer. The following theorem 
is proved by that analysis: 
THEOREM 4 In a society consisting of one Fixed-Job Cosr Minimiurand one pri1·ate ind11·idu,1!. 
society will product on the production possibilities cun-'t if and only if the government is suable in 
tort. (Some judicious choice of the job constraint must be made in order to insure that max1mali1) 
will result.) 
53. For a description of the circumstances in which a bureau might be expected :o act as a 
Profit Maximizer, see W. NISKANEN, JR., supra note 34, at 33-35 
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government immunity forces it to consider the social costs caused by its 
production methods. 54 After considering these social costs, the government 
would decrease the level of spark emissions, thus permitting citizens to 
consume more satisfying combinations of goods and services (wheat and train 
rides). Society will be better of f.35 To achieve this happy result, however, a 
Profit Maximizer must be suable in tort. 56 
54. Set note 45 supra. This result is a well-known theorem in law and economics. Su 
Brown. supra note I. 
SS. The logical step at this point is provided by some complex economic analysis. Su note 
56 infra. 
Technically, a redistribution of wealth may be necessary, following a change in the immunity 
rule, to achieve these strict results. Changing the immunity rule is, in itself. a wealth redistribu-
tion. It is possible that, following a change in the immunity rule, wealth holdings will have been so 
allered that the competitive system would not produce a better state of society. With an 
appropriate redistribution of wealth, however, any Pareto-optimal state of society may be 
achieved. J. QUIRK & R. SAPOSNIK. INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY AND 
WELFARE. ECONOMICS 149 (1968). This is sufficient to guarantee that with an appropriate wealth 
redistribution society will be better off if the government is suable. Su note 56 infra. 
56. For general definitions and assumptions, su note Ml supra. 
PROFIT MAXIMIZER MODEL 
Specific Definitions and Assumptions 
Every definition and assumption used in the analysis of the Product-Maximiz.ing Budget 
Consumer will also be used here el'.cepl that here the government is assumed to act as if its 
primary goal were profit maximiz.ation (This theorem reproduces, in some respects, results 
contained in Brown. supra note I.) 
THEOREM 5 In a society consisting of two profit maximiurs (an individual and a govtrnmental 
entity), society will product on the production possibilitits curve if and only if tht govtrnment is 
suable in tort. 
-~---P~oof. Using theHresul,ts. on production efficiencyco111:lirit:Jl'l~<1n:d:--t;e·1111'11a=-t:--found-in-th~~~~~~~~~~~ 
analysis of the Product- Ma:idmiz.ing Budget Consumer in note 47 supra, consider the two cases 
immunity and suability. 
Case /: Assume that the government is immune from tori suit. It will maximiz.e profit 
without regard to tort judgments and will use the interfering technology to the point where the 
marginal productivity of the interfering technology is zero. This, in turn, means that society is not 
producing on the production possibilities curve. (Profit = 1T = p1f - rK - wL where p1 = price 
off. 1T0 = P1f0 = 0 implies f0 =: 0.) 
Case 2: Assume that the government is suable in tort. The measure of damages will be 
assumed to be the difference between the revenues which the private firm would have had in the 
absence of interfering technology and the revenue which it actually did have (holding price 
constant). (1.t., Damages = pqq(o}_ pqq(Q).) [On the measure of damages and the need for 
Definition 15, ste note 47 supra.] 
The government will maximize profits while taking damages into account. (Profit = 1T = 
p1f(a) - rK- wL - pqq(O) + pqq(a).) This will lead to a use of interfering technology to the point 
that the marginal value of increasing the technology to the government is equal to the marginal 
value of the decrease in private production. (p1f0 + pqq(a) = 0.) The normal input conditions are 
also obtained. (p1f L = w, p1f K = r.) 
That the private producer will use inputs to the point that the value of their marginal 
productivity equals their cost (pqqK = r, pqqL = w), follows from the results in the Product· 
Maximiz.ing Budget Consumer. [Su note 47 supra.) Q.E.D. 
Herc it may be necessary to redistribute initial wealth holdings to guarantee optimality. 
35 
4. Empire Maximizer 51 
Assume that the person in charge of the hypothetical entity is anxious to 
expand his empire (area of operation). In such a case, the effect of a change in 
the immunity rule upon the entity's behavior is unpredictable. Depending on 
the bureaucrat's assessment of the political process, the effect on his empire 
might be perceived as positive, negative. or zero. Even if the entity's 
alternative behavior under immunity or suability were known, it would still be 
unknown in terms of social welfare whether this behavior was good, bad, or 
indifferent. 58 Although it may be possible to determine that the bureau's 
behavior under both immunity and suability is non-optimal, selection of a 
"second best" solution is likely to be very expensive or fraught with 
inaccuracies. 59 Since fairness and comparative utility are thus the most 
attractive and appropriate criteria for choosing an immunity rule, 60 an 
Empire Maximizer should be suable in tort. 
5. Malevolent Entity61 
Assume that the person running the railroad is a personal enemy of one of the 
57. This model is attributed to Professor Michael E. Levine, University of Southern 
California Law Center. 
58. An example demonstrates that with more data it may be possible to predict the 
direction. but not the desirability, of a legally inspired change in an Empire Maximizer's 
behavior. The bureau, accountable to an extremely cost-conscious. budget-controlling. and 
reelection-oriented legislative group. might wish to expand into research and development 
activities. If the government were suable in tort then the railroad could increase the level of spark 
--------~~----~-~emi.s.sion~to_e_ngeJi,d_e_Lmore judgments. These judgments could be used as evidence of the cost 
-- -effectiveness of research and development activities aimed ar.inventing.sparkless tra111trac:1? -- -
Higher judgments would lead to a greater probability that the cost conscious legislative group 
would allow the railroad to undertake research and development activities. Nevertheless, if the 
railroad were immune it would become impossible to make such arguments to the legislative 
group and there would be no analogous incentives to make sparks 
In general. the bureau's relatiom with legislative oversight committees, desires for expan-
sion into certain endeavors, desires for publicity, and sources of funding may be relevant areas of 
inquiry. The acquisition of this information on any Empire Ma~imizer. which is likely to be 
expensive and time consuming, is unlikely to yield results on the desirability of the bureau's 
behavior. Information on the relationship of the behavior under either immunity or suabilit]· \o 
the citizens· tastes and preferences would still be lacking. 
59. See note 26 supra. 
60. Where it is not possible to say anything rigorously. this Note chooses suability on the 
basis of fairness and comparative utility. Set text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. 
61. This title might suggest a social welfare minimizer to some readers. For example. 
someone who hates society might be put in charge of the government's railroad. It is unclear 
exactly how this could be explained-perhaps madmen or ultra-ambitious individuals have seized 
control. This rather fantastic model docs not seem helpful to the analysis in this context. At the 
very least. a social welfare minimizing government would be politically unstable. On the other 
hand, for a summary of the attempt to explain regulatory behavior by a theory of "lawyer 
dominance," see R. Noll, Government Administrative Behavior and Technological Innovation 
21-26 (Cal. Inst. Tech. Soc. Sci. Working Paper No. 62, Oct. 1974) 
For the purposes of the economic analysis in this Note, it is more useful to portr a> a 
Malevolent Entity as one which picks on disfavored individuals. such as those who are politicall> 
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wheat farmers (Mr. Baker) who lives along the tracks. The railroad is run so 
as to use the socially optimal amount of sparking everywhere except on that 
section of track which borders Baker's land. On that track, the spark level is 
greatly increased through the use of a spark gun. As a result, Baker has a 
tremendously high number of wheat fires. 
The analysis of purely destructive sparking is simple. If the government 
is immune from tort suit for malicious behavior then Baker will suffer as large 
a torrent of sparks a~ is feasible. On the other hand. suability will lead to fewer 
sparks falling on Baker's crops. If malicious behavior were the only consider-
ation under this model, then suability would be the most efficient rule; 
suability would deter some of the fires on Baker's land, allow him to bring 
more wheat to market, and let the citizens eat increased quantities of food. 
Society would be better off. 
It is possible, however, that suability for malicious behavior would 
affect productive behavior. If judges and juries were unable to ascertain 
whether a spark was emitted maliciously or pursuant to productive behavior, 
suability in tort for malicious behavior might engender judgments for dam-
ages resulting from productive sparking. The railroad might lose cases to 
!armers other than Baker whose crops were burned by the socially optimal 
amount of sparking. These farmers would claim that they, like Baker, are 
hated by the railroad. If juries and judges are unable to distinguish between 
malicious and productive sparking. some of these farmers will prevail. In 
response, the railroad will adjust its productive behavior, resulting in a 
~-~---~~-~-~~ ... ~.-.... ~ ....•. cl~crease-in-t·he-number-0f-train-t.r-ips-a:v.ailable.J.or_citize.n_c_Qns.u.m.12"'ti""o""n"-. --~~--~--~~ 
It is impossible, in the abstract, to show rigorously that fewer train rides 
and more wheat would be better (or worse) than more train rides and less 
wheat. In specific situations, the importance and magnitude of the losses and 
gains may be ascertainable. Narrow rule:. could be developed in accordance 
at odds with the government or are personal enemies of the officials in charge. The existence of 
the White House enemies list should make this assumption more credibic. 
In particular, malicious prosecution has inspired this model. Puhli< entities are e.~pre~~l' 
exempted from liability in California for malicious prosecution. Fish v. Regents of Univ. of Cai . 
246 Cal. App. 2d 327, 54 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1966); CAL. Gov'r CODE§ 821.6 (1966i 
In enacting an amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act the federal government may h~'- e 
accepted some of the arguments of this section. The amendment reads· 
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest. 
malicious prosecution, abuse of process. libel, slander. misrepresentation, deceit, or 
interference with contract rights. Provided, That. with regard to acts or omissions of 
investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the 
provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim 
arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, false arrest. abuse of process. or malicious prosecution. For the 
purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any 
officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize 
evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law. 
28 U.S.C. § 26RO<hl (Supp. IV 1974) 
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with these specific observations. In general, however, fairness ana compara-
tive utility suggest that a Malevolent Entity should be suable in tort.63 
C. NONMAXIMIZING MODELS 
Nonmaximizing models, which are usually the product of sociology or 
political science,64 define the government's motivations only as they are 
ex.pressed in observable behavior. For this reason, nonmaximizing models 
are very difficult to analyze rigorously. Nevertheless, these models are a 
significant part of the existing literature on governmental behavior and must, 
therefore, be considered. 65 
t. Product-Satisficing Budget Consumer 
A Product-Satisficing-Budget-Consuming governmental entity seeks to pro-
duce some predetermined level of service and does not attempt to produce any 
more. In addition, the person in charge exhausts the allocated budget. 66 The 
railroad would be run, for example, so as to make exactly five trips per day 
while using all of the budget in the process. No absolute prediction as to the 
level of sparking is possible given these assumptions. The Product-Satisficing 
Budget Consumer should therefore be suable in tort based upon fairness and 
comparative utility considerations. 67 This result is reached for independent 
economic reasons, moreover, if it is further assumed that there is some "fat" 
in the budget. 68 Under these circumstances, the judgment process takes some 
of the resources that are being used inefficiently by the government and gives 
-----.,-----.,---~~~~~~~~~:'.th~e:;_im~to~th~e~far~m<;_e:__i_r~s. The farmers could then grow more wheat while the 
· ··· - government-produced tnesame .. level of serYrc:·e_,W·h~T~~~5=:iJ!l1l1unit-y~weukl~.---~-~~~ 
impede this resource redistribution, government suability ~oufd enibie ·-
citizens to consume larger quantities of train rides and wheat. On these 
grounds, the Product-Satisficing Budget Consumer should be denied tort 
immunity. 
2. Fixed Producer 
Assume that all of the activities of the governmental entity are predetermined 
63. Ste text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. 
64. See, e.g.' w. NISKANEN, JR., supra note 39, at 48; G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION 
67-68 (1971). 
65. Because the nature of each paradigm precludes rigorous analysis and behavior predic-
tion, intuition must play a greater role. Obviously, the specification and analysis of these models 
will seem natural only to the extent that the author's intuition coincides with that of the reader 
66. This model is Niskanen's "demand constrained" bureau. Set W. NISKANEN, JR., 
supra note 39, at 48. 
67. Set text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. 
68. This expression means that the government is not producing as much as it could with its 
budgetary resources. 
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at some level and that the level does not vary with changes in the immunity 
rule (i.e., the entity's behavior is fixed). 69 Under these circumstances, no 
choice between the rules can be made on the basis of production and 
consumption levels. Once again, a recommendation must be based on 
fairness and comparative utility: a fixed producer should be suable. 
3. Random, Budget Consumer 
Assume that there is no discernible systematic pattern to the railroad's, 
behavior, except that the entire budget is consumed. 70 It would then be 
impossible to predict the effect of a change in the immunity rule on bureau 
behavior. On the basis of fairness and comparative utility ,71 a Random, 
Budget Consumer should be suable in tort. 
0. PRELIMINARY SYNTHESIS OF AN IMMUNITY RULE 
Each analysis of government behavior presented in this section suggests that 
the governmental entity should be suable in tort. In the cases of the 
Product-Maximizing Budget Consumer, the Profit Maximizer, and the Fixed-
Job Cost Minimizer suability is indicated for economic efficiency reasons. 
Each of those entities should be denied immunity to force it to consider the 
social costs of its actions. Although, with regard to each of the other models, 
it is impossible to say that either suability or immunity would be more 
economically efficient, immunity should be denied to the entity on the basis 
of fairness and comparative utility. Thus, the rule which may be synthesized 
--~~-~~~~~~~~~.~ •.. rom~:H,..of=th~medels.-is.,,thaLthe~gov~rnment should l:>e. suable in tort. 72 
-- --~-····----
69. For a more complex variant of this form of model, sec G. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF 
DECISION 67-68 (1971 ). Although Allison docs not maintain that government behavior is fixed. he 
claims that there arc an extremely limited number of options. This Note assumes that the number 
of options equals one. A more sophisticated treatment of his model would still lead to a 
recommendation of no immunity on the grounds of fairness and comparative utility. Su te)(t 
accompanying notes 27-30 supra. 
70. The model is similar to a Product-Maximizing or Product-Satisficing-Budget-
Consumer model, but it is difficult to imagine how this model could be an accurate reflection of 
governmental behavior. If the budget is entirely consumed then someone must be paying 
attention to cash flows and lo phenomena associated with these flows. If immunity is granted to 
the government, then the person who is paying attention to the cash outflow can forget ahoui the 
cost of wheal fires. Subjecting the railroad to liability, however. will capture the altention o! 
whomever is controlling the money. Gross overuse of sparking may then be corrected because it 
costs a lot of money in tort judgments. 
71. Su text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. 
72. These results are significant in two respects. First, the analyses of individual model~ 
are independent of each other. Second, the analyses demonstrate the sensitivity of economic 
analysis to assumptions about institutions. The results of economic analysis can be altered-from 
suability to immunity-merely by changing behavioral assumptions. Comport notes 41-43 and 
accompanying tel(! supra, with notes 73-7S and accompanying text infra. 
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JV. REFORMULATION 
In the foregoing section, a governmental immunity rule was formulated using 
nine models of governmental behavior. In the interest of simplicity, however, 
one relevant model was not considered. This section will analyze that final 
model and its effect on the rule that was synthesized using the other models. 
A. WELFAREfTORT BALANCER 
The Welfareffort Balancer is a variant of the Simple Welfare Maximizer. 
Like the Simple Welfare Maximizer, the Welfareffort-Balancing bureaucrat 
wants to do the best that he can for the citizens. Unlike the Simple Welfare 
Maximizer, however, the Welfareffort Balancer dislikes tort judgments 
against his bureau. 73 This difference alters the analysis significantly. 
If the government is suable, then it is possible that tort judgments will 
interfere with the government's desire to help the citizens. The person 
providing government services might desire to minimize tort judgments for 
several reasons. He might feel, for instance, that an adverse tort judgment is a 
statement that he has not done his job well, or that a certain amount of public 
ridicule and embarrassment accompanies a tort judgment. Under these 
circumstances, he might be willing to sacrifice citizen welfare to escape some 
liability; the Joss to the bureaucrat from lost social welfare might be more than 
balanced by a gain in foregone embarrassment. If the government is granted 
immunity, however, it will be left free to pursue the best course of action (in 
terms of social welfare), unhampered by the desire to avoid tort judgments. 
Suppose, for example, that the manager of the government-owned 
· . · ra1lroacLv..·ants to satJsfy, as muc!Las possible, altollne citizens. He 1<=n=o=w=s-... ~-~~---­
how much each of the citizens likes wheat (as opposed to train rides) and 
wants to pick the level of spark emission that makes the citizens as happy as 
possible. He also wishes to avoid tort judgments against the railroad. If the 
government is suable in tort, the bureaucrat will believe that tort judgments 
will change as the level of spark e~issions changes. 74 In such a situation, the 
railroad manager will choose a non-optimal level of spark emission so that the 
entity can escape some liability. On the other hand, if the railroad is immune. 
he will feel free to choose the optimal level of spark emission, unhampered by 
fears of tort judgments. Therefore, if the government is acting as a Wel-
fareffort Balancer, immunity is the preferable rule. 75 
73. Legal literature is full of examples of the "fear of tort judgment" assumption. Su. e.g .. 
Hjort, The Passing of Sow!reign Immunity in Montana: The King Is Dead.', 34 MONT. L. REV. 2R). 
296-97 (1973); Jame~ . . ~upra note 3, at 652; Kennedy & Lynch, Some Problems of a Sovereign 
Without Immunity, 36 S. c ... 1.. L. REV. 161, 180-81 (1963); Comment, Tht Role of the Courts in 
Abolishing Gm-ernmenta/ Immunity, 1%4 DUKE L.J. 888, 896. 
74. Su Equation (2'), note 75 infra. 
7~. For the general assumptions and definitions, su note 40 supra. 
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WF.LFAREITORT BALANCER 
Sptc:ific Assumptions and Dtfinitions 
Deflnilion 19 A bureaucrat is a Welfareffort Balancer if his utility function is wrillen U 
U(W .T(a,)) where T (a,) is defined to be the dollar amount of tort judgments against the ith 
bureau. (For the purposes of this proof. every bureaucrat will be assumed to be a Welfarcrrort 
Balancer.) 
Assumption 17 Each bureaucrat wants, other things held constant, to make society belier off. In 
other words. 
au w> 0 for all i, 
where U, is the utility function of the ith bureaucrat. He or she also wishes to minimize the 
amount of tort judgments against the bureau. In other words, 
~<O for all i. 
THEOREM 6 A We/fareirort Balonctr should be granted immunity from tort suits. 
Proof. 
Ltmma 4: Governmental suability may lead to a state of society that is nonmaximal. 
Proof of Lemma 4: The bureaucrats arc as_sumed to be in a game of simultaneous utility 
maximization. At an equilibrium of this game, X = (a1, • • , a.). the rate of change of each 
bureaucrat's utility with respect to a change in the level of governmental activity that his or her 
bureau controls is equal to zero. In other words. 
au, aw aa, au, aT aa, 
+.....,..,--+.......-....,...1'"':"""+ . an aa, aa, a I aa, aa, 
au, aw aa. au, aT aa. f . 
. . . + aw~ an;- + aT aa. an;-= 0 or every Is I :s n. 
Since the corollary to Theorem I, note 40 supra, indicates that each bureau controls (directly or 
indirectly) only one activity, i.e .. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-.. _.,,~~Q1ori~4~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
equation (I') means that for each bureaucrat the product of the marginal utility of social welfare 
times the rate of change of social welfare with respect to a change in that bureau's activit} level 
plus the marginal disutility of tort judgments times the rate of change of ton judgments with 
respect to the bureau's activity is zero at equilibrium. In other words. 
!i'> ~ aw ... au, aT _ 0 f . aw "&ii aT rcr,- - , or every 1. 
Assume that at least one Welfarerron Balancer believes that he will not minimize the 
amount of tori judgments against his bureau at the global mallima of the social welfare function 
[For a discussion of this assumption, see case bin Case 2 of Lemma 6 in note 78 infra.] Then nci 
global mallimum can be a Nash equilibrium. 
Consider a particular bureaucrat who does not believe that he will minimize the amount of 
tort judgments against his bureau at the global mallima of the social welfare function. Al a Nao;h 
equilibrium, this bureaucrat will be mallimizing his own 11tility, subject to the belief that other 
bureaus' activities arc fixed. Hence, equation (2') will be satisfied at equilibrium. It has been 
assumed that the marginal utility of social welfare is positive. i.e .. 
au 1 '"'iW" > o. 
the marginal disutility of ton judgments is nonzero, i.e .. 
au -1?-"' 0, 
11 
B. SYNTHESIS OF AN IMMUNITY RULE 
Faced with a sovereign immunity issue, a court should have at its disposal an 
efficient, concise, fair rule that directs its inquiries. 76 Three potential rules of 
governmental tort immunity are suggested by the preceding economic 
analysis. Each of these rules will be examined in an effort to determine which 
best satisfies explicit efficiency and fairness criteria. These are the 
alternatives: 
Rule 1: The government should be suable in tort for monetary damages. 
Rule 1 was the rule originally derived. 
Rule 2: The government should be immune from tort suit for monetary 
and the bureaucrat does not believe that he will minimize the sum of tort judgments against his 
bureau at the global maxima of the social welfare function, i.t., 
1.l.(X) "- o. oa1 
If an equilibrium were to occur at W-max. then equation (2') could not be satisfied. In other 
words, 
aU/X) aW(X) + aU,(X) aT(X) = 04- ~Q.;<i> n'C~) 
aw -ra;- aT aa n acr.; "' o. 
I 
Hence. an equilibrium is not at a maximum of the social welfare function.H 
Ltmma 5: Granting immunity always leads to a global maximum of W. 
Proof of Lemma S: Immunity means that every bureaucrat knows that no matter what level 
of activity his bureau undertakes. there will be no tort judgments against it. Hence. each 
bureaucrat will disregard tort liability as a factor in determining the bureau's behavior. By 
~-----~-~~~~~~~~~assumption, the only other important factor is social welfare. Each bureaucrat will adjust the 
- . ···· bureau"s-activity-sMhaHhe-product-otthc..margiJ:iaLuJ.ili!>'. ()f social welfare times the marginal 
---· ~aie--of Ctiangeofsociarwelfafe ·with respect to the-bureau's activity is zero. Since the.marginal .. ·. 
utility of social welfare is positive for each bureaucrat, however, the marginal rate of change of 
social welfare with respect to ta ch bureau's activity is zero. By the corollary to Theorem I, supra 




fil = .!!:!i !Ji_ ... ~ .!!. = 0. 
da1 aw aa; aT aa, 
aT Tci;"" = 0 for every i. 
dUi au aw 
do =iW ~ + O = O. 
I 
au; aw 0 f . -w > o implies - = or every 1, 
ti aa; 
by the corollary to Theorem I, supra note 40, a global maximum is indicated.i 
Lemmas 4 and S, supra, and assumption 3. supra note 40, indicate that immunity is the 
appropriate rule under these circumstances. Q.E.D. 
76. Consider the following. A wheat farmer sues the government in tort for its having 
started a fire in his fields with engine sparks. The government moves to dismiss the case on th~ 
grounds that it is protected by immunity. At this puint a rule is needed to help the judge decide 
whether to allow the tort suit to proceed. This section will formulate that rule. 
41. 
damages if and only if it demonstrates that it decided, after weighing social 
costs and benefits, to risk the occurrence of some loss. 77 Because Rule 2 
grants immunity to any welfare-maximizing entity (Simple Welfare Max-
imizer or Welfarerrort Balancer), and immunity was efficient for both of the 
welfare-maximizing entities, Rule 2 is efficient. 78 
77. This is similar to the discretionary immunity dcx:trine that is currently recognized in the 
tort law. Stt, t.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680<.a) (1970): 
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, 
el\ercising due care, in the cl\ecution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such 
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure 
to el\ercisc or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency 
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused[;) 
CAL. Gov'T ConE § 815.2(b) (West 1966) ("Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public 
entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public 
entity where the employee is immune from liability."); id. § 820.2 ("Except as otherwise 
provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission 
where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him. whether or 
not such discretion be abused."). 
For a history of the analytical problems involved in trying to define "discretionary" without 
a paradigmatic reference, sec Note, The Discrttionary Function E:xctption of tht Ftdera/ Tort 
Claims Act, 66 HARV. L. REV. 488 (1953); Note, The Discrttionary Immunity Doctrine in 
California, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 561 (1968). 
78. Jn a situation where the Simple Welfare Maximizer and Welfarerrort Balancer are 
factually indistinguishable, Rule 2 is the only efficient rule. This implies at least a partial 
relaxation of the assumption that administrative costs equal zero. Su notes 80-85 and accom-
panying text infra. The following proof demonstrates the efficiency of granting immunity to all 
welfare-maximizing entities under these circumstances. For the general assumptions and 
definitions, stt note 40· supra. 
WELFARE MAXIMIZER MODEL 
------~-~~-~~~-~~~~-~----..J!_Sptcific Assumptions and Dtfinitions 
· · · - Definition 20 A bureaucrat is a Simple WclfarcMexim1zer 1rhls uriliry-funclio:n~is-writtcn-t:J 
U(W). 
Definition 21 A bureaucrat is a Wclfarcrrort Balancer if his utility function is written U = 
U(W,T(a,)) where T(a,) is defined to be the dollar amount of tort judgments against the ith 
bureau. [For the purposes of this proof. every bureaucrat will be assumed to be either a Simple 
Welfare Maximizer or a Welfarerrort Balancer. Assume that since it is impossible to tell the 
difference between these two t)'\'Cs of bureaus, the only options are to grant immunity or 
suability to both types of bureaus. "Welfare Maximizer" denotes both types of bureau. I 
Assumption 18 Each bureaucrat wants, other things held constant, to make society better off. 
i.e .. 
au . W > 0 for each 1 
where U; is the utility function of the ith bureaucrat. 
THEOREM 7 A We/fart Maximizer should~ granted immunity from tort suits. 
Proof. 
Ltmma 6: Governmental suability may lead to a state of scx;1ety which is nonmaximal. 
Proof of Ltmma 6: 
Case I: Assume that all bureaucrats are Simple Welfare Maximizers (i.t., U; = U,(W) for all 
i). The bureaucrats are assumed to be in a game of simultaneous utility maximization. At an 
equilibrium of this game, X = (a1,a2,. ... an). the rate of change of each bureaucrat's utility with 
respect to a change in the level of governmental activity which that bureau controls is zero: 
(I) au; aw aa, ~ aw aa1 ~ aw aa,,. aw ~ ~ + · · · +aw raj raj + · · · + aw aa,; Fcij = o. 
Since assumption S, supra note 40, indicates, however, that each bureau controls (directly or 
indirectly) only one activity, and since the rat~ of change or any activity with respect to itself is 
always one, line (I) means that for each bureaucrat at equilibrium the product of the marginal 
utility of social welfare times the rate of change of social welfare with respect to a change in that 
bureau's activity level is zero. In other words, 
au aw iW" a;:;-- <X:l = 0. 
I 
By assumption 7, supra note 42, each bureaucrat wants, other things being equal, to make 
society better off. i.t., 
*>0 
means that at equilibrium the rate of change of social welfare with respect to a change in any 
activity level is zero, i.t., 
~ = 0 for every j. 
aal 
This is the condition needed to satisfy the corollary to Theorem I, supra note 40, so the 
equilibrium, X:, is a global maximum of W. 
Case 2: At least one bureaucrat is a Welfa~errort Balancer. 
Subcase 2a: Assume that every Welfareffort Balancer believes that he will minimize the 
sum of tort judgments against his bureau at each global maii:imum. It may be true that, under 
subcase 2a 's assumption, a governmental suability rule will lead to a welfare-maii:imizing 
outcome. 
The analysis of this Welfareffort Balancer's behavior is identical to that contained in case 1. 
At a simultaneous utility maximization equilibrium, each Welfareffort Balancer will choose an 
activity level such that the product of marginal utility of social welfare and the rate of change of 
welfare with respect to a change in the bureau's activity, plus the product of the marginal 
disutility of tort judgments and the rate of change of tort judgments with respect to a change in the 
bureau's activity, is zero. In other words, 
.. . <2f :W·!~ ii1~~~-:!=i <=x:=r==-:-o:-:-ro:-::r:--:.e~ac'.';h:-:: .. -:--i.=· ~~~~~~~~~---~~~~~~~~=~ 
Since every Welfareffort Balancer believes that tort judgments against his bureau are 
minimized at every global maximum, i.e., 
aTa (Y) = O for every y t [global maii:imum of W], 
al 
some global maii:ima, those for which 
.!!!_. (X:) = 0 
aa; 
will satisfy equation (2) and be included in the set of equilibria. 
Subcase 2b: Assume that at least one Welfarerrort Balancer believes that he will not 
minimize the amount of tort judgments against his bureau at the global maxima of the social 
welfare function. Then no global maximum can be a Nash equilibrium. 
Consider a particular bureaucrat who does not believe that he will minimize the amount of 
tort judgments against his bureau at the global maii:ima of the social welfare function. At a Na~h 
equilibrium, this bureaucrat will be maximizing his own utility, subject to the belief that other 
bureaus' activities are fixed. Hence, equation (2) will be satisfied at equilibrium. It has been 
assumed that the marginal utility of social welfare is positive, i.t .. 
ilU1 aw> o. 
---------------------
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the marginal utility of tort judgments is nonzero, i.t., 
ilU tr .. o. 
and the bureaucrat does not believe that he will minimize the sum of tort judgments against his 
bureau at the global maxima of the social welfare function, i.t., 
!!_<XI"' o. aa, 
rr an equilibrium were to occur at a W-max, equation (2) could not be satisfied. In other words, 
d~!(X) = aU,(X) ~ (:JC) + aUfX) !I..CX) = o+ ilVJOO i\T (X) .. 0. 
, -aw"" aa1 a aa, :1T a"'J 
Hence, an equilibrium is "ot at a maximum of the social welfare function.U 
In order for subcase 2b to be plausible, one of three assumptions must be made: that the rule 
of liability is strict, that the rule of liability is negligence and that the bureaucrat fears juries will 
inaccurately gauge W, or that costs of moving for dismissal are ignored while costs of litigating 
suits arc viewed as tort judgments. i.e .. 
ana,> <X> . 
ila .,_ 0 for every 1. 
' 
Three major articles advocating the use of a strict liability standard in torts are Calabre5i & 
Hirschoff. Toward a Test For Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972) (arguing that 
strict liability should be imposed on categories of best cost avoiders); Fletcher, Fairness and 
Utility in Tort Thtory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 ( 1972); and Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability. 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 151 ( 1972). I For the contention that the negligence rule relieves citizens from tort 
liability if they act in a social-cost-minimizing manner, see Posner, A Theory of Negligence. I J. 
LEGAL STUD. 29 ( 1973). Accepting his contention, we would concl'ude that welfare-maximizing 
behavior would be deemed nonnegligent and therefore exempted from liability. If juries always 
gauged the W function perfectly then a bureaucrat would never need to fear losing a tort suit for 
maximizing welfare. 
Ltmma 7: Granting immunity always leads to a global maximum of W . 
. ~----~Proofo/Ltmma 7:lmmunitymcans that every bureaucrat knows ihaLno rnalter.what.lc.vel .. 
of activity his bureau undertakes, there will be no tort judgments against it. Hence, each 
bureaucrat will disregard tort liability as a factor in determining the bureau's behavior. The only 
other important fact {by assumption) is social welfare. Each bureaucrat will adjust the bureau's 
activity so that the product of the marginal utility of social welfare times the marginal rate of 
change of social welfare with respect to each bureau's activity is zero. By assumption 3, supra 




dU, . au, aw au, n 
~==- +-=--- - 0 ua, aw aa, a1 aa, - . 
aT 0 f . -= or every 1. aa, 
dU, = au, aw + 0 = 0 aa, awaa;- . 
au, . . aw 0 aw> 0 1mphes aa, = 
by assumption 5, a global maximum is indicated.U 
Lemmas 6 and 7, supra, and assumption 3, supra note 40, indicate that immunity is the 
appropriate rule under these circumstances. Q.E.D. 
45 
Rule 3: The government should be immune from tort suit for monetary 
damages if and only if it demonstrates that it decided, after weighing social 
costs and benefits, to risk the occurrence of some loss and that its decision 
·process would be affected by [l.Otential tort suits. The strict economic analysis 
suggests that a Welfare/Tort Balancer should be immune from tort suit, while 
public entities behaving in any other fashion should be suable. Since 
administrative costs are presently assumed to be zero, a judge may freely and 
accurately characterize any governmental behavior with respect to any 
accident. If the judge finds that the government was Welfare/Tort Balancing, 
the tort suit should be dismissed. Alternatively, if the judge finds that the 
government was acting in accordance with one of the other models, 79 the suit 
should be heard on its merits. Rule 3 is formulated by combining these two 
conclusions. 
1. Administrative Costs 
Choosing a final immunity rule requires explicit consideration of administra-
tive costs, which have previously been assumed to be negligible. These costs 
influence the analysis in two ways. They aid in developing the tentative 
rules80 and, more importantly, in choosing between the alternatives. 
Of the three rules, Rule 3 would involve the greatest amount of 
administrative costs. In administering Rule 3 rather than Rules 1 or 2, a court 
must distinguish Welfare/Tort-Balancing behavior from the behavior of all 
the other models (including the Simple Welfare Maximizer). Thus, in 
------~~-=-~~~ ..~. addit.ion~to~identif.y.ing~welfare,,maximizing_..,heba.YiQL(!lLR=u~le~ . .,,,2C..,, .. ""al:><.so~ .. .,.:r--"'e~~. ----~-~ 
. ... qiiires)~~tfie-coiirfwould oe-i:eqiiired toiaentify-conducnharis affected by the. 
79. It is entirely possible Iha! a governmental entity may no! acl with the same motivations 
as to all types of accidents. For example, a railroad may welfare-maximize with respect to 
spark-ignited fires but fixed-job cost-minimize with respect to running over cows. A judge should 
not feel compelled to make a binding choice between the two models. Instead, the railroad should 
be treated as a welfare maximizer only in suits by cattle ranchers. For different purposes 
(cattleman suits and farmer suits) the government may be treated as having different motivations. 
80. Rules 2 and 3 raise the problem, for example, of allocating the burden of proof. The 
economic analysis gives no hint, however, as to how the burden of proof should be allocated 
under these rules. One solution is placing the burden on the party with the best information on the 
resolution of an issue. Set generally J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD. 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 1008 (6th ed. 1973). This rule of burden l\Ssignmenl would 
help minimize administrative costs because the pany with the best information can provide da1a 
at least cost. On the issue of sovemmental behavior, the government clearly has the bes! 
information. For eumple, it has all of its own records and can talk with any of its employees a! 
any time. 
The burden of proof can also be seen as a fairness issue. When deciding whether to deny a 
citizen access to the coun system, it may be unfair to make the citizen prove thal the courts are 
available. Having sustained injury from the government and facing a tort immunity claim by the 
sovernment, it may be unfair to ask the citizen to expend the resources needed to sustain the 
burden, for the government is likely to have far more resources and time available for the chore. 
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level of tort judgments. In isolated cases, relevant data might exist. For 
example, an occasional internal memorandum might discuss the possibility of 
tort suits and the entity's reaction to potential adverse judgments in those 
suits. In the vast majority of cases, however, this data will not exist, and 
distinguishing between a Simple Welfare Maximizer and a Welfarcrrort 
Balancer will not be possible. This means that if Rule 3 were used, the 
government would rarely be able to show that it was a Welfarerrort Balancer 
rather than a Welfare Maximizer, and the government would almost always 
be suable-substantially the same result as if Rule l were being used. This 
implies that the effective choice is between Rules 1 and 2. 
Rule 2 would also involve significant administrative costs. A judge 
would be required to distinguish between welfare-maximizing behavior 
(including both Simple Welfare Maximizing and Welfarerrort Balancing 
behavior) and other behavior. This would likely involve consideration of 
numerous factors, among them: (l) the language of the authorization under 
which the acting official made any decision; (2) the entity's authority to 
consider broad policy questions; (3) the nature of the position held by the 
employee responsible for any crucial decision or action; (4) the existence of 
any governmental cost-benefit studies discussing the class of damage in-
volved in the suit; (5) the existence of any debate or public hearings on the 
decision to risk the damage; (6) the tone of internal memoranda dealing with 
the possibility of damage; and (7) public statements as to governmental 
motivation (though these may have to be taken with a grain of salt). 81 This list 
suggests a time-consuming, costly, and difficult inquiry when relevant 
~-iriformation=isavailable:-
Where information relevant to a Rule-2 inquiry is unavailable, the 
government will be unable to meet its burden of showing welfare-maximizing 
behavior. Consequently, Rule 2 would yield the same result as would Rule l. 
Even if such information would generally be available, however, Rule 2 is 
preferable to Rule 1 only if there are so many Welf arerrort Balancers that an 
immunity-provided efficiency gain compensates for the greater administra-
tive costs Rule 2 would entail. 82 Although no empirical evidence is available 
regarding the frequency of Welf arerrort Balancing behavior, 83 and procedur-
81. Cf. Note, Tht Discrtlionary Function Exctption of tht Ftdtral Tort Claims Act. 66 
HARV. L. REv. 488, 491-94 {1953) (listing factors relevant to analysis of "discretionary 
function"). 
82. This Note assumes that if there are very few Welfarerrort Balancers, then the cost of 
the inquiry in Rule 2 will exceed the loss due to the Welfarerrort Balancers' changed productive 
behavior. 
83. It may be possible, through some appropriately worded and widely distributed ques-
tionnaire, to generate some data as to frequency. The survey's costs may be substantial. 
however, and since the people who respond to the questionnaire will not often understand the 
underlying concern of the survey, its results may be untrustworthy. 
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al devices such as presumptions could reduce administrative costs under 
certain circumstances,84 administrative costs seem to tip the scales in favor of 
the simpler, easier to apply, Rule I. 85 
2. Fairness as a Constraint 
Considerations of fairness serve two distinct functions within the framework 
of this analysis. First, fairness is an independent criterion by which an 
immunity rule is selected for those models of governmental behavior that do 
not lend themselves to rigorous economic analysis. Second, fairness is a 
84. The administrative costs associated with the inquiry into welfare-maximizing behavior 
can be reduced hy using legal presumptions. Assume that some preliminary gathering of relevant 
data is affordable. but that a full inquiry is much more expensive. Certain legal presumptions may 
be developed in response. Given a preliminary set of facts in which the government is negligent, 
either immunity or suability may be the correct judicial response according to the economic 
analysis, depending on the type of bureau involved. According to the probabilities of immunity or 
suability (given the preliminary set of facts). it may be appropriate to grant immunity, deny 
immunity, or proceed to a full inquiry into the government's behavior. For example, suppose that 
in 99'il- of the spark-ignited wheat fires the government was acting as a welfare maximizer, while 
in 99% of the cow/train accidents the government was acting as a Fixed-Job Cost Minimizer. In 
response, one may create a pair of presumptions which are based only upon the accident's 
preliminary facts. If the tort involves a wheat fire, then the government is presumptively immune 
from tort suit, but if the tort involves a cow/train collision, then the government is presumptively 
suable. Analogous presumptions may be found elsewhere in tort law. For example, the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur allows a court to presume negligence from a preliminary set of facts. A set of 
sufficient conditions are 
(I) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of 
someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the 
~----~--~-~--~-~~ __ ~ __~-__~c:;;~;;_;;-ch:rsive--mntrol---ohhc--defendant~(-3-)-it~must-not-have~bcen-due-to.afl-y .. \'oluntar.) .. ' ---~--~---~-~ 
aciionor coiili'ioiiticfr\ on the part· of-the-plaintiff; -- -
W. PRossFR. supra note 2, at 214. Su gtntrally id. at 208-11. Whenever a set of preliminary facts 
conforms to all three elements of this description, it is very likely that the defendant was 
negligent. Therefore, the court may prtsume the defendant's negligence. 
Despite the use of presumptions, the inquiry mandated by Rule 2 is likely to be very 
expcmive. Assembling the relevant data on this point is not likely to be a regular function of 
someone within the bureau. Either an attorney or someone within the bureau who is working with 
an attorney will have to wade through piles of irrelevant material to assemble the salient 
information. This process will be repeated in every lawsuit, either to establish immunity in the 
first place or to rebut and reestablish a presumption on the point. Further, determinations of this 
issue may be frequently appealed, thereby consuming even more resources. 
85. Wherever Welfare/Tort Balancers arc operating under a negligence rule, and juries 
correctly perceive social welfare maximizing activities as nonnegligent, bureaucratically optimal 
behavior, with or without immunity, will coincide with socially optimal behavior. 
The choice of Rule I also avoids any need to establish, on fairness grounds, an independent 
compensation agency. The discussion in Section IV .B.2 reduces fairness considerations to 
access to compensation. Because Rule 2denies the standard avenue of compensation (the courts) 
whenever a victim is injured by a welfare-maximizing entity. fairness may require the creation of 
an independent compensation agency to reimburse deserving victims. For example, Congress 
provicled compensation to the victims denied relief on grounds of immunity in Dalehitc v. United 
States, 346 U.S. I~ (1953). Act of Aug. 12, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-378, ch. 864, 69Stat. 707. Rule I 
would avoid such a need. 
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constraint. 86 Any rule formulated through economic analysis should be 
subject to the additional constraint that it be fair. An unfair rule should not be 
adopted. It is therefore necessary to ex.amine, at this juncture, the fairness of 
Rule 1. 
Before this fairness question can be answered, the nature of the con-
straints that operate in this context must be explored. The following 
"fairness assumptions" are offered to aid in the exploration: 
(1) Fairness considerations for the government do not affect an immuni-
ty rule. This fairness examination questions whether the suggested rule deals 
too harshly with the stochastically selected victims of government activity. 
The fact that most governmental activities are for collective benefit means 
that, in some sense, if a citizen is not the victim then he is the injurer. The 
question of governmental immunity reduces to whether the class of potential 
injurers (as represented by the government) should allow the victims access to 
the courts. It may be legitimate to suggest that the injurers should deny the 
victims access to the courts for reasons of efficiency. In a society where the 
normal expectation is that injurers must meet their victims in court, however, 
the injuring class should not be permitted to frustrate this expectation upon 
fairness grounds. Therefore, fairness to victims is the only salient concern. 
(2) The name of the entity from which the victim recovers is irrelevant. 
If fairness demands compensation (or at least access to compensation), then 
recovery from the railroad is no more or less fair than recovery from general 
revenue funds. An implication of this assumption is that the victim's urge for 
revenge is-given:noweight,··AlthC>ugh the victim may want to ''get·back''at-- · 
the injuring entity by successfully suing it (to the exclusion of all other 
entities), society should not cater to these primitive desires in the name of 
fairness. 
(3) It is fairer to compensa.te a victim than to force him to bear the Joss 
himself. Injured parties are victims of activity designed for the collective 
benefit. Requiring the victim to go uncompensated demands that he contrib-
ute more than his proportionate share to societal ventures. 
These three assumptions reduce the question off airness to one of general 
access to compensation. Rule 1 provides access to the standard avenue of 
compensation (the courts) under al1 circumstances. On the other hand, Rules 
2 and 3 would deny such access in some cases, assuming that administrative 
86. "Fairness," in this sense, will be used in the same way that Guido Calabresi u~e'> 
"justice" in Tht Costs of Accidents. "[J]ustice is a totally different order or goal from accident 
cost reduction. Indeed, ii ... is not a goal but rather a constraint that can impose a veto on 
systems or on the use or particular devices or structures within a given system .... " G. 
CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 25. 
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costs would not teduce those rules to the equivalent of Rule 1. Thus, while 
fairness would not preclude the use of Rule l, it does suggest that Rules 2 and 
3 might be inappropriate. 87 
3. The Proposed Rule 
Economic analysis suggested three possible rules of governmental tort 
immunity. While one of these rules was pref erred by strict economic analysis. 
assuming away administrative costs, 88 other factors must be considered in 
choosing an immunity rule. After relaxing the assumption of negligible 
administrative costs and considering the fairness of the alternative rules, the 
pref erred rule is that the government should be suable in tort for monetary 
damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Given certain fundamental assumptions, it is possible to engage in economic 
analysis of costly interactions between the government and individuals. Such 
an analysis must necessarily focus upon a potential rule's effect on govern-
mental behavior. This was the task undertaken by this Note. Various models of 
governmental behavior have been either borrowed or developed, and these 
models have then been independently analyzed. Economic efficiency 
suggested that a particular immunity rule should be adopted with regard to 
certain models. In the case of other models, however, rigorous economic 
--~--~~~~-~~~~anaLysis~wasjmp~Qs_~jj:)Ie; in ~uch cases, suability was chosen over immunity 
- ·····-··-···- ······-··· · ······· ··011me-oasrs--of fairness and corl1par-ative utility:··Based upon-thisanalYs1s, ... · · 
three potential governmental immunity rules were formulated, and of these 
three rules, one was chosen based largely on considerations of administrative 
costs and fairness. The indicated rule is that the government should be suable 
in tort for monetary damages. 
Matthew L. Spitzert 
87. See note 8.5 supra. 
88. See texl accompanying notes 76-79 supra. 
t The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable help of Professors Michael Le\ ine 
and Robert Ellickson, University of Southern California Law Center, and Professor James 
Quirk, California Institute of Technology. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application 
of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the 
FCC, and the Courts* 
Kenneth Arrow's 1951 work, Social Choice and Individual Values, 1 
started a new field of social science, usually called "public choice."2 
From the beginning, public choice scholars have examined alternative 
democratic processes for making societal decisions.3 Public choice 
theory assumes that each citizen has preferences about alternative social 
policies. The fundamental task is to investigate the process used to 
combine these individual preferences into a social choice. Arrow's 
theorem. demonstrates that democratic methods of social decisionmak-
ing fail to meet some conditions that seem desirable for any such 
process.4 
A public choice theory approach can be applied to the decision pro-
cesses of courts and administrative agencies. ·when a court or agency 
purports to select one of many possible outcomes by ranking the out-
--------... -.. -.. - ... -.. -.. -.-.•. -c_o_m-es-.•-:u-n-aer a set.of criteria,.·•.tli£situat10h_parallelsthed_e_in_o_c_· r-a-t~1c-.-. ----------------
process. In place of the preferences of individual citizens, rankings 
• The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance and comments of Pro-
fessor Michael Levine of the California Institute of Technology and the University of 
Southern California Law Center; Professors Charles Plott, John Ferejohn, Roger Noll, and 
James Quirk of the California Institute of Technology; Professor Allan Schwartz of the 
University of Southern California Law Center; Professor Steven Matthews of the University 
of Illinois; and Jean Spitzer, whose effort on this article's final draft made its production 
possible. 
t Member, California Bar. 
I. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUf.S (2d ed. 1963). 
2. Prior to Kenneth Arrow's seminal work, the literature on the theory of public choice 
contained only a "few items." Id. at vii. Today there is enough literature in the area to 
justify calling public choice "a separate field." Mueller, Public Choice: A Survey, 14 J. 
EcoN. LITERATURE 395, !195 (1976); see id. at 424-33 (listing over 200 articles and books in 
or closely related to social choice field from 1951 to 1976). 
3. Arrow focused directly on the problem of whether particular types of processes for 
making societal decisions by combining individual preferences meet certain rationality 
conditions that serve as attractive constraints for social decisionmaking processes. See K. 
ARROW, supra note 1, at 2, 22-33. For discussions of public choice theory accessible to the 
layman, see R. MUSGRAVE &: P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 102-26 
(2d ed. 1976); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970). 
4. See K. ARROW, supra note 1, at 2-3, 59-60; R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 
3, at 104-06; A. SEN, supra note 3, at 35-46. 
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under criteria determine judicial or administrative choices. This article 
will use public choice theory to demonstrate that some administrative 
decision processes cannot possess all of the qualities that either are 
claimed by the agencies involved or are required by law: It also con-
siders the applicability of public choice theory to judicial decision-
making. The existing public choice literature appears to have ne-
glected such an analysis. 0 
In the recent case of Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke,6 the Supreme Court examined procedures that use a set of 
criteria to select applicants for admission to medical school. In his 
opinion, Justice Powell found the admissions system at issue uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory, but suggested that one such procedure, 
still involving race as a criterion, would be constitutional.7 Four mem-
bers of the Court (in an opinion hereafter referred to as the "Brennan 
opinion") attacked Justice Powell's suggestions, claiming that his al-
ternative process was not significantly different because it would merely 
permit decisionmakers to achieve the same result "in a manner that is 
not immediately apparent to the public."8 Application of public choice 
theory to alternative methods for choosing medical school classes can 
offer insight into the choice process suggested by Justice Powell and 
also demonstrate the usefulness of the theory for analysis of admini-
strative and legal decision processes. Part I of this article uses the 
-------~~-~~.medical...scho.oLa.dlili~siqgs . context to eXE_la'"-:i:--n_a':. 4p_a":-r_ti_c":u:-la_r_ .. _f;;:o:--r_m_o_f _______________ ~ 
puolii::--C:hoice-analysis~Itals·o demonstrates that Justice-Powell's pro--
posed admissions process must violate at least one of a specified set of 
axiomatic characterizations of that process, and that the most likely 
violation directly supports the critique in the "Brennan opinion." 
Part II applies public choice analysis to the hearing process used by 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to choose a broadcast 
licensee from among competing applicants. It demonstrates that the 
process is internally inconsistent, and explores interpretations of the ap-
5. In Mueller's 1976 collection of social choice literature there are no sources that 
concern themselves primarily with agency and judicial decisionmaking processes. See 
Mueller, supra note 2, at 424-33. Although one recent article discusses the possible ap-
plication of public choice analysis to juries, multiple judge courts, and administrath·e 
agencies, Levine &: Plott, Agenda Influence a11d its Im/>lications, 63 \'A. L. REV. 561, 563, 
592-96 (1977), the article applies existing theory to voting in settings other than legisla-
tures or popular elections. This article focuses on how substantive decision elements in 
the form of "criteria" are combined into a choice, rather than on how votes representing 
the preferences of individuals are combined into a collective choice. 
6. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). 
7. Id. at 2762-66 (Powell, J., announcing judgment of court). 
8. ld. at 2794 (opinion of Brennan, White, M:rrshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring 
in judgment in part and dissenting). 
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parent inconsistency, as an illustration of the consequences of the 
analysis for administrative decision processes. Part III considers the 
application of public choice analysis to judicial decision processes and 
contrasts the implications of the theory in this setting with the con-
clusions previously reached concerning administrative agencies. 
I. Internally Inconsistent Multicriteria Choice Processes-
An Explication Focusing on the Bakke Decision 
A. Introduction 
A multicriteria choice process (MCCP) is a method of choosing a 
single alternative from many. Three steps characterize an MCCP. First, 
the decisionmaker defines or is given a finite set of relevant criteria. 
Second, alternatives are ranked under each of the criteria. Finally, the 
rankings are combined to generate a choice. 
College, graduate, and professional school admissions can be con-
ducted by using an MCCP. In the Bakke case, Justice Powell put 
forward the Harvard College admissions progTam as "[a]n illuminating 
example" of a choice process that includes race as a criterion in a con-
stitutionally permissible way.0 As described in the Powell opinion, the 
Harvard program does not assure racial diversity by setting aside a 
~~~~~~~~~~~ 
.. fixeo .. numb:e.coepl:CI:<:~ci.()t:=II1in0Fit·ies,,-as~th€_UniversiLy~oLCaliJw""n"'i~a~~~~=~~~~~~~~ 
at Davis Medical School had doii-e~ Irlstead, .th-e -Han·ara program looks 
at many criteria to assure diversity in its student body. After Harvard 
chooses about one-seventh of a class on the basis of the single criterion 
of intellectual potential, "diversity" is the primary concern in selecting 
the rest of the class from the large group of remaining applicants who 
are academically admissible. 10 The "diversity" judgment is made with 
"a number of criteria in mind" 11 including intellectual potential, 
athletic and artistic talent, strength of character, family background, 
geographic origin, intended field of study, intended occupation, and 
membership in "disadvantaged economic, racial [or] ethnic groups." 12 
The comparative value of a high ranking in any one criterion is 
influenced by the prevalence of high rankings in that criterion by 
previously admitted applicants; 13 the goal is to create a diverse class. 
9. Id. at 2762. 
10. Id. at 2765 app. (opinion of Powell, J.). 
11. Id. at 2766 app. 
12. Id. at 2765 app. These criteria do not comprise an exhaustive list; they are garnered 
from the description of the Harvard program in the appendix to Justice Powell's opinion. 
See id. at 2765-66 app. 
13. Id. at 2766 app. 
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The Harvard progTam uses an MCCP. A set of criteria are identified, 
applicants are ranked under those criteria, 14 and the rankings combine 
to dictate a choice. It also seems clear that, at least in filling the last few 
places in the class, the process is designed to choose additional members 
one by one from the pool of applicants remaining.15 
B. A Class of Internally Inconsistent MCCPs 
This section examines whether an MCCP can conform consistently 
to a given set of principles or constraints. The first step in the analysis 
is to choose nine "axioms." Each axiom either characterizes the opera-
tion of a wide range of real-world MCCPs or represents a normative 
principle that is often imposed on the MCCP. The nine axioms yield 
an internally inconsistent MCCP in the sense that it is not possible for 
all nine axioms to characterize the MCCP at the same time.16 Given 
an MCCP that satisfies some of the axioms, one knows that the process 
must violate at least one of the remaining axioms. By examining the 
Harvard program as an MCCP, one gains insight into the dialogue 
among the justices in the Bakke case. This discussion of the Harvard 
program illustrates the nine axioms in a simple context and serves as a 
prelude to more complicated treatment of the axioms in their relation 
to administrative and judicial decisionmaking. 
I. .Axiom I: The MC CP chooses one a[tr:rn:«fi7.Jt1~fr_or!i:ll:"'±<!ol--of~a-=-~~~~~~~~~~~ 
ternatives. 
This axiom requires that a choice process operate by selecting a 
single most desirable candidate from the pool of candidates.li Even 
14. Although all of the listed criteria are considered with the goal of "di\'ersity" in 
mind, diversity apparently does not determine all the rankings under each criterion and 
thereby reduce the process to a single criterion choice process. The continued emphasis 
on excellence in the description of the HarYard program, see id. at 2766 app .. suggests 
that applicants with higher intellectual potential or more striking artistic talents would 
be preferred, all other aspects being equal, oYer competing applicants. Thus Har\'ard 
would not choose applicants that were Jess talented than alternatiYe applicants in order 
to obtain a more "diverse" spectrum of abilities in the incoming class. Cf. note 4i i11fra 
(determination of ranking under single criterion mar itself be product of MCCP). 
15. See 98 S. Ct. at 2766 app. (opinion of Powell, J.). This passage contains an example 
that suggests a one-by-one choice process. Although one of the facts in the example is that 
the admissions committee has "only a few [remaining] places left to fill," the example is 
meant to be a general illustration of how race enters as a factor in the admissions pro-
cess. Id. 
16. In the appendices, see pp. 768·78 infra, the roman numeral axioms in text arc 
translated into a set of arabic·numbcred axioms and then a rigorous proof of the incon-
sistency of the axioms is carried out. In Appendix A, see pp. 765-68 infra, the proof is 
explained by relating it to previous, well-known results in public choice theory. Appendix 
D, see pp. 778-79 infra, lists the roman numeral axioms for convenient reference. 
17. See pp. 768-79 infra. 
54 
when more than one candidate is ultimately chosen, as in the selec-
tion of a college or medical school class, this axiom is still satisfied 
if the group chosen is increased by successively adding the best can-
didate from the remaining alternatives. In an admissions program, 
one-by-one addition usually occurs at least for the candidates chosen 
from a "waiting list." Presumably this waiting list represents a sequen-
tial ordering by desirability of the best prospects from the pool of 
candidates that have not already been accepted.18 
2. Axiom II: There are at least three "potential alternatives," each of 
which would be chosen if available and if no better alternative were 
a possible choice. 
This axiom asserts that the world contains at least three minimally 
qualified candidates, but makes no claim respecting the number of 
candidates that are actually alternatives in the choice process.19 A 
minimally qualified candidate is one who would be chosen if there 
were no available better candidate. A candidate who is not minimally 
qualified will not be chosen even if there are no alternative candidates 
available. Axiom II is satisfied in the case of medical schools and 
universities that have more minimally qualified candidates than places 
to be filled.20 
3. Axiom-III:--Tne choice process i:a1Lconszaer any conceivaoJe''po~ . 
tential alternative," regardless of its particular characteristics. 
In the context of an admissions MCCP, this axiom means that any 
minimally qualified candidate can be considered for a position in the 
class.21 
4. Axiom IV: The MCCP uses no absolute scales or absolute weights 
to combine categorical rankings into a choice. 
This axiom precludes the use of either absolute scales, which trans-
late rankings within criteria into units of an absolute preference, or 
absolute weights, which compare and combine the size of preferences 
18. The University of California at Davis Medical School used such a waiting list. Sec 
Regents of Univ. of Cal. \'. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2740 (1!178) (opinion of Powell, J.). 
19. See p. 769 infra. 
20. The Harvard program defines the central admissions "dilemma" as that of "choos-
ing among a large number of 'qualiflctl' cancliclatcs." 98 S. Ct. at 2765 app. (opinion of 
Powell, J.). "'Qualified'" apparently means "'admii;sible'" and able In do "adcqua1c 
work at Harvard." Id. 
21. See p. 769 infra. 
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under different criteria.22 When absolute scales or absolute weights 
are used, the MCCP may combine rankings under various criteria into 
a ranking under a single criterion that is decisive. For example, a 
medical school admissions process that selects a class by a formula that 
combines Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT) score, college 
grade-point average, and numerical scores recorded by interviewers into 
a single numerical score violates axiom IV. 
A choice process may, without violating axiom IV, involve the use 
of scaled or quantitative comparisons between applicants within a 
single criterion. "Quarternary" comparisons, such as "with respect to 
criterion one, A is preferred to B twice as strongly as C is preferred to 
D" are acceptable under axiom IV. Only the use of some absolute 
method of comparison between criteria violates the axiom. 
The use of absolute weights or absolute scales need not be in the 
form of a comprehensive and explicit quantitative formula in order 
to violate axiom IV. Admissions officers might combine criteria by 
unstated, informal rules of thumb. They might, for example, recognize 
membership in racially or economically disadvantaged groups by add-
ing standard numbers of points to a candidate's MCAT scores. In 
effect, two criteria would be measured on the same absolute scale of 
MCAT points. 
5. Axiom V: Given any two alternatives A and B, A will be a more 
----~~~~~~~~.-.. -. -· ·desi'.rable-alte.ma.ti.ve-ihan-Bro.1:_B_wilLb.e...a_w ore~. ~d~e~si~· rc,_a,,,_b~le_.""a;c.,lt_e.;,,_r'-n_a-_ ...--------------~--= 
tive than A, or A aiid B wil{biiequall)! desii'iilile alternatives; The·-··· 
more desirable of the two must be chosen if one is more desirable 
than the other. 
The first part of this axiom is technically described as the existence 
of a "complete binary relation.'' 23 The choice process must be able to 
compare alternatives in pairs. Although some pairs of alternatives may 
be equally desirable, a complete binary relation exists unless there are 
pairs that cannot be compared at all.24 The second part of the axiom 
simply constrains the decisionmaker to choose the more desirable o[ 
two unequal alternatives. 
An admissions program would probably claim to abide by axiom V. 
Admissions officers are unlikely to confess an inability to form prefer-
ences, including indifference, between candidates and they would 
22. See pp. 769-70 infra. 
23. See pp. 770-71 infra. 
24. See A. SEN, suPra note 3, at 3 (indifference between pairs of candidates is to be 
distinguished from inability to compare pairs of candidates at all; only latter indicates 
absence of "complete binary relation"). 
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recognize that selection of the less desirable candidate of a pair would 
be irrational. 
6. Axiom VI: No one criterion totally dominates the MCCP. 
A criterion totally dominates an MCCP if, for all possible pairs of 
candidates, the candidate who ranks higher under a particular criterion 
will be chosen regardless of the rankings under other criteria that sup-
posedly enter into the choice process. If axiom VI is violated, rankings 
under a single criterion determine the choice between any pair of 
candidates.25 
As long as a single criterion would not be decisive in every possible 
case, axiom VI will not be violated. The axiom can still apply if the 
choice within certain categories of candidates is made on the basis of 
a single criterion. For example, admitting a medical school class strictly 
on the basis of l\1CA Ts would ii1"olve using a single criterion choice 
process, but choosing between white applicants from high-income back-
grounds solely on the basis of MCATs, while using multiple criteria 
to choose candidates for admission from other gToups, would not in-
volve such a process. 
7. Axiom VII: For any set of alternatives, the choice process will have 
the same result whether the choice is made directl)1 from the entire 
··· set~or~ismadefrornaselofprelimina9wi1tnerschosenf~roffm"' .. r.·."fsnn·1.1.7~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
sets comprising the entire set. 
This principle means that "agenda" influences will not affect the 
outcome of the MCCP.26 Suppose, for example, that three candidates 
are being considered for admission to college and that the admissions 
committee operates under the rule that one candidate will be preferred 
to another if the first candidate ranks higher under two out of three 
criteria used in the MCCP.27 Suppose, in addition, that the committee 
chooses a candidate by successively comparing pairs of candidates-the 
"winner" of each pairwise comparison is compared against a candidate 
from among those who have not yet been considered. If candidates dis· 
play certain rankings under the three criteria, the agenda alone will 
25. See p. 771 infra. 
26. See id. 
27. This example is often used to illustrate that decision by majority vote will not 
necessarily be consistent from one occasion to the next even though the same issue is 
voted on and the voters have the same preferences. Sec, e.g .. K. ARROW, supra note I, al 
2·3; R. MUSGRAVE 8e P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 3, at 106. This "voting paradox" is altered 
for the purposes of this article by replacing voters with criteria. 
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determine the winner. Suppose the candidates are A, B, and C and 
that the rankings under the three criteria are as follows: 
Ranking Criterion I Criterion 2 Criterion 3 
Best A B c 
Middle B c A 
Worst c A B 
Any of the three candidates can be chosen, depending on which pair of 
candidates is compared first: 
\Vinner of 
First Pair First Pair Second Pair Overall Winner 
A versus B A A versus C c 
B versus C B B \'ersus A A 
A versus C c C versus B B 
An admissions process that operated in this fashion would violate 
axiom VII because in some situations the agenda would influence the 
choice between candidates.:i8 
It is unlikely that admissions committees have analyzed possible 
agenda influences in their selection processes. It seems safe to assume 
that, if asked, most committees would agTee that agenda influences 
.·u shouldl1()t:~ha\•e_:anyeffect=onthe cho1ce~bet\\·eericaridi0ates. }\:~_'rco""'n~:~~.~~~~~~~~~~~ 
trary assertion would admit that substanti\'e criteria do not alone de-
termine which candidate will be chosen. 
8. Axiom VIII: For ever)' possible set of alternatives, if one member 
of the set ranks higher than a second member in every criterio11 
used in the choice f1rocess, then the second member will not be 
chosen. 
Axiom VIII precludes the choice of an alternative that is inferior to 
28. This type of admissions process can also violate other axioms. Suppose the rank-
ings of four candidates under three criteria are as follows: 
Ranking Criterion I Criterion 2 Criterion 3 
First y x w 
Second x w z 
Third w z y 
Fourth z y x 
Suppose that in the first pairwise comparison W is compared lo X; X would emerge the 
winner of that comparison. Suppose that X is then compared lo Y; Y would be the 
winner of that comparison, but Z would emerge as the choice after being compared with 
Y in the final pairwise comparison. Z, however, is inferior to \'\' under every criterion. A 
choice process tha l selects a candidate when there is another candida tc superior under 
every criterion violates axiom VIII. See pp. 724-25 infra. 
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another alternative under every criterion.29 Admissions MCCPs com-
bine desirable applicant characteristics into a choice. If two candidates 
are equal under all criteria but one, then the candidate that is superior 
under the remaining criterion would be more desirable. Hence, if 
candidate A is superior to candidate B under every criterion, A is a 
more desirable candidate than B. Rationality requires that B not be 
chosen when a totally superior candidate, A, is available. All admis-
sions committees would claim, if asked, that this axiom characterizes 
their MCCP. 
9. Axiom IX: For any two alternatives, A and B, conslrucl their com-
parative categorical rankings. If there are any other two allenw-
tives, C and D, where Chas the same comparative rankings relative 
lo Das A has lo B, and Dis nol chosen over C, then Bis not chosen 
over A. 
Axiom IX requires that switching a candidate's social security num-
ber and other irrelevant characteristics not alter the choice.30 Most 
admissions officers would claim that this axiom characterizes their own 
choice process, i.e., that supposedly irreleYant criteria do not influence 
the choice between candidates.31 
e--;--TheA.1wlyiieUse~o[theliztefiuillnconsisten9 Resutr_=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
The appendices contain a proof of a "possibility theorem"32 estab-
lishing that an J\ICCP cannot simultaneously satisfy all nine axioms.aa 
The possibility theorem aids in the analysis of i\lCCPs in three ways. 
First, the law may require that an MCCP satisfy all nine axioms or 
institutions may claim that one does so. An awareness of the possibility 
2!1. See p. 772 infra. 
The analysis of MCCPs in this article focuses on a single step in which one candidate is 
chosen. Axiom \'111 precludes the choice of candidate B when another candidate, A, is 
superior to B under cn~ry criterion. If A is chosen in one step, in the next step B coul1l 
be chosen without Yiolating axiom \'III. because A would no longer be in the pool of 
candidates. See pp. 720·21 su/1ra. 
30. See p. 772 infra. 
31. The examination here focust·s on the admissions process at a particular period in 
time, such as one year. ll is dear that criteria change compil'xio11 or arc aucll'tl O\t'r timl'. 
See Regl'llls ol' l'nh·. of Cal. , .. Bakkt'. !18 S. Ct. 2733. 2ili5-lili app. (Hli8) (opinion ol 
Powell. j.) ("concl'pl of dil·ersit~" cxpa11dl'd rcct'nlly in Har\'anl program Lo make it 
cll'sirabk that l.'ach class ronlain 110111ridal numbers of studt'nls from "disadvanlagt•tl 
Cl'onomil'. racial and t>th11ir groups"). IL b assumt·tl for purposcs of dt'lt'rmi11i11g· thc 
applicahility of axiom IX that tht' aiteria am! Lhl'ir sig11ifica11n· in lht' admissions prort'ss 
remain fixed o\·cr the period wht'll a particular class is chosen. 
3!!. Ewn though the thcorl'm dt·mo11s1ratt·s that it is i111/1n.1~i/Jlc for ccrtai11 prnn•sst·s 
to satisfy cenain axioms simulla11t"Ously, it is of a Lypl' that is referred lo as "possihility 
Llll'orcms." See A. SEr->, .111/1ra 11olt' 3, :11 37-40; Mut>lll'r, .\11fm1 11otc !!, at 4!!0. 
33. S1•1· pp. 720-!!5 >ll/m1 (discussi11g axioms): 1101!' Hi .\11/m1 (su111111ariti11g appemlkes). 
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theorem allows one to say for certain that at least one of the claims or 
legal requirements is not satisfied by the MCCP.34 
Second, some of the axioms are more likely to be violated than 
others.35 By examining the probability that each particular axiom is 
violated, some idea about the ways in which the MCCP under examina-
tion departs from institutional claims or legal requirements can be 
formed. For example, if it is known that a particular process satisfies 
axioms I-VIII, one knows that axiom IX is violated and can conclude 
that identical cases may not be decided the same way,36 or that in-
fluences not captured by the criteria are affecting the outcome.3 7 If 
axioms I-V and VII-IX are satisfied, one knows that axiom VI is 
violated and choices are determined by the outcome under a single 
criterion.38 
Finally, when an MCCP claims to satisfy all nine axioms, the possi-
bility theorem is useful in analyzing proposed reforms. Reforms that 
do not propose an acceptable violation of at least one axiom will leave 
the process in a form that is unable to satisfy at least one institutional 
claim or legal requirement. However, if the MCCP can use absolute 
weights or rely on a single criterion, in violation of axioms 1\739 or VI40 
respectively, then the process will not be internally inconsistent under 
the possibility theorem.41 
· ··· · ···· ·· ·:n. · A.pplicaiion o/theA.nalysirto·11te Bakke case 
The possibility theorem42 can be applied in two ways to the choice 
processes discussed in Bakke. First, the theorem can help illuminate the 
probable operation of some of the admissions programs discussed in 
the case. Second, the theorem can offer insight into the substance of 
the debate within the Court about the constitutionality of various ad-
missions processes. 
34. The possibility theorem holds only that at least one of the nine axioms must be 
\'iolated. Any particular MCCP may violate more than one axiom. 
35. l'or example, when an axiom is a legal requirement and it is easy to detect a \'iola-
tion of the axiom, the axiom is not likely to be \'iolated. On the other hand, the \'iolation 
of some axioms may be \'irtually impossible to detect and therefore may be more likely. 
See pp. 745-48 infra. 
36. See note 31 supra (MCCPs can change o\'er time; axiom IX focuses on one point 
in time). 
37. See p. 725 supra. 
38. See p. 723 supra. 
39. See pp. 721-22 supra. 
40. See p. 723 supra. 
41. The process may still be internally inconsistent for entirely separate reasons. 
42. See pp. 720-25 supra. 
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I. Analyzing the Harvard Program Under the Nine Axioms 
Eight of the nine axioms seem to apply to the Harvard program. In 
at least part of the admissions process, the program seems to employ an 
MCCP43 that satisfies axiom I by making a series of choices of single 
applicants from the pool of remaining applicants.44 Because there are 
at least three minimally qualified potential applicants when each 
choice is made, axiom II is satisfied.4" Because the admissions process 
places no apparent restrictions on the characteristics of applicants, 
axiom III appears to be satisfied.46 Since no single criterion dominates 
the selection of the last six-sevenths of the class, at least that part of the 
admissions process satisfies axiom VI.47 Axioms V, VII, VIII, and IX 
all are either highly plausible or highly desirable characteristics of an 
admissions process: the process will be able to decide that it either 
favors one of two candidates or is indifferent between them and a more 
desirable candidate will be chosen over one who is less desirable; the 
"agenda" will not influence the outcome; a candidate will not be 
chosen if there is another candidate available for the same slot who is 
superior to the first candidate under every criterion; and "irrelevant" 
criteria will have no effect.48 
Of the nine axioms, axiom IV is the only one that is neither ex-
plicitly imposed by the Harvard program nor a plausible or desirable 
characteristic of the admissions process. The material cited in the 
~~~~~~~~~~~· 
.: : .J>o'\\ielLopinion. ooesnO:C:SLJ)'---tlI<l!:!l1t!::l>J'()gr(l111.__\lses~s0m€ .. killd.__0Lab.~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
solute scales or absolute weights to combine indi\;Tciuaf ratings under 
each criterion into a choice.49 Because the Harvard program probably 
satisfies the other eight axioms,50 however, axiom IV is probably 
43. For a description of the Harvard program as an MCCP, see pp. 719-20 supra. 
44. See pp. 720-21 supra. 
45. See p. 721 supra. 
46. Id. 
47. Seep. 723 supra. 
According to the description of the Harvard program in Bakke, roughly one-seventh o[ 
the class is chosen on the basis of "intellectual potential" alone. 98 S. Ct. at 2765 app. 
(opinion of Powell, J.). Determining the outcomes for the single criterion of intellectual 
potential, however, may itself invoke an MCCP. 1£ it docs, then the elements of that 
MCCP combined with the elements of the MCCP used to choose the remaining six· 
sc,·enths of the class comprise a composite MCCP that is used to determine the choice of 
the entire class. 
48. See pp. 722-25 supra. 
49. See 98 S. Ct. at 2762-66 app. 
It can therefore be assumed, for present purposes, that Justice Powell was referring to a 
process in which there arc no absolute scales or absolute weights. 
50. This statement must be qualified in three respects. First, it is arguable that Harvard 
selects the last six-se\'enths of the class based on the single criterion of "diversity," in 
\'iolation of axiom VI. But see note 14 supra ("diversity" not single criterion in Harvard 
program). 
The second qualification goes to the question of whether Harvard uses a finite number 
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violated. In choosing each additional member of a class, with knowl-
edge of the characteristics of those already admitted, the admissions 
committee must use a system that establishes the relative importance 
of the various criteria. This system need not be an explicit quantitative 
method of combining information on performance under each crite-
rion; it may consist of unstated rules of thumb.111 
2. Harvard's Treatment of Race as a Criterion 
The description of the Harvard program states that in order for 
Harvard to offer "first-rate education to its students, minority repre-
sentation in the undergraduate [student] body cannot be ignored."52 
It goes on to say that "there is some relationship between numbers 
[of blacks] and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse 
student body."53 Furthermore, "10 or 20 black students could not begin 
to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points of 
view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States."u4 
Yet the description states that there are no "target-quotas for the num-
ber of blacks" set in the admissions process.55 In the conclusion of the 
statement one is given a hypothetical example of a choice between three 
applicants to "help to illustrate the kind of significance attached to 
race."56 The lesson of the hypothetical is meant to be that "the critical 
criteria are often individual qualities or experience not dependent 
~-~-~~=~~~~~-~~J:rp-:orr-:r:rc:l:!:-l:>i:rr::s,olileti!ll<!S~(l~sociated-'''it:h-it.'' 5-~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
of criteria in its decision process. If the choice criteria are infinite in number or unspeci-
fied even as rough categories, then the admissions process is not a true MCCP. See pp. 719-
20 supra. The description of the Har\'ard program, however, states that the admissions 
committee proceeds "with a number of criteria in mind." 98 S. Ct. at 2766 app. (opinion 
of Powell, J.). That statement suggests a choice process based on a finite number of 
criteria. In addition, many of the criteria considered seem well-defined but broad enough 
to choose a multifaceted college class. See p. 719 supra (listing criteria). Unfortunately, 
the description does not provide enough information for one to determine whether there 
is a finite set of criteria. See 98 S. Ct. at 2iG2-66 app. (opinion of Powell, ].). 
A final qualification invohes the question of whether the Harvard program satisfies 
axiom I. There is evidence that at least part of the process operates as a one-by-one choice 
of members of the class. See p. 720 su/Jra. Unfortunately, again, the materials give in-
sufficient information to determine for certain whether axiom I applies. 
51. See pp. 721-22 supra. 
52. 98 S. Ct. at 2765 app. (opinion of Powell, J.). 
53. Id. at 2766 app. 
54. Id. at 2765-66 app. 
55. Id. at 2765 app. 
56. Id. at 2766 app. 
57. Id. The hypothetical is as follows: 
The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find itseH forced 
lo choose between A, the child of a successful black physician in an academic com-
munity with promise of superior academic performance, and B, a black who grew up 
in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose academic achievement was lower 
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After reading the hypothetical, one is tempted to concur with Justice 
Powell's assertion that race "is simply one element-to be weighed 
fairly against other elements-in the selection process" so that the con-
stitutionally fatal "facial intent to discriminate"58 evident in the Davis 
Medical School "quotas" is absent. Yet the hypothetical assumes there 
are "few (remaining] places to fill" in the class.59 By that point, the 
admissions committee would presumably have admitted significant 
numbers of blacks. Othenvise, Harvard could not fulfill its goal of 
sufficient minority representation to assure "first-rate education to its 
students."60 As a result, the weight given to minority status would be 
lower than it would be if much of the class had been admitted but the 
college was far short of its goal of sufficient minority representation. 61 
The possibility theorem suggests that, in extreme circumstances, the 
Harvard program would act as if it admits students under the follow-
ing rule of thumb: "only blacks shall fill the remaining places in the 
class." If Harvard had admitted most of its class, but had admitted 
very few black students, there would be a large premium granted to 
black applicants. 62 If the situation were extreme enough, then any 
minimally qualified black applicant might be preferred over any re-
maining nonblack applicant regardless of the nonblack applicant's 
other qualifications. Such machinations constitute an effective but im-
precise quota. The probable violation of axiom IV suggests that this 
~~~~~~~~~--=--'~~ . 
..•. effective•quota musctte~impl('!I1T~nted~through.,-an---absolute,,,.weights o.,,,,r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
absolute-scale process at least in the form of rough rules.of tliiimb. 
3. The "Brennan Opinion" Critique 
The "Brennan opinion" criticized Justice Powell's distinction be-
tween the Davis "quota" admissions policy and the Harvard program 
but who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently abiding 
interest in black power. If a good number of black students much like A but few 
like B had already been admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and vice versa. 
If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic talent, were also seeking one of the 
remaining places, his unique quality might give him an edge over both A and B. 
Id. 
58. Id. at 2763. 
59. Id. at 2766 app. 
60. Id. at 2765 app.; see pp. 730-31 infra. 
61. In an MCCP with absolute weights, it might seem logical that the weights them-
selves would not change to reflect the goal of racial diversity, but one of the criteria would 
take into account information about the number of candidates already admitted who be-
long to a disadvantaged group and about the number of spaces remaining to be filled in 
the class. For purposes of exposition, the weights have been described as changing, al-
though one could view the weights themselves as fixed while a "racial diversity" criterion 
varies. 
62. The amount of the premium would depend on the number of blacks already 
admitted to the class and on the numb<.·r of spaces that remain tu be fillecl. 
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by hypothesizing an absolute-scale process designed to achieve approx-
imately the same number of minority admissions as a "quota" system: 63 
There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional distinction 
between, for example, adding a set number of points to the ad-
missions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants as an ex-
pression of the preference with the expectation that this will result 
in the admission of an approximately determined number of quali-
fied minority applicants and setting a fixed number of places for 
such applicants as was done here.64 
The high likelihood that the Harvard program violates axiom IV 
and uses an absolute scale or absolute weights suggests that this hy-
pothetical is exactly on point. Public choice analysis only strengthens 
the criticisms in the "Brennan opinion" by suggesting that the weight 
given to membership in a disadvantaged group will be higher if the 
actual number of previously admitted applicants from the disad-
vantaged group is lower. Such a system would cause the automatic ful-
fillment of a rough quota. 
Justice Powell also argued that the "Court would not assume that a 
university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admis-
sions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent 
of a quota system." 65 The Harvard program was Justice Powell's 
primary example of a process employing a facially nondiscriminatory 
admissions policy.66 Harvard's description of its admissions process 
~-~~~~~~~~~~~~. 
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program will operate as the functional equivalent of a quota system 
when circumstances demand such a system to achieve adequate minority 
representation. Since the Harvard admissions process probably em-
ploys a system of absolute weights or an absolute scale, further factual 
inquiry should be undertaken before drawing the sort of distinction 
63. The "Brennan opinion" did not use the term "absolute scale" to characterize its 
hypothesized process. Against the background of the Davis program, in which each ap-
plicant's qualifications were reduced to a single numerical score, see 98 S. Ct. at 2740 
(opinion of Powell, J.), however, the process hypothesized in the "Brennan opinion" sug-
gests an absolute scale. In a Davis-type process, disadvantaged minority applicants pre-
sumably would receive enough points added to their "rating" so that they would con-
stitute the desired proportion of the final admitted class. The idea of combining each 
applicant's qualifications into a single numerical rating strongly suggests an absolute 
scale process because each quality, including membership in a disadvantaged minority 
group, is transferred onto the same scale of points. 
64. Id. at 2794 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, ]J .. concurring 
in judgment in part and dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
65. Id. at 2763. 
66. The only other example that Justice Powell referred to was Princeton"s undcr-
graduate admissions program which he described as being "'similar" to Han·ard's. See id. 
at 2762 n.51. 
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that Justice Powell does between the Harvard program and an ad-
missions process that directly employs quotas. When an absolute scale 
or absolute weights underlie an admissions process, discovery of the 
exact nature of the scale or weights is the most important step in 
deciding whether the process meets constitutional standards. Justice 
Powell's facial constitutionality test only would be appropriate for 
hypothetical processes not subject to examination at the trial level.67 
Finally, the fact that an absolute scale or absolute weights probably 
are used at Harvard, but are hidden from view, supports the "Brennan 
opinion" view that Harvard's program approximates the Davis quota 
system; as the opinion states, the only difference is that the Harvard 
program "proceeds in a manner that is not immediately apparent to 
the public" since it "does not ... make public the extent of the prefer-
ence [for minority students] and the precise workings of the system."Gs 
The "Brennan opinion" captured most of the results that can be 
achieved by an application of public choice theory to admissions pro-
cesses. In the administrative area, however, the defects of particular 
decision processes have not been as apparent to judges and com-
mentators. 
II. The Use of Internally Inconsistent Multicriteria 
Choice Processes by Administrative Agencies 
Administrative agenciessometimes use.l\lfCCPs to .make regulatory 
decisions.69 This discussion focuses on FCC use of an MCCP in initial 
67. Justice Stevens emphasized that the focus of the case should be on the Davis 
process. See id. at 2809·10 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting 
in part). Because the case could be decided based on federal statutes and the facts about 
the Davis admissions process, Justice Stevens found that no consideration should properly 
have been given to admissions programs not before the Court. See id. at 2809-10, 2815. 
68. Id. at 2794. 
It has been asserted that decision processes that hide the actual mechanics of decision 
may be desirable when a decision involves a clash of fundamental values. Resolving the 
issue explicitly would involve the painful choice of one value over another when both arc 
held dear. See G. CALABRESI & P. Bosmrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 24-26, 57-58 (1978). Justice 
Powell cited as one reason for holding a quota system unconstitutional the fact that such 
a system "will be viewed as inherently unfair by the public generally as well as by ap-
plicants for admission," since "[f]airness in individual competiLion, ... especially [for 
benefits] provided by the State, is a widely cherished American ethic." 98 S. Ct. at 2763 
n,.53 (emphasis added). But see Calabresi, Bakke: Lost Candor, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1978, 
at Al9, col. 3 (conflict between equality-of-opportunity ethic and goal of reparations for 
past bias should not justify subterfuge in admissions process; subterfuge should be rescncd 
for situations in which "irreconcilable fundamental principles are at stake and openly 
affirming one value destroys the other"). 
69. Although FCC initial broadcast licensing is the only example discussed extensively 
in this article, there are other instances of MCCPs used by administrative agencies. For 
example,' until recently, the Ci\"il Aeronautics Board (CAB) used an MCCP to award 
domestic airline routes. Although the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 directed the CAB to 
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broadcast licensing comparative hearings ("comparative hearings") to 
select one broadcaster from a set of candidates for the exclusive right to 
broadcast over a particular wavelength in a particular region. Although 
the focus is on one kind of regulation by one agency, the same type of 
analysis can generate similar policy conclusions about MCCPs used by 
other administrative agencies. 
This discussion first describes FCC comparative hearings and then 
demonstrates that each of the nine axioms described previously are 
either physical constraints or legal requirements for the hearing process. 
Since public choice theory dictates that the hearing process cannot obey 
all of the axioms, the second part of this section discusses the likelihood 
that the MCCP violates particular axioms and the legal and normative 
implications of the violations; it concludes by using the analysis pre-
viously developed to evaluate various proposals to reform FCC com-
parative hearings. 
A. FCC Initial Broadcast Licensing Comparative Hearings and the 
Applicability of the Nine Axioms 
1. The FCC Initial Broadcast Licensing Comparative Hearing 
Process as an MCCP 
_TJi.:~~f§_§J:i(ls-al-loeated-the....bx:oadcast_spJ!Ctr::-;u:--'m~_ --;t~()~_-"""V~<tr;i;__;;o7l1,,:;.s~u~s:.::e~s,:__,,_::_;in7-~~~~~~~~=~~ eluding radio and- te-ievTsfon--fransmissii:Wi. - The- Commissi~n -- has al- -
located radio and television channels to communities throughout the 
United States.70 Since only one broadcaster can use a frequency in a 
authorize service on any route as "required by the public convenience and necessity," 49 
U.S.C. § 1371 (1970), the Board has often withheld route authority from all but one 
applicant. See, e.g., Chicago-New Orleans Nonstop Route Proceeding, 2 Av. L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 22,234 (1977); Chicago-Montreal Route Proceeding, 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 22,224 
(1976). 
The CAB awarded routes on the basis of a set of criteria, including the number of 
passengers who would recei\'e service for the first time, the strength of a challenge to a 
foreign carrier, the amount of revenue diverted from existing carriers, the total beyond-
area benefits, and the need for carrier strengthening. Sec, e.g., Phoenix-Des Moines/ 
Milwaukee Route Proceeding, 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 22,255.02, at 15,051-54 (1978); 
Chicago-Montreal Route Proceeding, 2 Av. L. REP. (CCH) t;; 22,224, at 14,875 (1976). Rank-
ings under each criterion were combined to pick authorized carriers. 
Recent changes in the operations of the CAB haYe made this description obsolete, sec 
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDl:NT OF THE UNITED STATES, AIRLIN[ DEREGULATION, H.R. Doc. l'o. 
92, 95th Cong., 1st Ses;;. (1977), and the CAB's authority to restrict the number of airlines 
serving particular routes will lapse altogether on December 31, 1981, Airline Deregulation 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40(a), 92 Stat. 1744 (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. § 1601). 
70. See National Broadcasting Co. '" United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-13 (1946); 47 
C.F.R. § 73.202 (1977) (FM radio); id. § 73.606 (teleYision); Anthony, Towards SimPlicit)' 
and Rationalit)' in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1, 
7-10 (1971). 
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particular region at any given time, the FCC must often pick a single 
licensee from among several applicants. When no legally qualified 
broadcaster wishes to renew an existing license for a particular fre-
quency, the Commission grants an "initial broadcast license" for the 
frequency.71 The Commission's choice process employs an l'vlCCP and 
is divided into application and hearing phases. 
In the application phase, the FCC determines whether or not ap-
plicants meet minimal qualifications for receiving a license.72 In mak-
ing that determination, the FCC's Broadcast Bureau scrutinizes ap-
plicants for legal,73 financial, 74 technical, 75 and moral7° soundness. In 
addition, the Bureau reviews other factors related to the "public in-
terest," including program service plans, concentration of control of 
the mass media, and any allegations of an applicant's anticompetitive 
or monopolistic practices.77 After these preliminary evaluations, every 
application is forwarded to the Chief of the Broadcast Bureau who 
71. Until recently, the FCC treated hearings involving competition between a broad-
caster wishing lo renew a license and broadcasters wishing to obtain the license for the 
first time quite differently from hearings involving only initial licensing. See Anthony, 
suPra note 70, at 106-10. "Renewal" hearings in which potential new licensees lake part 
have now become similar to initial broadcast hearings in their governing standards and 
procedures. See In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Ap-
-----~=~~~~plicant,~Slemmi11g~frolll the Comparative Hearing Process, 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 430 (1977) (if 
H applicant- meets-certain- standards of past pcrforlllarice_~that_ are_Jlig!ierlllan th-oli1:minii"·--~~~-~~~~~~~-~~~~ 
mally required for renewal, then renewal may follow without makl~g-comparlson--\\~ilh­
other applicants for license; otherwise renewal candidate will be considered in normal 
comparative hearing except that renewal candidate will be favored to some degree on 
basis of "legitimate renewal expectancy"). The Supreme Court, however, has recently held 
that the Commission may use different standards in comparative renewal hearings than 
in initial broadcast licensing comparative hearings. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. 
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 810-11 (1978). 
The discussion in this article is limited to the choice process used to select a licensee 
in initial broadcast licensing comparative hearings. Technically, the procedures described 
in this article apply only to granting the right to construct a broadcast facility. The right 
to broadcast over the facility, however, is routinely granted once construction has been 
completed. Anthony, supra note 70, at 11. As a result, this article will treat comparative 
construction permit hearings as comparative license hearings. 
72. The application phase limits consideration at the hearing phase to "potential 
alternatives" in the sense of axiom II. See p. 721 supra ("potential alternative" or 
"minimally qualified candidate" is one who will be chosen if no other alternatives or 
candidates are available); p. 769 infra (technical definition of potential alternative); 
Anthony, suPra note 70, at 34. 
73. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (Supp. \' 1975) (requiring applicant, its directors, of. 
ficers, partners, and four-fifths of its stockholders lo be United Stales citizens); 47 C.l'.R. 
§ 73.35 (1977) (applicant may not own any AM radio or television station in same market 
as AM station that is being awarded). 
74. See Anthony, supra note 70, al 18-19. 
75. See id. at 18 (technical factors include availability of frequency, coverage and clarity 
of signal, studio location, antenna location, and equipment requirements). 
76. See id. at 19. 
77. See id. at 19-24. 
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designates the set of minimally qualified applicants for a comparative 
hearing before a hearing examiner.i8 
In the hearing phase, the FCC selects a single licensee from this set 
of qualified applicants. The relevant federal statute, the Communica-
tions Act of 1934,79 provides meager guidance for choosing a licensee. 
The statute merely states that the FCC shall grant a license to an 
applicant if the Commission finds "that the public convenience, in-
terest or necessity would be served" by such a grant.Bo The courts and 
the FCC have understood this language as mandating the selection "on 
a comparative basis" of the applicant who will best serve the public 
interest.Bl In response to this vague mandate, the FCC created an 
MCCP for choosing among applicants in a comparative hearing. The 
Commission's 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hear-
ingsB2 describes the :MCCP and lists six criteria that are intended to 
dictate the choice between minimally qualified applicants for an initial 
broadcast license.Ba 
The six criteria are diversification of control of the media, integTa-
tion of ownership and management, proposed program service, past 
broadcast record, likely degree of efficiency in use of the frequency, 
and character. The 1965 policy statement describes the diversification 
criterion as "a factor of primary significance."84 The diversification 
criJe:rion rests on _the belief_ that diffusing .. ~ ... _c_~o~n~tr~o~l~. _o~f~t~h~e~ ... ~m-.. _a_ss~ __ c_o_m~-.~~---~~~--~~--~~~ 
· - -rn.unicationmediawillproduce-an-increasedflow of information to the-
public.B0 Under this criterion, an applicant who does not own or con-
trol any other media interests will be preferred to one who does. An 
applicant who has existing media interests is further disfavored under 
the diversification criterion to the extent that his interests "are larger, 
78. Id. at 34. If some question arises as to the minimal qualifications of one or more 
of the applicants, the applications may be routed through the full Commission before 
being sent to a hearing examiner. Id. 
79. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. V I!J75). 
80. Id. § 309(a). 
81. Ulysses Sherman Bartmess & W.H. Hansen, 35 Fed. Reg. 16,064-65 (19i0); sec note 
139 infra (citing cases). 
82. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Policy Statement]. 
83. The two goals that shaped the :FCC's choice of criteria were "first, the best prnc· 
ticable sen·ice to the public, and, second, a maximum diffusion of control of the metlia 
of mass communications." Id. at 394. 
In addition to the six criteria listed in text, the :i:cc may insert "other factors" into 
comparative hearings. Id. at 39!J. The existence of other factors in particular hearin~s 
does not affect the analysis. One is merely faced with an MCCP that has more Llwn six 
criteria. In addition, a leading commentator on the FCC comparati\·e hearing proce>s has 
stated that use of "other factors" is "rare." Anthony, sufn·a now 70, al 43. 
84. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 394. 
85. See id. at 394 n.4. 
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i.e., go towards complete ownership and control."86 Such interests are 
also more detrimental to the degree that they are in media "in, or close 
to, the community being applied for," or are "significant" because they 
reach large numbers of people in a locality or extend to regional or 
national coverage.87 
The 1965 policy statement attributes "substantial importance" to 
the factor of "integration of ownership and management."88 This 
criterion reflects the view that owner participation in station manage-
ment increases a station's responsiveness to its legal duties and to the 
broadcast area's changing needs.89 Accordingly, an applicant that plans 
to integrate ownership and management will be preferred to one that 
does not. The number and nature of the factors used to discriminate 
between applicants under the integration criterion may, howeYer, make 
ranking applicants difficult.9° For example, an owner's full-time par-
ticipation is greatly preferred to part-time work,91 but the importance 
of an owner's work will depend on his actual activities at the station, 
his past broadcast experience, and his residence within the broadcast 
area.92 
In its 1965 policy statement the FCC admitted that, although pro-
gram service is crucially important to the public, "[t]he feasibility of 
making a comparative evaluation is not so obvious."93 The FCC expects 
each applicant to ascertain the broadcast needs of the community and 
-------------=---t~o-Cie'SignariadequateprogTani-plari-foY.:ih6-seneeds.Iritheabseii<Oe-0r-•-
"material and substantial differences between applicants' proposed 
program plans,''94 however, the Commission gives no weight to this 
criterion.95 
Another criterion employed by the FCC concerns the applicant's 
performance in previous ownership or management of a broadcast 
station. When the Commission evaluates this criterion of "past broad-
cast record," it is seeking an indication of the applicant's likely future 
performance. Although the FCC will disregard a past broadcast record 
within the bounds of average performance,96 it will consider both un-
usually good and unusually poor records. 
86. Id. at 395. 
87. Id. at 395-96. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. See Anthonr, supra note 70, at 29 n.169. 
91. See 1965 Policy Statement, sufna note 82, at 395. 




96. Id. at 398. 
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The final two criteria are likely efficiency in using the frequency 
and the applicant's character. The FCC will favor an applicant pro-
posing technically superior service.11 ; It will disfavor applicants with 
serious character deficiencies,D& but will disregard character considera-
tions in the absence of such serious defects.99 
The FCC ranks the applicants under each of the applicable criteria, 
sometimes ranking ordinally100 and sometimes hinting at preference 
size.101 Finally, the rankings are combined, in some undefined manner, 
to choose a licensee. The 1965 policy statement states that the process 
is "inherently complex" and that "the subject does not lend itself to 
precise categorization or to the clear making of precedent."102 Further-
more, the Commission asserts that the various criteria "cannot be as-
signed absolute values." 103 The importance of any one criterion is only 
determinable "upon consideration of the circumstances and conditions 
before us in an actual hearing case."104 
2. Different Ways in which the Axioms Can Apply to an 
Administrative Process 
Particular axioms can constrain an administrative process in several 
ways. First, an axiom can be a "physical constraint," a constraint im-
posed not by human institutions but by technological or natural limita-
tions. For example, it is not physically possible with present technology 
-----~-~~-~-.. ~_-___ -._-__ -_ -:-~·-~.:_forlwo_oroaacasters to .. snare_ tne same frequency_ a LJne_same_. time~ __ ~i1=1-• --~~--------~~ 
the same region. Thus, the FCC must grant only one broadcast license 
for each frequency in a region at a given time.10 j 
"Explicit legal constraints" and "implicit legal constraints" are two 
97. See id. at 398-99. 
98. Id. at 399. 
99. See id. The general exclusion of character evidence is intended to prevent an ap-
plicant from turning "the hearing into a search for his opponents' minor blemishes, no 
matter how remote in the past or how insignificant." Id. 
JOO. An ordinal ranking is one that specifies the order in which applicants are ranked 
but gives no other information. A ranking that is constructed by assigning each applicant 
a number expressing how much that applicant is preferred is a "cardinal," as opposed to 
ordinal, ranking. 
IOJ. See, e.g., Mid·Florida TeleYision Corp., 33 l'.C.C.2d I, 21 (1972) (specification of 
degree of preference for some applicants O\'er others under various criteria as "small" or 
as "substantial"); WHDH, Inc., 22 l'.C.C. 767, 860·61 (1957) (under ciYic participation 
criterion, two applicants entitled to "some preference" oYer third applicant and to 
"significant preference" oYer fourth applicant). 
102. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 393. 
103. Id. 
104. WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 767, 858-59 (1957). 
105. Note that the FCC's MCCP could theoretically choose more than one applicant 
to receive a license. In such a case, the FCC would have to resort to means other than its 
MCCP to narrow the field to one applicant. See note 117 i11/ra (axiom requiring that 
MCCP choose only one applicant from any group of applicants is not physical constraint). 
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other kinds of axiomatic limitations on administrative agencies. A legal 
constraint is explicit when courts have indicated that an agency must 
obey the constraint. Implicit legal constraints are easily constructed 
extrapolations of present legal doctrine that have never been con-
sidered explicitly by courts.106 This second type of constraint is im-
portant because administrative agencies and courts will sometimes not 
have cause to consider or explicate various aspects of agency decision-
making with the degree of rigor required for application of highly 
precise axioms.107 
Three kinds of legal principles are particularly important in the 
analysis of FCC comparative hearings. The Commission must (1) 
comply with the statutory provisions that establish and govern it; 108 
(2) use procedures that meet the minimal standards of procedural due 
106. See, e.g., pp. 743-44 infra (arguments, by extrapolation from physical and ex-
plicit legal constraints, that axioms VII and VIII are implicit legal constraints on FCC). 
Although implicit legal constraints are based on extrapolations from existing legal 
principle, and have never actually been imposed by courts, they are acceptable as binding 
constraints under the theory that existing legal principle is to be taken seriously because 
courts derive their legitimacy in a democracy from making principled decisions. See notes 
211 &: 235 infra. 
As understood here, explicit legal constraints embody a legal realist's conception of the 
role of law in society, i.e., "law" as an expression of courts' holdings, and nothing more. 
See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897) (object of study of 
law is "prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the 
courts"). Alternatively, implicit legal constraints, relying as they do upon an e\'aluation 
-----~~~--~~qLth_e FCC's statutory mandate, institutional setting,. and relation to the courts, reflect a 
•. ··· -···--far- bro~der.:_ notion--of.:_wha t= is- la w ... iil-our.sodety .. IL ma)·. neverlheless·i:;b:;;-e_•t;;:r_-;-;u_:;;-e~'Jn:h;-;;a"t' __ e;;-;\-:;;.e"'11-... -.. ~_-_ -----------------~ 
legal realists will ultimately ha\'e to see the FCC's implicit legal constraints as "law." 
This change would be the result of the new, activist role that the D.C. Circuit has been 
playing with respect to the FCC. See, e.g., Central Fla. Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 4 MEDIA 
L. REP. (BNA) 1502 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 1978), amended, No. 76-1742 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 
1979) (renewal hearing). Since all of the implicit constraints discussed here are easily 
linked to accepted legal rules, it seems likely that they would be enforced by the D.C. 
Circuit in an appropriate case. 
Only one who argued that the law is nothing more than an expression of what the 
courts have actually done and are actually likely to do would claim that some of the 
axioms are not properly called "law." Such a person would see the implicit constraints as 
merely elements that must be hidden in the FCC's opinion writing process in order for 
the opinion to escape reversal. 
107. Sometimes this effect results from the technical nature of the axioms. See p. 
743 &: note 147 infra (unlikely that agencies or courts ha\·e e\'er considered impact of 
"agenda" influences on institutional decisionmaking processes). In other situations. an 
axiom may express a principle that is so ob\'iously inherent in a decision process that it 
may ne\'er be considered explicitly. Sec note 151 infra (principle that candidate inferior 
to another under all criteria used will not be chosen may be so ob\'ious as ne\'er to be 
considered). The difficulties inherent in applying axioms to real-world institutions ha\'e 
been recognized elsewhere. See Plott, Axiomatic Social Choice Theor)': A 11 Overview aml 
Interpretation, 20 AM.]. POLITICAL Sci. 511, 555 (1976) (need usually to focus on models 
of processes rather than real-world processes themseh'es; "only a few [real-world] processes 
can be modeled with the degree of precision required by [axiomatic] methods"). 
108. See, e.g., FCC '" Potts\'ille Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 144-45 (1940); Greater 
Boston Tele\'ision Corp. '" FCC, 444 l'.2d 841, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
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process; 109 and (3) avoid decisions that are arbitrary and capricious, 
i.e., lacking any reason to support them.11° 
The procedural due process standards include the requirement that 
an agency cannot ignore its own precedents and previously enunciated 
policies. It must either adhere to the precedents and policies or explain 
the reasons for departing from them. 111 The FCC therefore must honor 
previous claims about its decisionmaking process made in case law or 
in policy statements. 112 Although the claims may have been imposed 
by the FCC on itself, they operate as legal constraints. 
The principle that agency decisions must not be "arbitrary and 
capricious" requires that an agency use "reasoned decisionmaking·." 
Whether the decisions are made in adjudication or policymaking, a 
reasoned basis must be provided.m The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, the court with exclush·e jurisdic-
tion to hear appeals from FCC comparative hearings, 114 has stated that 
"reasoned decisionmaking" as opposed to "bidding" or "chance" must 
be the basis of choices between potential licensees, even "when a 
certificating agency is required to choose between two or more ap-
plicants endowed with virtually equivalent qualifications."rn; 
109. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
110. See id.; Administrative Procedure Act § lO(e)(B)(l), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). 
-----~~~~~~~--'"=-~-~-1-M-:=-.See,-e,g"""EnvironmentaLD.efens.c:~E\l.11-cl, Inc, v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 
--··· - f975P''ana-gencfis not required to--adhere- to-a---prior-polic)·v•itll. ifon.rlgfcfl1r'=:J5\lt---laa_\\W ___ -_ ~==~-~~~~=~~~==~ 
requires that agency "explain the reasons for its modification''); UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 
1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (principle that "agency must eitller conform to its own 
precedents or explain its departure from them" is "elementary tenet of administrati\'e 
law"). 
112. See, e.g., Pasadena Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1046, 1051·52 & n.45 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (FCC cannot examine only single criterion of technical efficiency in granting 
initial license; doing so would be departure from long·settled precedent mandating that 
multiple criteria be examined); Greater Boston TeleYision Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 
852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dictum) (special judicial vigilance required when agency changes its 
policies; agency "must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and stan-
dards are being deliberately cllanged, not casually ignored''). 
113. See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968) (rate selling 
must be done only after "reasoned consideration ... of the pertinent factors"); Rhode 
Island Consumers' Council v. FPC, 504 F.2d 203, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (record only vaguely 
describes reasons for agency action; it must "disclose with unmistakable clarity the rea-
sons" for action). 
The requirement that changes in policy or departures from precedent must be accom· 
panied by "reasoned decisionmaking" is distinct from the pre\'ious point that an agency 
must follow the rules and policies that it has enunciated. The reasoned decisionmaking 
requirement restricts the ways by which an agency can change its policies, even when it 
does so openly. 
114. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970); see Citizens Comroillee to Save WEFM \'. FCC, 506 F.2d 
246, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
115. Greater Boston TeleYision Corp. ,., FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(dictum). 
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3. The Applicability of the Nine Axioms to FCC Comparative 
Broadcast Licensing Hearings 
It is not difficult to demonstrate that each of the nine axioms dis-
cussed above is a physical or legal constraint on FCC comparative 
hearings. Axiom I requires the FCC to choose only one licensee for any 
given broadcast license.116 The axiom, for example, eliminates any 
MCCP that selects several "winners" and then randomly chooses one 
of them to receive the license. This requirement is an explicit legal 
constraint on the choice process,117 which must proceed by reasoned 
distinctions and not by "chance" even when the applicants being com-
pared are nearly identical. The District of Columbia Circuit has man-
dated that, between two applicants, comparative hearings "must reveal 
which would better" serve the public interest. 118 Since two applicants 
cannot simultaneously "better" serve the public interest, the FCC's 
MCCP must choose exactly one winning licensee on the basis of sub-
stantive "public interest" considerations contained in the criteria. 
Axiom II requires that there be at least three minimally qualified 
potential applicants for each initial licensing decision. 119 Because the 
axiom speaks of potential applicants, it is not necessary that three 
minimally qualified applicants actually apply. There need only be at 
least three minimally qualified possible applicants in the world. This 
requirement is necessarily satisfied because any given region contains 
a large number of minimally qualified potential applicants for a broad-
-----~~~~~ca~.~s~t-"'l~ic~e~n"-'s~e~:1~2_0"-'I~n~ .. Eractice, FCC comparative hearings often include 
ll6. See pp. 720-21 supra. 
117. The FCC is not physically constrained to use an MCCP that results in exactly 
one winner. It could use an MCCP that selected se\'eral of the applicants as winners and 
then choose one licensee from the set of "winning" applicants. This final choice, which 
would not be part of the MCCP, could be by lottery or by some other method not related 
to the MCCP. 
llB. Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 356 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (emphasis 
added). Although Johnston Broadcasting was decided before the 1965 Policy Statement, 
suPra note B2, the D.C. Circuit has subsequently stated that the case describes "the 
decisional process to be followed" in FCC comparati\'e hearings. Star Tele\'ision, Inc. '" 
FCC, 416 F.2d IOB6, IOBB (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. BBB (1969). Although many of 
the principles stated in Johnston Broadcasting can be taken as dicta, the Commission 
seems to have adhered to the principles as scrupulously as to holdings in other cases. In 
discussing the fact that much of Johnston Broadcasting can be read as dicta, a leading 
commentator notes that nonetheless, "the Commission O\'er the years seems to ha\'e ob-
served the court's dicta as solicitiously as its narrow holdings, and it is hard to escape the 
impression that the court concei\'ed its entire opinion [in Johnston Broadcasting] as a 
detailed set of instructions to the Commission." Anthony, supra note 70, at I IO (footnote 
omitted). 
119. See p. 721 suPra. 
120. For example, any given region contains wealthy individuals of good character who 
do not have any connection with broadcasting. These individuals could apply for a 
license. They could, by employing the right individuals, establish a technically good, pro-
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three or more minimally qualified applicants as competing· can-
didates.121 
To satisfy axiom Ill, the choice process must be able to consider any 
conceivable minimally qualified applicant regardless of the character-
istics it possesses.122 Because the FCC states that it will include any 
minimally qualified applicant in a comparative hearing, 1:!3 it appears 
that this axiom is satisfied in practice. Indeed, for the same reason, com-
pliance with axiom III can be characterized as a legal requirement. 
The Commission must obey its own policy directives unless it an-
nounces a policy change openly and offers a reasoned explanation.124 
Axiom IV forbids the use of absolute weights or absolute scales in 
combining categorical rankings into a choice.125 The FCC incorporates 
this axiom by presuming that criteria cannot be assigned "absolute 
values." 126 One commentator has described the process of combining 
outcomes on the different criteria as one of "subjective 'weighing,' " 127 
because there are no absolute weights or absolute scales.128 
gramatically responsive, and financially sound broadcasting company. In addition, the 
owners could live in the communities that received the broadcasts and could take an 
active role in the management of the station. 
121. See, e.g., Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 l'.C.C.2d l, 1-2 (1972) (five minimally 
qualified applicants); WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 767, 767-68 (1957) (four minimally qualified 
applicants). 
122. See p. 721 suPra. 
123. See pp. 733-34 supra. 
124. See p. 738 supra . 
. H·-~--.-- --~The ~courts_:w.ill_ enforce· tile . reason-ed-dedsfonmaking-requirement...-See~pp.-742-43~ ...~. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
infra (use of single - crit~ri;n-fn-conlra\;cntIC>n on965- polic); sfatement and -,,·ithour ex:-- --
planation is illegal and would not be tolerated by court); Central Fla. Enterprises, Inc. ,._ 
FCC, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (B:'\A) 1502, 1509-11 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 1978), amended, :Ko. 76-
1742 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1979) (renewal hearing) (FCC did not gh·e adequate rationale for 
its decision; FCC orders vacated and case remanded to Commission). 
125. See pp. 721-22 supra. 
126. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 393. 
The FCC has designated three criteria as of "primary" or "substantial" importance. 
Anthony, supra note 70, at 42-43. As Anthony points out, however, there is no specifica-
tion of which of the three criteria take precedence in case of conflict. Id. at 43. In addi-
tion, there is no discussion of the relative importance of several other criteria. Yet these 
other criteria sometimes override the criteria described as primary. See id. at 43 &: n.248. 
Thus, the FCC's hints as lo the relative importance of some of the criteria give little 
indication of relative importance in practice. 
127. Id. at 42. 
128. See id. at 42-44: 
Fundamental are the problems of subjectivity presented by the need to choose the 
winning applicants on the basis of multiple preferences drawn from multiple criteria . 
. . . There is no comprehensive system of priorities that establishes whether or when 
or to what extent or;ie kind of preference ... should have more weight than another. 
... The decision makers thus lack principles to govern them in deciding whether the 
preferences [for] one applicant [on the criteria] outweigh those [for] another [on 
other criteria]. 
The complexities and uncertainties of reaching ultimate decision are carried even 
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The 1965 policy statement and case law prior to it indicate a belief 
that use of absolute scales or absolute weights in comparative hearings 
would be impossible.129 Experience and the nature of the criteria 
themselves suggest that this belief is well founded. At times it has been 
extremely difficult for the FCC merely to rank applicants ordinally.1ao 
In addition, the nature of the criteria seems to defy application of an 
absolute scale even to a single criterion. Each criterion breaks down 
into a large number of elements that are difficult to compare, and 
under any one element there is a large degree of variability in possible 
applicant characteristics.131 For example, the diversity criterion com-
pares an applicant's existing media interests on the basis of extent of 
control, proximity to the community that the new licensee will serve, 
size and area of audience, significance of regional or national coverage, 
and significance with respect to other media.13 2 
In any event, axiom IV, like axiom III, operates as a legal constraint 
on the FCC because there exists an announced policy against the as-
signment of absolute values to the various criteria. Until this policy is 
changed publicly, the Commission cannot legally grant licenses on the 
basis of a secret or open set of absolute weights or an absolute scale.133 
Axiom V requires that there be a complete binary relation134 within 
any possible set of minimally qualified potential applicants for each 
~~--~~~-~~~fa;ense,,..ancLthaJ~th£! MCCP choose a more desirable applicant over a 
further by the fact that the preferences to be weighed are variable in size. This 
variability raises the problem of how to weigh against each other, for example, a 
"substantial" preference from one subject area and "moderate" or "slight" preferences 
awarded under other headings .... 
The Commission has established no principles or standards to govern this ultimate 
step [of weighing the preferences for one applicant under some criteria against the 
preferences for another under one criteria] in the decision process. 
129. See p. 740 supra; Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. 
Cir. 1949) (there are "no essential absolutes" in comparing applicants; there arc such 
absolutes for determining if applicants are minimally qualified). 
130. See, e.g., Moline Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263, 284-87 (1971) (Johnson, 
Comm'r, dissenting) (renewal hearing) (renewal applicant should not have been ranked 
higher on past programming record criterion than new applicant; new applicant should 
have been given "substantial preference" under integration criterion); Flower City 
Television Corp., 9 F.C.C.2d 249, 262 (1967) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting) (disagreeing 
with majority's rankings under integration criterion). 
131. See 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 393 ("differences between applicants 
with respect to each factor are almost infinitely ·variable"); Anthony, supra note 70, at 46 
(absolute scale cannot be established for present criteria because consideration under each 
criterion involves too many variable factors). 
132. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 395. 
133. See p. 738 &: note 124 supra. 
134. A "complete binary relation" exists when the decisionmaker can specify, between 
any two alternatives, that one is more desirahlc than the other or that the two are 
equally desirable. Seep. 722 suprn; pp. 770-71 infra. 
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less desirable one.135 The FCC is required to satisfy this axiom because 
of two explicit legal constraints. Under the principle of reasoned 
decisionmaking, the Commission must choose between applicants in 
some manner rationally related to its statutory duty to further the 
"public convenience, interest or necessity."136 In addition, it must 
choose only one applicant for any particular license.137 These two 
requirements are both satisfied only if the FCC is capable of de-
termining which of any two potential applicants would better serve the 
public interest. If the Commission can make such a determination, 
there exists a complete binary relation within any possible set of 
potential applicants. 138 Moreover, because the public interest must 
control every outcome, it would be unlawful for the FCC ever to select 
a less desirable candidate over a more desirable one.139 
If the outcome under one criterion determines the outcome in all 
possible cases, axiom VI is violated.140 This axiom is embodied in an 
explicit legal constraint on the FCC. Appellate courts consistently 
require that the FCC consider all material differences between ap-
plicants raised by the parties in a comparative hearing.141 In a recent 
case,142 the District of Columbia Circuit referred to "long-settled 
precedent"143 in rebuking the FCC for apparently deciding between 
applicants solely on the basis of the technical efficiency criterion. One 
applicant had been excluded from consideration solely because it pro-
===~O~f!~:!()_-:-:!:>!()(1~~~-st-a-wea-ke-r-Signal-than-the_other_appliq1ms_._u_4 __ T,,,,,_..,.,h=e;,,,.. __ ----~~~~~~~~~ 
court noted that the appil.C:ant's ''othei-atfri1::)iii:esmigliTsliow-mactlfe-
135. See pp. 722-23 supra. 
136. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970); see pp. 738-39 suPra (choice among applicants must 
proceed by reasoned distinctions; illegal to decide between applicants by chance). 
137. See p. 739 suPra. 
138. In fact, there is more than a complete binary relation. Since the FCC must choose 
only one applicant by its MCCP, it must be able to establish a strict preference between 
any two applicants. Indif£erence as a result of a comparison would not allow the FCC to 
choose between two applicants. 
139. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-17 (1943); 
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 n.2 (1940). 
140. See p. 723 supra. 
141. See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 
1970). cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677, 
680 (D.C. Cir.). cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951). The courts will not hesitate to overturn 
licensing decisions that ignore relevant criteria put at issue by the parties. See Citizen's 
Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (FCC failed to give 
adequate consideration to program service criterion because it did not inquire into 
whether program format should be retained when it is "unique or otherwise serves a 
specialized audience that would feel its loss"). 
142. Pasadena Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 555 F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
143. Id. at 1051. 
144. Id. at 1048. 
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satisfaction accorded to those who will listen counterbalances, as far as 
the public interest is concerned, the fact that fewer could hear." 145 
To satisfy axiom Vil, the outcome of an MCCP must not be affected 
by a change in the "agenda" in any particular comparative hearing.146 
Specifically, the choice from a set of minimally qualified applicants 
should be the same whether the choice is made directly from the whole 
set or the set is divided into subsets and an overall winner is chosen 
from the preliminary winners in each subset. There appear to be no 
FCC or court decisions dealing specifically with agenda influences.147 
Axiom VII, however, is an implicit legal constraint following from the 
explicit legal requirement that the FCC choose applicants on the basis 
of the public interest148 and from the requirement that the FCC be 
able to specify which of any pair of minimally qualified applicants will 
better serve the public interest. 149 Suppose that, under one agenda, ap-
plicant A would be chosen while, under a second agenda, applicant B 
would be chosen. Assuming that the FCC can determine that one of 
the two applicants will better serve the public interest, one of the 
agendas would not choose this preferred applicant. A failure to adhere 
to axiom VII would therefore be legally unacceptable. 
Axiom VIII states that if there exists an applicant, A, who ranks 
higher than applicant B under every criterion, then applicant B will 
not be granted the license.150 This requirement is an easy extrapolation 
----~~--~ ..-~fr~o~m!! ....,,:c~e~r~ta~i~n~e~. X.f>licit legal constraints. 151 When courts support an FCC 
·· ::.. __ irtitial license-award thathas~been-ehallenged as arOitrary orirrationaJ-, --~~~-~~-~=~~~ 
they usually first point to the winner's superiority over the challenger 
under certain criteria and then defer to the FCC's discretion in weigh-
ing and combining all of the criteria.152 But if the challenger were 
superior under all criteria, such judicial support for the FCC decision 
145. Id. at 1053. 
146. See pp. 723-24 supra; p. 771 infra. 
147. Although agenda influences may be detectable by agencies and courts in some 
cases, see pp. 745-46 illfra, the abstruse and technical nature of agenda influences make it 
unlikely that the FCC, the courts, or the public have considered the general problem of 
agenda influence on comparative hearings. 
148. See pp. 738-39 supra. 
149. See pp. 739, 742 supra. 
150. See pp. 724-25 supra. 
151. The lack of more explicit consideration by the FCC and by the courts of the 
principle inherent in axiom VIII is probably caused by a perception that failing to follow 
the principle would be a flagrant violation of the reasoned decisionmaking requirement. 
See p. 738 suPra. Thus, axiom VIII may be so far within the core of the law that the FCC 
would not even consider violating it, at least explicitly. 
152. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bay Telecasters, Inc. '" FCC, 261 F.2d 55, 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 
1958). cert. denied, 366 .U.S. 918 (1961); Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2<l 204, 
205-06 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956). 
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would be impossible. In addition, courts will overturn an FCC decision 
if the FCC has not considered all of the public interest criteria raised 
by the parties. 1 ~ 3 If the FCC were to choose one applicant over another 
that is superior under every criterion, it would have ignored all of the 
criteria raised in the case. Such a decision would obviously be unlawful. 
Axiom IX requires that, for any four applicants A, B, C, and D, if C 
compares to D under the criteria as A compares to B, and if D is not 
chosen over C, then B will not be chosen over A. 154 In essence, the 
axiom requires that an applicant's name or other irrelevant character-
istics not affect the choice. Axiom IX is an explicit legal constraint on 
the FCC. 1£, in the hypothetical above, D were not chosen over C in one 
case, then in a subsequent case the FCC would have to follow the 
precedent and not choose B over A.155 The FCC could only ignore the 
precedent if it could make reasoned distinctions between the two cases. 
Yet if the two cases were identical under the public interest criteria, it 
would not be possible to make such distinctions.15a 
B. Determining which Axiom is Likely to be Violated by FCC 
Comparative Hearings 
The possibility theorem indicates that the FCC's MCCP cannot 
simultaneously obey all nine axioms, even though all nine constitute 
legal or physical contraints on comparative hearings. It seems clear, 
-----------~ther.efQr_e,_tha,Ltl1e_LC_Cj§ legally reguired to use a ch()ice 12_ro_c_e~s_s_t_h_a_t ____ ~------~ 
----n:as-inffrnally--in:co-rrsisteTfCproperties:····Al though ·such--a-concl usion···- -
clashes with the principle that regulators and regulated parties should 
not be subjected to contradictory legal requirements,15 i in practice, 
the Commission must be violating one or more of the axioms. The 
main task that remains is to determine ·which axioms are most likely 
to be violated. 
Axiom II is a physical constraint that binds the FCC in choosing 
153. See pp. 742-43 & note 141 supra. 
154. See p. 725 supra. 
155. See p. 738 supra. The general principle that the FCC must follow its own 
precedents or explain departures from them has been e\'ident in the holdings of many 
recent cases. See, e.g., Garrett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056, 1060-61. 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FCC 
must adhere to its own precedents and reconcile its disposition with past decisional 
practice; case remanded with instruction that FCC reevaluate its decision in light of its 
own past precedents); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. '" FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 102i (D.C. 
Cir. 1971) (FCC's "utter failure to come to grips with" past precedents "constitutes an in· 
excusable departure from the essential requirement of reasoned decisionmaking''). 
156. In discussing axiom IX, the focus is on a single point in time. As a result, the 
same policies must be in force for both cases. 
157. See L. FULLER, TllE MORALITY OF LAW 69 (re\'. ed. 1969) ("legislative careless-
ness about the jibe of statutes with one another can be very hurtful to legality"). 
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broadcast licensees.108 Some of the remaining eight axioms are unlikely 
to be violated because such violations either would be easily detected 
by reviewing courts or would require blatant dishonesty on the part 
of the FCC. To violate axioms III, VI, or VIII and avoid judicial 
detection, for example, the FCC would probably have to include false 
information in its opinion. If the FCC were to violate axiom III by 
refusing to consider a qualified candidate, violate axiom VI by using a 
single criterion choice process, or violate axiom VIII by selecting a 
candidate inferior under all criteria, it could not admit this conduct 
openly without bringing about appellate reversal.1iill 
It would also be extremely difficult to cover up violations of any of 
these three axioms. Since there is a body of rules and decisions con-
cerning minimal qualifications, the Commission would have to fabri-
cate an entire comparative hearing decision in order to avoid com-
paring any minimally qualified applicant to others as required by 
axiom III.100 If the same single criterion choice process were consis-
tently employed for any period of time, the pattern of the cases would 
probably reveal that fact and, in each case, the FCC would have to 
"pretend" to be considering the other criteria.161 To violate axiom 
VIII, the FCC would have to distort the case enough to make plausible 
the selection of an applicant who was inferior under all criteria.10 ::1 
~---~~~-~~~It~would~be--.faL.-easiedor_tb __ e FCC to violate axiom VII. In the 
···· ········ ·a.bstract,--l:flerCC's .. refusan:o· define precisely its· ~h~i~e p~ocess--preven ts 
any theoretical check on possible agenda influences. In practice, it is 
difficult to gauge the plausibility of either an inadvertent or deliberate 
violation of axiom VII. In most cases, there are relatively few ap-
158. See pp. 739-40 suPra. 
159. See pp. 742-43 supra (courts will overturn any FCC attempt to use single criterion 
choice process); pp. 743-44 supra (\'iolation of axiom VIII would be more serious than 
other illegal administrati\'e acts; axiom \'Ill is probably so deep within core of law that 
agency would not violate it). 
160. At least one recent case indicates that courts will detect and overturn FCC deci-
sions that are too implausible or depart too much from past precedents. See Central Fla. 
Enterprises, Inc. '" FCC, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1502, 1516 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 1978), 
amended, '/>;o. 76-1742 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1979) (renewal hearing) (Jo'CC order "is unsup-
ported by the record and the prior law on which it purported to rely''). 
161. An effort to "tell a story" in each case that directed attention away from the use 
of a single criterion choice process would inrnlve assessment in opinions of criteria that 
were not given weight in the actual decision. Such an effort would almost certainly ha\'e 
to be conscious. 
162. It is likely that if any significant distortion were involved, courts would detect it 
and vacate the FCC action. See Central Fla. Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 4 MEDIA L. REP. 
(BNA) 1502, 1510 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 1978), amended, No. 76-1742 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1979) 
(renewal hearing) (1965 policy statement "imposed an orderliness on the inquiry which 
made it obvious when applicants were not in fact on an equal footing"). 
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plicants163 and the FCC should be able to detect the end result of 
agenda influences, at least when they lead to selection of an applicant 
who is clearly inferior to at least one other applicant. In such a situa-
tion, a reviewing court could also detect this result. It would, however, 
be unable to correct the underlying agenda influences, unless the FCC 
had made these influences plain in its decision.164 Moreover, if one of 
a group of quite similar applicants prevailed under the MCCP, de-
liberate or inadvertent agenda influences might be impossible for 
anyone to detect. 
The situation is roughly the same for axioms I and V. Although it 
would probably be easy to detect a choice of a clearly inferior applicant 
resulting from a violation of either axiom, it would be difficult to 
determine which, if either, of these axioms had been violated. Even 
worse, it would be virtually impossible to detect any problem at all 
when the hearing compared a group of similar applicants. A violation 
of axiom I would mean that that the FCC does not rely entirely on the 
MCCP to choose one applicant. In some cases the FCC might use 
chance or legally irrelevant considerations to choose a final licensee. In 
order to do so, it would have to offer false reasons related to the public 
interest in support of its decision. The same kind of deception would 
be required to disguise the violation of axiom V that would take place 
if the FCC were unable to distinguish between roughly similar can-
didates on the basis of public interest considerations,165 or chose to 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
------ - -~--~selecitilieless desirable ... ofa pa1I'of cand1dates._Yet,inanysucn .cas_e,Jt~_ ~~~~~~~~~~ 
would be easy to emphasize minor differences between candidates and 
write a conclusory opinion that would pass muster.166 
163. Although the FCC often considers three or more minimally qualified applicants 
for a particular license, the number rarely exceeds five or six for a particular case. See 
note 121 supra (citing cases). 
164. FCC opinions usually indicate the rankings of the applicants under various criteria 
and give sequential overall comparisons of applicants to explain the choice made. See, 
e.g., Mid·Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d I, 21-22 (1972); WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 
767, 881-82 (1957). When only a few applicants are considered, it is difficult to imagine 
that an applicant who is clearly inferior to another would be chosen because of agenda 
influences. There would be a natural inclination to "test" the winner against other strong 
candidates either as a final step in the decision process or in the opinion. As Jong as there 
are only a few applicants, the FCC and the courts can easily compare the "winner" against 
all the other applicants. 
165. Commentators have recognized the possibility that the FCC may labor diligently 
to write an opinion that rests solidly on public interest grounds. See H. FRIENDLY, THE 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 59-60 (1962) (FCC opinions sometimes include "tortuous 
argumentation wherein the opinion writer seeks to give the successful applicant a prefer-
ence under every 'criterion' or at least to minimize its disadvantage"); id. at 63 (changes in 
policy may be disguised so that "the opinion writers remain free to pull [the prior 
authorities] out of the drawer whenever the agency wishes to reach a result supportable 
by the old rule but not the new"). 
166. The FCC usually simply states the rankings of various applicants under different 
criteria and then selects a licensee after a sequence of conclusory comparisons between 
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Axioms IV and IX could be violated most easily and with the least 
chance of detection because either axiom may be violated without any 
conscious falsification on the part of the Commission. The FCC can 
violate axiom IV without consciously using absolute scales or absolute 
weights if it uses rough rules of thumb to compare the significance of 
characteristics under different criteria. Use of rough rules of thumb 
can violate axiom IV as effectively as use of absolute weights or of an 
absolute scale.167 Moreover, it would be hard to detect a deliberate or 
inadvertent violation of axiom IV, even if the comparative hearing 
process did not violate any of the other axioms.168 As long as the FCC 
claims that "[t]he weight to be given to each factor is dependent upon 
the circumstances of each particular case,"169 no rationale need support 
the use of particular weights in any given case other than talismanic 
public interest language. As a result, it would be easy to hide absolute 
weights or absolute scales behind a facade of conclusory statements 
much like those that presently characterize FCC opinions. Further, the 
rough rules of thumb might shift over time as the Commission changed 
its conception of the public interest. The FCC would feel no need to 
articulate the change since the weights used in any decision could be 
characterized as unique.170 Such circumstances would probably prevent 
detection of a system of absolute weights. One could not distinguish 
between the claim that no absolute weights or absolute scales are used 
-~--~~~-~-_~::_~_=an=<1=tl:le:=cla,im-:-t:ha:t~l!:C:~~~!ght~:::~llc:l.---~ales-are-used,-but-the-pr-eGise--------~~~--~----~~ 
weights or scales change over time.1 n ·· · -
applicants based on performance under all of the criteria. See note 164 supra (citing cases). 
Since the treatment of the significance of comparative performance under each criterion 
is conclusory, as long as a candidate is superior under at least one criterion, that candidate 
can be chosen. In fact, commentators have noted that the comparative hearing process 
seems to operate without any apparent rules governing the combination of criteria into a 
choice. See note 171 infra. 
167. See pp. 721-22 supra. 
168. If some of the other axioms are violated, detection of a violation of axiom IV 
would be even more difficult. For example, if the FCC violated axiom IX by letting 
influel)ces not covered by the criteria affect the decision, then decisions might be too 
haphazard to allow detection of absolute weights or absolute scales. 
169. Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 1176 (1951). The FCC repeated this assertion 
after its 1965 policy statement. See p. 736 suPra. 
170. Although there is a requirement both that changes in policy be articulated and 
that a reasoned explanation be given for the changes, see p. 738 supra, if the FCC 
uses different weights in each particular case, there is no general policy to alter or explain. 
171. Commentators have repeatedly noted that the FCC operates with no mies for the 
combination of criteria into a choice. See, e.g., H. FRIENOLY, supra note 165, at 67 (FCC 
"must develop enough courage to penetrate the fog it has helped create" by revealing 
clearly what weight newspaper ownership will carry); Botein, Comparative Broadcast 
Licensing Procedures and the Rule of Law: A Fuller Investigation, 6 GA. L. REV. 743, 
752-54 (1972) (FCC comparative hearings operate under ,·ague and contradictory criteria 
and are inherently subjective). In a statistical analysis of comparative hearings for grant-
ing television stations, one study has even shown that qualities that the FCC claims 
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If the FCC's MCCP violates axiom IX, then factors not among the 
criteria claimed to comprise the MCCP may enter into the decision 
process. In this case, the FCC would have to hide its use of outside 
factors by not revealing the entire basis for its decision. Axiom IX, 
however, can also be violated without any intent to deceive on the part 
of the Commission. The objectives of the decision process may be so ill-
defined that identical cases are not necessarily decided identically.n:i 
A violation of axiom IX arising in this manner would be difficult 
to detect. Absolutely identical cases will never arise, and it is hard 
to evaluate the significance of small variations from case to case when 
the weights that criteria will receive in different cases are as ill-defined 
as they are at present. 
This discussion indicates the futility of attempting to establish def-
initely, by empirical analysis, which of the nine axioms is violated. 
The more difficult it is to detect the violation of any particular axiom, 
the more likely it is that the axiom is, in fact, violated. When detection 
is easy, appellate review and public criticism will forestall or rapidly 
correct violations. Conversely, difficult detection may tempt the Com-
mission to commit violations. 
C. General Implications of this Analysis 
- -- -- ---· ---···---- --·-··---·-·-
One might suggest that, despite the results derived here, the compara-
tive hearing works well enough to be continued. It is important, how-
ever, to recognize the seriousness of the comparative hearing's defects. 
Any violation of an axiom by the FCC constitutes a violation of a legal 
standard. In addition, some of the most likely violations are also the 
most serious. If axiom I is violated, the FCC does not, or cannot, 
despite its claims, rely entirely on its MCCP to choose a single broad-
are desirable actually have lessened an applicant's chances of being awarded a license. 
See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. McGOWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGUL.\TION 
112-14 (1973). 
One recent case may indicate some judicial awareness of this problem. See Central Fla. 
Enterprises, Inc. '" FCC, 4 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 1502, 1510 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25, 1978), 
amended, No. 76-1742 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1979) (renewal hearing) (FCC has not "even 
vaguely described how it aggregated its findings into the decisive balance," but simply 
indicated that it relied on "'administrative "feel"'"; "[s]uch intuitional forms of decision· 
making, completely opaque to judicial review, fall somewhere on the distant side of 
arbitrary''). 
172. The Commission has only the vague statutory standard of the "public convenience, 
interest or necessity" as an ultimate guide for its choices. See p. 734 supra; H. FRIENDLY, 
suPra note 165, at 54-57 (vagueness of congressional mandate leaves FCC to perform 
frustrating task with little guidance). 
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cast licensee in each case.173 If axiom V is violated, the Commission 
either cannot draw distinctions based on the statutory public interest 
standard, or it makes some decisions directly contrary to that stan-
dard.174 If axiom IV is violated, then the Commission uses a secret 
system of absolute scales or absolute weights despite claims to the con-
trary.175 If axiom IX is violated, then irrelevant factors are influencing 
decisions or the choice process is so ill-defined that identical cases may 
not be decided identically.li 0 Each of these violations contravenes 
deeply-held tenets of the administrative process: those subject to the 
process are entitled to be given at least a rudimentary knowledge of its 
operation, 177 and agencies gain their power from and must adhere to 
the statutory purposes specified by the legislative branch.178 
The possibility theorem's attack upon comparative hearings is bol-
stered by commentators' criticisms. Three common criticisms of the 
process are that it fails to implement the policy objectives inherent in 
the agency's own criteria,179 that its extreme vagueness engenders a 
173. See p. 739 supra. 
174. See pp. 741-42 supra. 
175. See pp. 740-41 supra. The secret use of absolute scales or absolute weights may 
not be deliberate. See p. 747 supra. 
"176. See pp. 744, 748 supra. 
177. See p. 738 supra (reasoned decisionmaking requirements). Some commentators 
ha\'e contended that when there is an allocatiYe decision that invol\'es a clash of 
fundamental values, it may be desirable to allow the clash to be resolved in a way that 
-------------does-not-appear~to-violate-either~value-,-SuGh-a~result~is-usuall-p-acwmplished~via--!!sub·-~~-~--~~~~~~--~ 
-· ·-- ·-·-----ter£uges"··th-aThide-the-fact--thacone- value-will be-satrificetl-for-the-sakTon1JlotheY.-Sire-
note 68 supra. It is doubtful, however, that these commentators would judge that preserv-
ing all of the axioms, especially IV and \'I, which could be violated without sacrificing 
the principles of rational decisionmaking, is a vital enough objecti\'e to justify subterfuge. 
178. In theory, Congress cannot delegate power to agencies unless it does so by legisla-
tion whose "explicit or reasonably discernible implicit purposes, and ... history, taken 
together" provide "the administrator with sufficiently clear guidance" so that a re\'iewing 
court "can 'ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.'" McGowan, Con-
gress, Court, and Control of Delegated Power, 77 'CoLUM. L. REv. 1119, 1127-28 (19i7) 
(footnote omitted). In practice this "delegation doctrine" is never used by federal courts to 
strike down legislation. Id. at 1127. Judge McGowan, however, has suggested that it might 
be appropriate to revive the doctrine for cases "in which Congress debates alternath·e 
policy choices entirely feasible for it to make, but chooses instead to compromise the 
matter by delegation in order to get a bill enacted or to avert the assumption of direct 
responsibility.'' Id. at 1129-30 (footnotes omitted). In the Judge's opinion, such cases in-
volve "a subversion of the democratic decisionmaking contemplated by the Constitution, 
as well as an imposition upon both the administrative process and judicial review." Id. at 
1130 (footnote omitted). 
179. See note 171 supra; Fisher, The President's Comment, 21 FED. CoM. B.J. 117, 118 
(1967) (procedures have "not reflected the only two policy principles [di\'ersification of 
ownership and integration of management and ownership] of consequence in the broad-
cast field"); Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications 
Commission, 63 GEO. L.J. 705, 715-18 (1975) (criteria and standards for combining them 
often ignored or unsatisfactorily explained away; failure to implement policies inherent 
in many criteria is e\'ident and there is some evidence that political or other biases 
dictate some decisions). 
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great potential for illegitimate influences,180 and that it is too time-
consuming and expensive.181 The first criticism is clearly related to 
possible violations of the axioms. If axiom IX is violated, then either 
the criteria are applied inconsistently or factors other than the criteria 
affect decisions. If axiom I or the first part of axiom V are violated, then 
the decision process does not use the criteria as the sole vehicle for 
choosing licensees. If the second part of axiom Vis violated, the MCCP 
picks the less desirable of a pair of applicants. If axiom VI is violated, 
all but one of the criteria are ignored. If axiom VIII is violated, then 
an applicant who is inferior to another under every criterion may be 
chosen. If axiom VII is violated, then the agenda as well as the criteria 
influence the decision. Only a violation of axiom IV might not involve 
a serious departure from the policies inherent in the criteria, but even 
if that axiom is violated, continual shifting of the weights, scales, or 
rough rules of thumb employed can leave the impression that the 
policies underlying the criteria are not implemented in a consistent 
manner.182 
The possibility theorem also helps illuminate the fear that illicit in-
fluences might enter into the process. Three of the five axioms most 
likely to be violated, I, V, and IX, are axioms that limit the process to 
a decision based on the criteria.183 If the comparative hearing process 
violates any of these axioms, then it is likely that outside and possibly 
illicit influences affect the decision process.184 
. . . ____ __ .. FinaUy,..gi.ven-the-nature.,.of_the..axioms_and.th.e_fac.t_thaLone~o~f"-"'tlo.,:;.1e=,;m~. =~~~~~~~~~~ 
-----mus-t~l>e-viofaie<l~TI: is-iiol: surprising thaTtne-comparativehearingprcF· 
cess has turned out to be costly and time-consuming. If no absolute 
180. See Geller, supra note 179, at 715-18 (flexibility of process FCC uses in selecting 
licensees leads to heavy role for preferences of commissioners); Johnson, A New Fidelity 
to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEO. L.J. 869, 883, 885 (1971) (discussing attempts by those 
regulated by FCC to influence Commission \'ia lobbying and public relations campaigns; 
"deferred bribe" of future employment with broadcasters may affect dccisionmaking by 
FCC personnel); Le\'in, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50 GEO. L.J. I, 24-25 
(1961) (applicants may attempt to influence FCC through congressional pressure, by ap-
proaching commissioners who may be dependent on applicant for future employment, or 
by making inflated and impossible claims about future performance). 
181. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 70, at 47 (uncertainty in and diversity of issues arc 
primary cause for length and complexity of comparative hearings; lawyers in such situa-
tion will quite properly assemble huge record in order not to fail to point out any fact 
that may help client obtain license-result in many cases is \'ast amount of irrelevant 
material in record); Levin, supra note IBO, at 26-29 (delay and high cost characterize 
hearings). 
182. See p. 747 suPra. 
183. See pp. 746-47 suPra. 
184. If influences other than performance under the criteria may be decisive, ap· 
plicants may attempt to apply political pressure on the FCC or to bribe commissioners 
by offers of future employment. See note IBO supra. 
84 
scales or absolute weights are used, or if the FCC secretly uses weights 
or scales that it periodically alters, 180 applicants in a comparative hear-
ing will have great difficulty in ascertaining what rankings will lead to 
a license award. As a result, the applicants will be tempted to submit 
tremendous amounts of detailed evidence in an effort to cover all pos-
sibilities. Hearing examiners, afraid of excluding possibly relevant 
facts, will tend to accept almost all of the evidence submitted and allow 
applicants to argue the importance of each fact. The elements of cost 
and delay will be further exacerbated if axioms I, V, or IX are violated, 
because then applicants can not safely limit themselves to arguing about 
facts linked to the criteria.186 The inability to predict what rankings 
will lead to a license may tempt applicants to expend resources, not to 
improve themselves, but to exert political pressure on the FCC or to 
bribe FCC personnel by offering them future jobs with the applicant.18 i 
2. Implications for Reform Proposals 
In evaluating proposed reforms of the licensing process, a crucial 
issue is which axiom the FCC should choose to violate, in order to 
escape from the impossibility of satisfying all of them.188 There are two 
routes that reform might take. First, some reforms retain a rational 
decisionmaking procedure aimed at choosing applicants who will max-
imize social objectives. Reforms from this group must satisfy axioms I, 
~~~~~~~~~.~ ..... ~.~ .• JticY.:.::Y:I!,:Y..i.-!.J1and~I.X7whiGh-a:re-rationalit.y~constraints,189 Jn.._,a=d,,,,d,,,,i,_,-~~~~~=~~~~~~~ 
tion to satisfying-tilephysl.Calconsi.rainiiiifierenfin axiom-IL Axioms _ 
Iv and VI can be violated: an absolute weights or absolute scales 
185. It is likely that one of these two possibilities holds because there is no apparent 
set of rules that the FCC relies on to combine criteria into a choice. See note 171 supra. 
186. A violation of axiom VI through the adoption of a single criterion choice process 
would reduce costs if the parties to comparative broadcast hearings knew that such a 
process was in effect. If the parties knew, however, courts would probably also know and 
would prevent the use of such a process. 
187. See p. 750 8: note 180 suPra. 
188. A large body of literature explores the process of deleting or changing public 
choice axioms in response to the conclusion that a choice process cannot simultaneously 
satisfy a set of axioms. See, e.g., Mueller, suPra note 2, at 419-22; Plott, supra note 107, 
at 551-54. 
189. If axiom I or VII is violated, the decision process is not based entirely on the 
criteria meant to govern choices under the process. If axiom III is violated, then some 
minimally qualified applicants cannot be considered in the choice process despite the 
fact that they would be chosen if no other applicant were available. If axiom V is violated, 
then either the process cannot form preferences between applicants on the basis of the 
. criteria that are supposed to govern the process or applicants may be chosen in direct 
contradiction to the outcome dictated by the criteria. If axiom VJII is violated, then the 
choice dictated by the criteria that govern the choice process may not be the actual 
choice. If axiom IX is violated, then the choice process is arbitrary in the sense that 
different applicants will be chosen in factually identical cases. 
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method of combining criteria can be employed or the decision process 
can be reduced to one that rests on a single criterion. Second, other 
reforms abandon the rational decisionmaking procedure in favor of 
a lottery or similar device not requiring evaluation by the FCC. If 
this path is followed, axiom IX no longer constrains the choice pro-
cess.190 Commentators have offered reform proposals that fit within 
each of these two groups. The most commonly proposed reforms in-
clude, in the first group, an auction, "first come, first served," and 
absolute weights or scales, and, in the second group, a lottery. 
Several commentators have favored or considered use of an auc-
tion.191 Applicants would be required to possess specified minimal 
qualifications, and the highest minimally qualified bidder would be 
awarded the license. Such a procedure employs the single criterion of 
number of dollars bid, and thus violates axiom VI. "First come, first 
served," a similar escape from the impossibility result, would award 
each license to the first minimally qualified applicant to file an ap-
plication. Although criticized on grounds of general broadcast policy 
and on the ground that programming regulation would be required,192 
such a system would avoid the impossibility result by using only the 
single criterion of application speed. Finally, one commentator has 
proposed that the licensing process rest in part on an absolute weights 
190. The outcome in factually identical cases could be different because eYaluation of 
the facts under a set of criteria would not enter into the decision. 
191. EYen though they disagree about the desirable degree of continued goYernment 
regulation of broadcasting, some writers ha\'e suggested auctioning rights to broadcast. 
See Cease, The Federal Communications Com111issio11, 2 J.L. & Eco:-:. l, 23-24, 30-35 (195!1) 
(favoring auctioning rights to broadcast combined with minimal regulation); De \'any, 
Eckert, Meyers, O'Hara & Scott, A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electro· 
magnetic Spectrum: A Legal-Ecor1omic-Erigineeri11g Study, 21 STAN. L. Rrv. 1499, 1532-33, 
1556-59 (1969) (adYocating use of auction at least on experimental basis to allocate por· 
tions of electromagnetic spectrum); LeYin, suf1ra note 180, at 22-23, 29-3i (faYoring auction 
as possibility in setting of continued government regulation and control). Other com· 
mentators have considered an auction procedure, but have rejected it for \'arious reasons. 
See Anthony, wPra note 70, at 99-102 (auction would be quick, cheap, and conclusin: 
but would result in abandoning public interest considerations in allocating broadcast 
rights and would put premium on financial resources); Botein, supra note 171, at 75!l-61 
(auction, although "administratiYcly feasible and economically valid" would "abandon 
any attempt al reaching a reasoned decision" based on public interest); Grunewald, 
Should the Co111fmrative Hearing Process Be Retained in Television Lice11si11g! 13 A~I. 
U.L. REv. 164, 167-69 (1964) (auction would eliminate delays and possible improprieties in 
present allocation process, but would lead lo cxcessi\'e commercialism and possibly Lo 
concentration of ownership in hands of wealthy). 
192. See Anthony, suf1ra note 70, at 102-04 (first come, fir~l scryed system would ignore 
public interest considerations and would unfairly penalize careful preparation of ap· 
plications; also, hard questions as to completeness of applications might arise); Grunewald. 
suPra note 191, at 168-69 (use of first come, first serYed system would require programming 
regulation by FCC). 
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and absolute scales approach. 193 Insofar as the process relied on that 
approach, it would avoid the impossibility result by violating axiom IV. 
Some commentators have considered use of a lottery to choose broad-
cast licensees from the pool of minimally qualified applicants. 194 The 
adoption of a lottery would mean the abandonment of rational decision-
making in favor of allowing chance to dictate the result in any given 
case.195 As a consequence, the process would not have to conform to 
axiom IX. 
Many reform proposals, although attractive on the surface, will be 
ineffective unless combined with measures that release the FCC from 
one of the axioms. For example, at least one commentator has suggested 
that granting longer tenure for commissioners and taking other steps 
193. See Anthony, supra note 70, at 64-66. Anthony suggests that the FCC take four 
steps to set up "a system of standards and priorities for choosing among mutually ex-
clusi\'e applicants in broadcast licensing cases." Id. at 64. First, criteria must be selected 
to evaluate applicants. Id. Second, the FCC should formulate "standards for awarding 
applicants fixed credits under each of those" criteria. Id. Third, the Commission should 
set up a "schedule o~ priority categories to rank the applicants on the basis of the credits 
they earn." Id. In doing so, a "weighted point system may be helpful." Id. Finally, the 
FCC should award each license to the applicant with the greatest number of total credits 
with ties to be broken by lot. Id. 
After setting out the four steps, Anthony provides a specific illustration of his type of 
system. Id. at 64-65. In the illustration, diversification of control of mass media and past 
~----~~---~~~broadcas_t_record are the only criteria. Under the diversification criterion, the FCC awards 
· --- · - ·-----an-appilcini:__.three-poiriisJLthe.:applka1JL!i~- no· su!Jstantia:l-media-interests.--two-poin~ .... -. ~---------------=------~ 
for no substantial interest in nearby or nationalmedii, and zero--points~otherwise:-Under-­
the past-broadcast-record criterion, an applicant earns four points for an outstanding 
record, one point for a satisfactory record, and zero points otherwise. Each applicant's 
points are totaled, and the applicant with the most points gets the license. 
Such a system would violate axiom IV insofar as it relied upon an absolute-weights 
system as in the illustration. In practice, a system like Anthony's proposal might function 
as a lottery. Because broadcast rights arc valuable, it would seem likely that se\'cral ap-
plicants, each with outstanding broadcast records and no substantial media interests, would 
apply for each license. The highest level under each criterion would in effect become 
a minimum standard, and the FCC would use a lottery as the core of its choice process. 
194. See id. at 102 (lottery offers all benefits of auction-"speed, economy, objectivity, 
and conclusi\'eness"; lottery a\'oids defects of auction except for lack of explicit public 
interest considerations in choice of licensee); Botein, supra note 171, at 758-59 (lottery 
might reduce administrative costs and potential corruption in present system but result 
could be that "by concentrating on threshold qualifications ... a lottery would just shift 
the procedural locus of the comparative hearing's deficiencies" without any reduction in 
either costs or potential corruption); Grunewald, suPrn note 191, at 169 (lottery system 
could be used, thereby cutting costs and political influences on choices, but such system 
might require programming regulation by FCC). 
Judge Leventhal, in discussing reform of the comparati\'c hearing, suggested that 
"[p]erhaps a lottery could be used, for luck is not an inadmissible means of deciding the 
undecidable." Star Television, Inc. v. FCC, 416 F.2d 1086, 1095 (D.C. Cir.), cert. deuied, 
396 U.S. 888 (1969) (Leventhal, J., dissenting). 
195. One could visualize a lottery as a single criterion choice process that violates axiom 
VI. The single criterion would be the outcome of the draw. Chance, however, seems to 
have little to do with the public interest goal that underlies the comparative hearing 
process. 
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to attract more highly qualified commissioners might alleviate the de-
fects of the comparative hearing process.196 An FCC composed of com-
missioners "dedicated to the public interest would be effective despite 
structural deficiencies, possibly inconsistent duties, and vaguely defined 
legislative standards."197 A proposal of this sort is rooted in a deeper 
conception of the "New Deal" administrative agency. Well-trained 
administrators will develop "expertise" in their agency's subject area. 
When faced with a problem, these expert administrators will naturally 
understand all of the complexities presented and then somehow will 
combine all of the considerations into the "best" resolution of the 
problem.198 Yet, regardless of their quality or expertise, decisionmakers 
who conduct the current FCC comparative hearing process must act in 
a way that offends at least one implicit or explicit legal constraint. Im-
proving personnel will be futile since the process itself is internally 
inconsistent. 
Other reform proposals are similarly flawed. A former FCC hearing 
examiner has urged that if the parties to each hearing proceeded with 
fuller, clearer, and more concise reasoning, then "it may be fairly 
assumed that the decisions, both initial and final, would likewise take 
on a desired quality of logic and consistency."199 Judge Friendly sug-
gested in 1962 that the criteria in the FCC's MCCP be given better 
definition by means of policy statements or rulemaking.200 The FCC 
~~~~~~~~~-------~-issuetitsJ!l6!Lpolic:y~statemen.t __ ''to~se:r:xe_the_pJ1r:Ros.e_QLcl<!:x:iJ:y_aml.~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
------------ oonsistency-of-deciSion,-ariO-tlie-·mrtnerpurpose·onmrninatifig-frorn· 
the hearing process time-consuming elements not substantially related 
to the public interest."261 In that policy statement, the FCC reduced 
the number of criteria to be considered and refined the elements to be 
considered under each criterion.262 One commentator has urged direct 
196. See Geller, sufJra note 179, at 720-24 (in order to secure higher quality commis-
aioners, they should have 15-year terms with no reappointment possible and should be 
barred from employment in communications field for five years after FCC service). 
197. Id. at 720-21. 
198. See Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. 
R£v. 1041, 1056-60 (1975) (criticizing and tracing development of expertise rationale). 
199. Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing Applicants, 43 MINN. L. ll£v. 479, 
498 (1959). 
200. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 165, at 67-69; id. at 69 (policy statement with respect 
to diversification criterion "would promote administrative consistency and intelligibility, 
and also facilitate congressional action if Congress desired to act"). 
201. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 82, at 394. 
202. Prior to the policy statement, the FCC commonly compared applicants under a 
large number of criteria including local ownership, integration of ownership and manage-
ment, participation in civic activity, diversification of background of stockholders, length 
of total past broadcast experience, record of past broadcast experience (including sense of 
public service responsibility), proposed program policies, proposed staff and technical 
facilities, and diversification of ownership of mass media. See Television Inquiry: Hear-
ings Pursuant to S. Res. H itr 16J Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
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steps to increase the efficiency of the hearing process: reducing the 
classes of relevant evidence, limiting the hearings in time, and limiting 
the amount of written evidence that will be considered.203 Steps like 
increasing the level of advocacy, refining the criteria, and attempting 
to make hearings more efficient all stop short of remedying the basic 
inconsistencies of the present comparative hearing process. More ef-
fective advocates, like more effective commissioners, cannot cure de-
fects that arise from the process itself. The refinement of the criteria 
in the 1965 policy statement left the structure of the hearing process 
fundamentally unchanged.204 Attempts to improve the efficiency of the 
system by limiting evidence that can be presented do not address the 
basic problem: counsel will tend to submit a great deal of evidence 
when faced with a process that allocates extremely valuable rights but 
does not give a clear indication about the basis upon which decisions 
will rest. 265 
3. Conclusions 
Public choice theory can provide insight into administrative agency 
decision processes. After expressing the physical and legal constraints 
Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 979 (1956) (letter from George C. McConnaughey, FCC 
Chairman); Irion, suPra note 199, at 481. The 1965 policy statement reduced the number 
of commonly used criteria to three or four. See pp. 734-36 sufJra. Only a reduction to 
one criterion, however, would have ensured that the FCC could escape from the serious 
------~-~~~consequences of the fact that no MCCP can simultaneously satisfy the nine axioms. 
-- -~-203:_:-See-Grunewald,-suPra_note_l9l,_at_f78-=-8o-:-(£avonng _~xi:>e~iting lfearirrgs-brFee:~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~~ 
limitations on permissible evidence, on total time of hearing process, and--on--amourit-of 
written material submitted; also farnring deletion of such unnecessary considerations as 
staffing and signal strength). 
204. WHDH, Inc., 22 F.C.C. 767 (1957). illustrates the ineffectiveness of the 1965 policy 
statement. In 1954, the FCC began comparative hearings to grant the initial broadcast 
license for television channel five in Boston to one of four minimally qualified applicants. 
After weighing and balancing rankings under 13 different criteria, see id. at 859-81, the 
Commission selected a winner, WHDH. The choice process was slow, turbid, and unpre· 
dictable. Because the Commission later discovered that representatives of WHDH had 
attempted to influence the FCC Chairman improperly while the comparative hearings 
were in progress, WHDH's grant was voided. See WHDH, Inc., 29 F.C.C. 204, 212-13 
(1960). Three competing applicants challenged WHDH at renewal time and, due to 
various delays, the Commission's final decision was not rendered until 1969. WHDH, 
Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1 (1969). Because the FCC treated the renewal hearing as if it were an 
initial licensing hearing under the 1965 policy statement, see id. at 7-8, a scholar can com-
pare the initial disposition of channel five before and after the policy statement. This 
comparison shows that the 1969 decision was only slightly more acceptable than the 1957 
decision. When the 1969 hearings compared the four applicants under only four cate-
gories, see id. at 10-17, one applicant ranked no lower than any other applicant under 
every criterion and thus was awarded the license. Unfortunately, the relationship between 
the evidence and the rankings was not obvious-the hearing examiner had chosen a 
different licensee on the same facts. Id. at 8-10, 19. If the ultimate winner had not been 
preferred under every criterion, the Commission would have had to engage in the same 
unsatisfactory weighing and balancing process that characterized pre-1965 decisions. In 
addition, of course, the decision process remained very slow. 
205. See pp. 750-51 Be note 181 mPra. 
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on an agency as axioms, one can test a decision process for internal 
consistency. A finding of inconsistency is valuable for two reasons. 
First, forcing litigants and public servants to operate within an in-
ternally inconsistent system has heavy costs. Even the most able and 
idealistic administrators will be frustrated when their best efforts must 
result in a violation of a principle that they accept or are constrained 
to obey. Resources are wasted and risks of corruption or illicit influence 
arise when lawyers and parties have to work within an inconsistent 
system. If the faulty system is an adjudicative mechanism, its continued 
failure to live up to the constraints placed on it may undermine public 
confidence not only in the mechanism, but also in law and government 
themselves. In addition to helping to detect internal inconsistency in 
agency decision processes, public choice theory also helps to separate 
useful reform efforts from those that are doomed to failure. A success-
ful reform effort must lead to a relaxation of one of the axiomatic con-
straints that leads to inconsistency. Otherwise, even well-intentioned 
proposals will be ineffective. 
III. The Use of Internally Inconsistent Multicriteria Choice Pro-
cesses by Courts 
Like administrative agencies, courts sometimes use MCCPs. These 
MCCPs may be required by statute206 or they may be created inde-
-· ·· · -- -- · --:-~- ~- :-206:--~-Fe-d~~~i- -1~~ -d~~ling- -~i lh: ba-nk- -~-~;g~rs·,-----£or-~·examp1e~---eSiahHShes~:a1i:~Mccp_:_· £or __  
determining the legality of anticompetitive mergers. The statute provides that the respon-
sible agency shall not approve a bank merger that will substantially reduce competition or 
cause a restraint of trade "unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the 
transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served." 12 
U .S.C. § J828(c)(5)(B) (1976). The section further provides that "[i)n every case, the 
responsible agency shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources 
and future prospects of the existing and proposed institutions, and the convenience and 
needs of the community to be served." Id. The statute therefore provides several criteria 
under which the agency is to reach a decision. 
In United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967), the Supreme Court con-
sidered the role of courts in reviewing bank merger decisions by the responsible agency. 
Id. at 367-70. Federal law provides that "the standards applied by the court" in such 
cases "shall be identical with" those that the responsible agency must apply. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1828(c)(7)(B) (1976). In addition, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(7)(A) (1976) requires the court to 
"review lie novo the issue presented" in bank merger cases. In ffrsl Cit)' National Bank 
the Court held that under these provisions courts should make an "independent de-
termination of the issues," which need not give any weight to the agency determination. 
386 U.S. at 368. As a result, it is "[t)he task of the district courts ... to inquire de 11ovo 
into the validity of a bank merger" to determine "whether the merger offended the anti-
trust Jaws and ... if it did, whether the banks had established that the merger was none-
theless justified by the convenience and needs of the community lo be served." United 
States'" Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171. 178 (1968). Thus, courts must evaluate the con-
venience and needs defense under the statutory MCCP. 
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pendently by the courts themselves.207 There are a number of ways in 
which one might apply public choice analyses to judicial decision-
making.208 This section focuses on the task of analyzing judicial choice 
processes using the possibility theorem developed previously.200 
Violations of some of the axioms by courts would be highly signif-
icant. For example, if it were known that all the axioms but axiom V 
were satisfied, then either the judiciary would not be able to distinguish 
between alternatives on the basis of the criteria it claims to use or there 
would be a possibility that the judiciary was choosing inferior al-
temati ves.210 Either situation would be extremely serious for an in-
stitution that derives its legitimacy in a democracy from a reliance on 
principled decisionmaking.m It is generally much more difficult, how-
ever, to apply the possibility theorem to the judicial process. Because 
of the nature of the process, courts reveal less of their decisionmaking 
process than do administrative agencies.212 Thus, it may be quite dif-
207. One example is the way in which courts decide the state of corporate citizenship 
in diversity jurisdiction cases. Under the Constitution, "[t]he judicial Power shall extend 
... to Controversies ... between Citizens of different States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
If any civil action over which the federal courts have original jurisdiction is filed in 
state courts, it "may be removed by the defendant ... to the district court of the United 
States." 28 U.S.C. § 144l(a) (1976). When a defendant corporation seeks to remove a state 
court action under diversity of citizenship, the corporation's state "citizenship" is a crucial 
issue. Because federal statutes equate citizenship with the corporation's "principal place 
--~---~----~ .. , of~businessf!,.-id.,.~l-332(&),""cour-ts~must~choose~one-.p:i:incipaLstat~oLbusinessJrom~~se~-~~-~~~--~--~-~~ 
·ofiffutuall Y-exclusi \·e-a:l ternatives:-courts appear to· use· an ·M CCP-to-make-this-determina' -·· · 
tion. See Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960) (ranking 
states and deciding principal place of business under criteria that include location of 
administrative officers, location of corporate employees, location of tangible property, and 
location of productive capacity). 
208. For example, Levine &: Plott, supra note 5, at 563, 592-96, suggests that models of 
voting behavior can be used to illuminate the agenda influences inherent in the rendering 
of special verdicts by courts. 
209. The axioms used here are only one of many possible sets of axioms. Because this 
set includes axiom II-which requires that there be at least three potential choices-it 
can only produce interesting conclusions concerning judicial decisions involving at least 
three possible outcomes. Compare note 206 supra (bank merger law allows only two out-
comes) with note 218 infra (many possible outcomes in procedural due process cases). 
210. See pp. 722-23 suPra (stating and discussing axiom V). 
211. Administrative agencies are subject to the legal requirement of "reasoned decision-
making." See p. 738 supra. Although courts arc not subject to a similar legal require-
ment, and although for the highest level of appellate courts there is no formal in· 
stitution to oYersee the quality of decisionmaking, many scholars have argued that courts 
derive their legitimacy in a democratic society from basing decisions upon principle. See, 
e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 205-06, 238-40 (1962); Wechsler, Toward 
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I. 15, 19 (1959) (judicial judg-
ments must not be ad hoc and merely political. but based on principles that both 
transcend given case and require particular result). 
212. A court is limited to deciding the cases before it. Although it can enunciate 
general standards and principles in any given case, it cannot comprehensively detail its 
decisionmaking process in a particular area of law by a device like the FCC's 1965 policy 
statement. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968) (dictum) (constitutional 
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ficult to discern from judicial opinions whether particular axioms are 
satisfied or, indeed, whether an MCCP is used at all. Moreover, even 
when the possibility theorem can be applied, violations of some of the 
axioms have different implications for courts than for administrative 
agencies. 
A. Difficulties in Deciding Whether an MCCP is Used and Whether 
the Nine Axioms Apply-An Illustrative Example 
This discussion uses procedural due process cases to illustrate the 
difficulties inherent in ascertaining whether courts use an MCCP and 
whether certain of the nine axioms apply. 
1. Procedural Due Process-Is an MCCP Used? 
Currently, courts examine three criteria to determine what pro-
cedures are constitutionally required before the government takes an 
action harming a person or denying him a valuable benefit: 213 the 
private interest affected, the risk of error, and the government's in-
terests.214 This test was set out by the Supreme Court in l\.fathews v. 
Eldridge,215 and has been repeatedly used by the Court in procedural 
due process cases.216 
The definition of an MCCP includes three aspects: specifying a 
~~~~~~~~--~ ____ ~ ___~ ___~ __= ___ ~ __-__ --':_~i~-~~Cil-J.l:t1~~~.!~=of~ci:iter!~-:-!?r=~~:_a~l1at~~!--:~~t_(Xllati'\les,Janking=th_caJ.==-~-~==~~~==~====~~ 
restriction of federal jurisdiction to "cases" and "controversies" bars federal judiciary 
from issuing advisory opinions); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (19ll) (federal 
judicial power is limited to "the right to determine actual controversies arising between 
adverse litigants"). Furthermore, an administrative agency often deals with a single 
problem over a long period of time while courts spend much of their time dealing with 
new, unresolved problems. See pp. 763-64 infra (litigators will not tend to raise issues that 
are resolved and courts can dispose of such issues summarily when raised). Even though 
a court can enunciate general principles in a particular case, it is often reluctant to do so 
until there is a body of related case law. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1267, 1301-02 (1975) (comprehensive prescription of procedures required by 
due process in certain types of cases amounts to unwise judicial legislation; it is best to 
allow slow evolution of requirements through case law). By that time, however, a court 
may be able to impose a clear solution; it may be able to establish an MCCP with 
clearly established weights for various criteria. 
213. The determination of the procedures that arc necessary follows the determination 
that a plaintiff has an interest in "life, liberty or property" that falls within the due 
process clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. If he docs not have such an interest, then the 
government need not make available any particular procedure. See Note, Specifying the 
Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of lnte1·est Balancing, 
88 HARV. L. REv. 1510, 1510 (1975). 
214. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
215. Id. 
216. See, e.g., Dixon ''· Love, 431 U.S. 105, II2-15 (1977) (procedures required before 
suspension of driver's license); Ingraham ,., Wright, 430 u:s. 651, 674-82 (1977) (procedures 
provided by public school before corporal punishment permitted). 
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ternatives under each criterion, and combining the rankings into a 
choice.217 In a procedural due process case, it is plausible to assume that 
alternative procedures are ranked by judges under each of the three· 
Mathews criteria. At least in some cases, however, a court will be faced 
with a large number of possible procedures that are minimally accept-
able.218 It may be nearly impossible to rank all of the possibilities under 
each criterion. If courts use an MCCP in such a context, they must do 
so by limiting consideration to a few candidates.219 But, if the initial 
winnowing process is too restrictive, only one candidate will remain and 
it will not be necessary to apply an MCCP. Thus, the argument that 
courts rank alternatives to decide what process is due depends on rather 
delicate assumptions about the existence and strength of this winnow-
ing process.220 
Failure to rank alternatives under the criteria is only one way in 
which a judicial decisionmaking process can fail to conform to the 
definition of an MCCP. The other major way is failure to use criteria 
at all. This discussion is limited, however, to situations in which courts 
explicitly employ a set of criteria to evaluate alternatives. 
2. Difficulties in Determining Whether Axioms I and II Apply 
A threshold issue that arises in applying the possibility theorem to 
a judicial MCCP is whether there are at least three alternatives, each 
of which would be chosen if no other alternatives were available. If not, 
~~~-~~~--_-__ -_-- -=~ __ tlie11=_crs-tqm:.--tI-;:-Fltii:;h:j~s-..a:-111eI"~ly:-teehn-ieal-r-equ-i-r-ement-,~wi1LnoLh~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~ 
satisfied. 221 As a result, one will not-be-able iosay-on-theoasiSofiffe __ _ 
possibility theorem that one of the more interesting axioms must be 
violated. Many cases have only two outcomes; sometimes, for example, 
the question may be only whether or not a particular procedure is 
adequate. 
217. See p. 719 supra. 
218. There may be many possible combinations of procedural elements that could be 
required in a given case. See Friendly, suPra note 212, at 1279-95 (listing 11 elements). 
Within some of the elements there may be many gradations. Thus, even when only a few 
procedural elements are under consideration, there may still be many possible combina-
tions. 
219. In FCC comparative hearings, the number of candidates is limited both by the 
number that apply and by the FCC's own initial winnowing process, which excludes 
candidates that do not possess certain minimal qualifications. See pp. 733-34 supra. 
220. In FCC comparative hearings, the number of candidates that must be considered 
is limited by the number of applicants. A parallel limitation in procedural due process 
cases might be that courts will only consi<ler the parties' own proposed candidates for 
a minimally required set of procedures. Placing such attention on issues raised by the 
parties, however, could lead to a "yes·no" type of decision with respect to each procedural 
element put at issue by the parties. Such a series of decisions would violate axiom II. 
See pp. 760-61 infra. 
221. See p. 721 supra (stating and discussing axiom II). 
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For axiom II to be satisfied in the procedural due process cases, the 
decisionmaking process must go beyond a mere "yes-no" determina-
tion of whether particular procedures meet minimal constitutional 
standards. In order to avoid the problem, it is necessary to make as-
sumptions about the hidden mechanics of judicial decisionmaking. One 
might assume that courts determine what minimal process is due, after 
considering many possible candidates, before they compare the actual 
process afforded with what is due. This assumption would avoid the 
threshold problem of axiom II. 
It is difficult to tell from the case law whether the assumption holds. 
When existing procedures are found to be adequate, there is no reason 
to specify the minimal requirements or, in some cases, even to consider 
them. In practice, courts usually do not specify the constitutional 
minimum in such cases.222 However, when courts find existing pro-
cedures inadequate, they usually do set out a minimal set of required 
procedures.223 Yet even when they do so, courts may limit themselves 
to a series of "yes-no" decisions about the need for particular procedural 
elements. Commentators are sharply divided about whether courts 
should be comprehensive in specifying what procedure is required.224 
If no comprehensive specification is provided, decisionmaking by a 
series of "yes-no" determinations with respect to each procedural ele-
ment sought by a party would seem at least as likely as decisionmaking 
that first defined, in a single step, a comprehensive, minimally required 
-~--~~~~~~~·-·-· .-JE:rocess.225 . A series of "yes-no'' determinations. woul~ C()nstitute (J- set 
222. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 855-56 (1977) 
(finding procedures adequate for transferring foster child to new foster parents); Ingraham 
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674-82 '(1977) (finding procedures preceding administration of 
corporal punishment in public school adequate). But see Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 
98 S. Ct. 948, 959-62 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) (attacking majority 
dictum that procedural due proces.s would have been satisfied by less procedural protection 
than provided; Mathews test mandated all procedural protection actually provided). 
223. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-84 (1975) (requiring notice and informal 
hearing before short suspension from public school); Goldberg '" Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
266-71 (1970) (requiring extensive procedural protection before deprivation of welfare 
payments). 
224. Compare Friendly, supra note 212, at 1301-02 (comprehensive prescription of 
procedures required amounts to unwise judicial legislation; it is best to allow slow 
evolution of requirements through case law) with Note, supra note 213, at 1520-21 (to 
avoid uncertainty, court should always articulate set of procedures to govern not only 
.. case before it" but also "broad range of similar cases"). 
225. In at least one recent opinion, the Supreme Court undertakes a series of "yes-no" 
determinations with respect to procedural elements that could be required. See Smith '" 
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 850·55 (1977). It is unclear, however, whether 
this series 'of arguments represents judicial thought processes. In addition, even if the 
Smith case was decided by a series of "yes-no" determinations, it may be that other cases 
are decided by a single-step determination of a comprehensive, minimally required set of 
procedures. 
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of decisions, each of which violated axiom II. In any event, procedural 
due process opinions do not provide enough insight into the decision-
making processes of judges to determine whether or not axiom II 
applies. 
A related problem is that there may be no single minimally required 
set of procedural rights. Some procedural elements may be traded of£ 
against others to yield equivalent packages of rights. For indigent 
plaintiffs in welfare or disability cases whose benefits have been 
temporarily suspended ·pending pursuit of formal remedies, for ex-
ample, the right to counsel without the right to confront adverse wit-
nesses may be roughly equivalent to the right to confront witnesses 
without any right to counsel. If there are groups of equivalent pack-
ages of procedural rights, axiom I's requirement that the MCCP 
choose one alternative may be violated.226 
One might assume that judges merely arrive at a class of equivalent 
procedures, but there is no support for this assumption in actual 
opinions. Indeed, in many cases, courts have specified a single pro-
cedural package as the constitutional minimum.22 ; It seems more likely 
that judges see their task as one of discovering such a single minimum 
procedure. But there remains a significant possibility that their deci-
sionmaking violates axiom I because they could easily choose any of 
several constitutionally equivalent outcomes.228 
-•· -"--"~ 3;_-07J.pf!licaof.lttrpbfx_tQrr1is:H.l:-!.?f:..-...· ======· ..-... .  -_. ___ -. ___ -___ -___ -___ ~_-____ -___ --~=--~------~--~ 
Axioms Ill, V, VII, VIII, and IX seem to be desirable traits of the 
judicial process: courts should be able to consider any potential al-
ternative; they should be able to determine whether one alternative is 
more desirable, less desirable, or equally desirable to another; they 
should choose a more desirable alternative over one that is less desir-
able; the order or "agenda" in which alternatives are considered should 
226. Perhaps with this problem in mind. Judge Friendly has produced a list of ele-
ments of procedural protection in deci;easing order of priority. See Friendly, supra note 
212, at 1278-95. judge Friendly's purpose in producing such a list, as weJI as a correspond· 
ing list ranking the severity of various gO\:ernment actions, was that such lists "may help 
to produce more principled and predictable decisions" than does the bare requirement 
that private and government interests be balanced against each other. Id. at 1278. But 
Friendly also observed that some protections can be traded off against others to obtain a 
similar amount of overaJI protection. See id. at 1279 ("the elements of a fair hearing 
should not be considered separately; if an agency chooses to go further than is constitu-
tionaJly demanded with respect to one item, this may afford good reason for diminishing 
or even eliminating another"). 
227. See note 223 supra (citing cases). 
228. Axiom I, like axiom II, is a technical axiom. Violation of axiom I prevents a 
demonstration that, on the basis of the possibility theorem, an MCCP violates at least one 
of the more interesting axioms. See p. 759 supra. 
95 
not affect the outcome; an alternative should not be chosen if there is 
another one that is superior under every criterion; and "irrelevant" 
criteria should not affect the choice.229 Although these axioms cannot 
be said to be legal constraints analogous to the requirement of "rea-
soned decisionmaking" that is imposed on administrative agencies,230 
courts derive their legitimacy in a democracy from grounding their 
decisions on principle.231 It is therefore reasonable to view axioms III, 
V, VII, VIII, and IX as constraints on any judicial MCCP. 
In the procedural due process cases, there is evidence that axioms IV 
and VI apply. Both the Supreme Court and commentators have in-
dicated that no one criterion is so overwhelmingly important that it 
would determine the outcome in every case,232 so axiom VI appears to 
be satisfied. In fact, reform proposals often focus on changing from an 
MCCP to a single criterion choice process even if the single criterion 
itself is somewhat ill-defined.233 Commentators have also noted that 
the process of "balancing" the criteria seems to be inherently subjective 
and that the criteria themselves seem to be incommensurable.234 Thus, 
axiom IV appears to be satisfied. 
B. The Implications of Judicial Violation of Some of the Axioms 
Violation of at least two of the axioms might be acceptable in a 
judicial setting. One might have no objection to a court decision that 
229. See pp. 721-24 supra (stating and explaining axioms III,\', VII, VIII, and IX). 
230. See pp. 739.44 supra (all nine axioms apply to FCC comparative hearings as 
physical constraints, explicit legal constraints, or implicit legal constraints). 
231. See note 211 supra. 
232. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976) (goYernment interest in 
minimizing fiscal and administrative burdens on agencies "is a factor that must be 
weighed" but not "a controlling weight" by itself); Lawrence, A Restatement of the 
Roth-Fuentes Analysis of Procedural Due Process, 11 GA. L. REV. 477, 502-04 (1977) 
(Mathews downplayed but did not eliminate government interest as factor and shifted 
greater emphasis to individual interest). 
233. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 232, at 507 (proposing that single test of "fairness" 
to private individuals affected by government action replace present MCCP in determina· 
tion of form of hearing required by procedural due process); Note, supra note 213, at 
1539-42 (single concept of procedural fairness and decency should govern decision as to 
what process is due rather than group of factors under interest-balancing test). 
234. See, e.g .. Friendly, supra note 212, at 1278 (test in procedural due process cases 
consisting of balancing government interests against individual interests is "uncertain and 
subjective"); Note, supra note 213, at 1519-20 ("[n)o scale has been calibrated" that permits 
courts and administrators "to sensith·ely and predictably measure either the relative 
severity of deprh·ations inflicted upon individuals or the relative importance of govern· 
mental interests in summary action" and e\·en if weights of government interest aml 
private interest "can somehow be accurately measured in isolation from [each) other," 
there is "no method" by which they could "be compared"; result of having to compare 
incommensurables is that it is "unpredictable what procedures are required by due pr~cess 
in particular cases"). 
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violated axiom IV by announcing openly an absolute scale for com-
bining various criteria, or violated axiom VI by announcing a single-
criterion test. In addition, although a secret violation 0£ axiom VI ap-
pears unacceptable in the judicial context, there may be situations in 
which a court's covert violation 0£ the axiom, unlike a similar action 
by an administrative agency, would not be totally unreasonable. 
Such a secret violation 0£ axiom IV might be only mildly objection-
able when a court faces a complex issue. In such a case, there may be 
some agreement about the factors that should be considered in deciding 
the issue, but there may not be enough knowledge or agreement to es-
tablish a wise, comprehensive, and systematic solution that will govern 
future cases. It would then be understandable for a court to enunciate 
decision criteria without announcing any absolute weights or scales for 
combining rankings under the criteria.235 By announcing the relevant 
criteria, the court can encourage counsel to concentrate on the appro-
priate facts in future cases, while, at the same time, avoiding problems 
that might arise from the premature creation of rules for combining 
the various criteria into a choice. Later repudiation of prematurely 
fixed rules would weaken the reputation of the judiciary as a prin-
cipled, nonlegislative decisionmaking institution230 and would harm 
those who had relied on the previous rules.237 
The policy formulation situation just described can occur in an ad-
ministrative agency as well as in a judicial setting. Some agencies go 
----~~--~,-,~,__.,.th'"'r,_o~u,gli (l Re!"iod vvhen_ they learn how to ascertain what policies and 
--decisions-are-inthe-pu blic-interest;238 rhat--period;-ho.\vever; is -meant• 
to be of limited duration, and agencies that have been addressing the 
same problems for decades can be expected to use processes that violate 
235. Many scholars and judges agree that a court should not lay down general rules 
or guidelines when these are not necessary to decide the case before the court. See, e.g., 
Friendly, supra note 212, at 1301-02 (courts perceive case at hand but not total spectrum 
of cases that could arise; general rules unnecessarily established by court to decide case 
may have unintended and undesirable consequences); cf. A. BICKEL, supra note 211, at 238-
40 (legitimacy of Supreme Court rests on ability of Court to make principled decisions that 
command widespread acceptance; "[t]he first wisdom" is to defer decision until Court has 
enough experience to render judgment that will command such acceptance). 
236. See notes 211, 212 & 235 supra. 
Prolonged operation without the formulation of general rules may also weaken respect 
for the judiciary. But, in some cases, the premature imposition of rules may be e\'en more 
detrimental. 
237. When an area of law is unsettled and courts are not using e\'en unannounced 
absolute weights or scales, another type of \'iolation may occur. If one \'iews the principles 
of res judicata and stare decisis as constraining an MCCP to be consistent O\'er time, then 
axiom IX must apply to cases that are separated in time. Yet, if the rules for combining 
outcomes under different criteria are in flux, it may be that there is no guarantee that 
the same case will be decided the same way on two different occasions. 
238. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 165, at 12-14; Freedman, s11f>rn note 198, at 1072. 
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axiom IV only in a principled and explicit manner, if at all.239 On the 
other hand, courts are constantly required to spend a great deal of time 
on new, unresolved problems. Litigants will tend not to raise issues that 
are already clearly resolved, and courts can deal with such issues by 
summary references to precedent or statute when they do arise. Policy 
formulation situations can thus be expected to be quite common for 
courts and somewhat less common for mature administrative agencies. 
Conclusion 
Public choice theory can be used to probe the mechanics of adjudica-
tion, as well as to analyze voting. The theorem developed here is most 
usefully applied to tribunals, like administrative agencies, that deal 
with the same problem continually and are subject to the requirement 
that their controlling principles of decision be both explicit and 
reasonable. Although public choice theory cannot eliminate the need 
to make vexing allocative decisions, such as deciding who shall be 
admitted to medical school or who shall be given broadcasting licenses, 
it can point the way toward reforms of our decisionmaking processes 
that will make those choices more rational and consistent. 
239. See In re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, 
Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 66 F.C.C.2d 419 (1977) (discussing 
possibility of using quantitative guidelines in comparative hearings); H. FRIENDLY, supra 
-------~-~-~~ote-""165,at-14-(when-initial-standard-is-gener.al-so-that-agenc:y,:.can-set-polic;,y_on_basis_of __ ,, _______________________________________ ~ 
·-- ·----·-·--··--·-· eXPefiCnce~--,,]l-iS.im-perative··-tnacsteps-·-oe-taken-·-over--the-years-· 10-define-and--clarify-· it!-';--·-
process of definition and clarification should be "carried to the point of affording a fair 
degree of predictability of decision in the great majority of cases and of intelligibility in 
all"). 
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Appendix A: Overview of the Proof of Internal Inconsistency and its 
Relation to Previous V\'ork in Public Choice Theory24o 
Arrow's general possibility theorem241 demonstrates that individual pref-
erences cannot be combined to choose a social policy if the choice process 
must meet certain conditions. The proof that an MCCP cannot simul-
taneously conform to the nine axioms presented in the text242 relies, ulti-
mately, on Arrow's theorem. That theorem assumes that each individual's 
preferences form an "ordering." An ordering is a relation between alter-
natives that is "complete," "transitive," and "reflexive."243 "Complete" 
means that the relation can compare any two alternatives and indicate 
that one is preferred to another or that there is indifference between 
them. Completeness is, by definition, a feature of an MCCP because such 
a process "ranks" the alternatives under each criterion.2H 
An ordering is transitive if the following is true for rankings under a 
given criterion: where alternative A is at least as good as alternative B, 
and alternative B is at least as good as alternative C, alternative A is at 
least as good as alternative C. This property also follows from the as-
sumption that in an MCCP alternatives are ranked under each criterion. 
For example, if A is ranked third and therefore is preferred to B, who is 
ranked fifth, and B is preferred to C, who is ranked sixth, then A is 
preferred to C. Setting up a ranking under each criterion precludes the 
possibility of intransitivity under any given criterion.245 
Finally, a relation is reflexive if it applies when an alternative is con-
sidered against itself. For example, if the relation were "at least as good 
as," then it would· be reflexive since an alternative is at least as good as 
itself under any criterion. Since the analysis has not ruled out ties be-
-----=~~-.~. tween~alternatives~under~any~given~c:;i:itei:ion,...,..the-:r:elation-..unde~consi~-.~~~~~~~~~-=~~~~~= 
···-eratTonlnu5t-6e-of ilie-Ioiffi-''is··a.rieasCas· good as··-irforderro-satisfy the--
reflexivity condition.246 
240. This appendix links the technical demonstration that the nine axioms cannot 
simultaneously apply to an MCCP to previous results in public choice theory. The ap-
pendix is meant both for the general reader who wishes to know what that link is and 
for the reader who desires to have a "roadmap" to the proofs in Appendix C. 
241. The original version of the theorem and its original proof can be found in K. 
AAAow, supra note I, at 46-60. A version of the theorem and its proof that is accessible 
to the general reader appears in A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37-46. 
242. See pp. 720·25 supra. 
243. The term "ordering" is not always used to describe a relation that has the three 
qualities of completeness, transitivity, and reflexh'ity. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 9. Those 
three qualities, however, are assumed to be qualities of the individual preferences con-
sidered in the general possibility theorem. See id. at 37 . 
. 244. See p. 719 supra. 
245. Even though rankings under each criterion are transitive, the overall choice 
process may not be. For example, in the choice process discussed at pp. 723-24 supra, 
there are rankings and therefore transitivity under each criterion, but the choice process 
as a whole is not transitive. Although A is preferred to B and B is preferred to C, C is 
preferred to A. See id. 
246. The relation "is at least as good as" still permits one to form a strict ranking. If 
the relation holds as to A against B but not as to B against A, then A is strictly preferred 
to B since A is at least as good as B but B is not at least as good as A. 
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In addition to these three conditions on the rankings under the criteria, 
Arrow's general possibility theorem imposes four major conditions on a 
choice process. First, the choice process must be able to operate for any 
particular ordering of the alternatives under the criteria.247 This condi-
tion is reflected in axiom lll. 24 8 If a potential candidate with any concei\'-
able set of characteristics can be considered in the choice process, then 
the choice process must be able to operate for any conceivable set of 
rankings that could arise. Second, the choice process must conform to 
the "weak Pareto principle."249 This principle requires that if one al-
ternative is preferred to a second one under every criterion, then the 
first alternative must be preferred in the choice process. This principle 
is equi\'alent to axiom VIII, which states that an alternative will not be 
chosen when there is another a\'ailable alternati\'e that is superior to the 
first one under every criterion. 25 0 Third, Arrow's theorem uses the "con-
dition of nondictatorship." 251 In the context of the aggregation of indi-
\'idual preferences, this condition requires that social choices not always 
conform to any one individual's preferences.2 ~ 2 In this article, "nondictator-
ship" is imposed by axiom Vl's requirement that the outcome under any 
single criterion not always determine the outcome of the choice process.21w 
The remaining condition of Arrow's theorem is "independence of irrele-
vant alternatives." 25 4 This condition requires both that the choice among 
a fixed set of alternati\'es depend only on the ordinal rankings of those 
alternatives under the given criteria and that the addition of other alterna-
tives in the comparison not change the rankings of the original choices.255 
As an example, consider a choice among four candidates, W, X, Y, and 
Z, under seven criteria.~5n Suppose that the choice process operates first 
by assigning each candidate one point for the lowest ranking under a 
criterion, two points for the second ranking, and so on up to the hig,,,_h~e~s~t~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
-· ---·~--. _::::rariking,-ana::tneri b-ychoosirig: the cariaidCl.te wi th::-thehighest tota.1::.nuffi-: __ _ 
ber of points over all the criteria. Consider the following set of rankings: 
Criterion 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ranking 
First w x y w x y "'' Second x y z x y z x 
Third y z w y z w y 
Fourth z w x z w x z 
247. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37. 
248. See p. 721 supra. 
249. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37. 
250. See pp. 724-25 supra. 
251. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 38. 
252. See id. 
253. See p. 743 supra. 
254. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37. 
255. See id. at 37-38. 
256. This example is taken from Fishburn, Paradoxes of Voting, 68 AM. J. POLITICAL 
Sci. 511 (1976). 
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\Vhen all four candidates are considered, Y will be chosen, but if Z is not 
includell in the pool of applicants under consideration, vV will be the 
winner aml Y will fall back lo third in total points. In fact, \·\', X, and Y 
will rank exactly opposite in total points: 
Total Points 
Z included Z deleted 
w 18 15 
x 19 14 
y 20 13 
z 13 
The outcome of the choice process between \V, X, and Y depends on 
whether Z is also considered. The process therefore violates the condition 
of independence of irrelernnt alternatives. 
Unfortunately, difficulties with . the indepemlence-of-irrelevant-alterna-
tiYes axiom preclude the direct application of Arrow's theorem to judicial 
and administrative decisionmaking processes. First, it is difficult to deter-
mine whether MCCPs violate the condition. In order to make such a 
determination, one would either have to be considering a precisely speci-
fied choice process, such as in the example presented above, or one would 
need to have empirical or llescriptive information about the effect of 
excluding certain alternatives from consideration. Many interesting MCCPs 
are not precisely defined, 21ii and most attempts to determine the effect of 
excluding certain alternatives from consideration would involve hypo-
thetical speculation. Finally, even if violations of the condition of in-
dependence of irrelernnt alternatiYes were easy to detect, the condition's 
---------..• ---=--.-=-1-e-'g""a-L~. a-1~1~a~=-~n~o~r~m~a~t1"e3mprii::aLTons .are rl0Las.:n1earungfi.il~:~o~r~:~i-n~te~r~e~s~ti=·11~g--~-a~s-·.·:~~-~---~--~ .. -.... ~.~ ___ -_.~ __ ~_ ~~~~~_-___ ~ ... ~._~ ___ ~ ___ -__ -__ ~ __ 
the implications of the axioms that replace it.:!;;~ 
Arrow's general possibility theorem holds that not all of the conditions 
in his theorem can be satisfied by a choice process simultaneously.:!:rn Ap-
pemlices B and C link the nine textual axioms to the conditions of the 
theorem. Appendix B lists technical axioms that follow directly from the 
textual axioms.:!uo Appendix C consists of two parts. First, the condition 
of independence of irrelevant alternatives is derived from some of the 
technical axioms.:! 61 The technical axioms provide all of the additional 
conditions necessary for Arrow's theorem.2 62 The second half of Appendix 
257. See, e.g., p. 72i wpra (Hanard program does not specify explicitly how con-
siderations under Yarious criteria are combined lo make choices between applicanls); 
p. 736 mpra (FCC docs not give clear indication about how rankings under criteria arc 
combined to choose single candidate from among many applicants for broadcast license). 
258. 1:or example, axiom IX can be related to the requirement that a court or agency 
adhere to precedent. See p. i44 supra. 
259. See A. SEN, supra note 3, at 37-38. 
~mo. Sec pp. 768- 72 infra. 
261. This derivation is accomplished by proving Lemmas 1-3. Lemma 3 is the condition 
of intlepcnclcnce of irrcle\'ant altcrnati\·cs. See pp. 772-i6 i11fra; A. SEN, supra note 3, at 
41 (stating condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives in form similar to Lemma 
3). 
262. See pp. 765-66 s11fm1, 
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C proves Arrow's theorem.2e3 Because the theorem holds that not all of 
the conditions can be satisfied simultaneously, anc.l because the nine 
textual axioms imply all of Arrow's conditions, every MCCP must violate 
at least one of the nine textual axioms. 
Appendix B. Translation of Roman Numeral Axioms into Arabic 
Number Axioms Used in Proofs in Appendix C. 
In this appendix, the roman numeral axioms are transformed into an 
equivalent set of arabic number axioms, that are then employed in Ap· 
pendix C to prove that the nine axioms presented in text cannot be 
simultaneously satisfied by an MCCP. All of the arabic number axioms 
are either direct "translations" of a roman numeral axiom into more 
formal terminology or axioms that are implied by a roman numeral axiom. 
This appendix presents each arabic numbered axiom and then explains 
the link between that axiom and the corresponding roman numeral axiom. 
Before proceeding with the arabic numbered axioms a few definitions 
need to be provided: 204 
E = the set of all potential alternatives265 
v = a subset of E 
N = a set of n criteria, c1, i = 1, 2, ... . , n 
U = the set of all real-valued functions on E X N 
Given a, b e v; u e U, u(a, c1) ~ u(b, c1) means a is at least as good as 
b under criterion i. 
I: Ax iom-J:-3-e(v;--u)~-a--singie=·valued-cholce~-funciion,~~'hicih aepends·· 
on v, the set of alternatives under consideration, anc.l on the numbers 
assigned to each alternative under each criterion by the function u. 
263. See pp. 776-78 infra. 
264. It is assumed in this appendix and in Appendix C that the reader is familiar 
with elementary logical and mathematical symbols. For readers who do not have such 
familiarity, the commonly used symbols and their meanings are as follows: 
- - it is not the case that 
3 - there exist(s) 
'V - for all 
e - is a member of 
> - greater than 
> - greater than or equal to 
Ac B - set A is contained in set B 
n 




- the number of elements in the set E 
- such that 
- such that 
- implies 
- if and only if 
265. "Potential alternath·es" here is meant in the sense of axiom 2 in this appendix, 
see p. 769 infra. A "potential alternative" is one that will be chosen if no other al-
ternative is available. 
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This axiom is equivalent to axiom I in the text.266 Both axioms specify 
that the MCCP chooses a single alternative from the set of alternatives 
under consideration. 
2. Axiom 2: I E I ~ 3. In addition, \f ul E U, C (a, ul) = a \fa E E. 
The first part of this axiom states that E, the set of potential alterna-
tives, contains at least three members. This part of axiom 2 is simply a 
technical statement of axiom II in text.267 
The second part of axiom 2 follows from the definition of potential 
alternatives as those that will be selected if there are no other alternatives 
under consideration. 
3. Axiom 3: C (v, ui) is defined 'Vv, 'eful E U. 
Axiom 3 states that regardless of the set of numbers assigned to the 
alternatives by the function ut, which establishes rankings under various 
criteria, the choice function will generate an "answer" when possible 
choices are limited to any subset, v, of the set of all potential alternatives. 
The axiom does not specify the form of the "answer." It may be that no 
choice or more than one alternative is the "answer." Other axioms such 
as axioms I and 2 put restrictions on what the answer can be.2as 
Axiom 3 follows directly from axiom III in text.269 Axiom III states 
that the choice process can consider any potential alternative regardless of 
the particular characteristics it possesses.2i 0 But axiom 3 states only that the 
choice function is defined for any subset, '" of the set E of all potential 
alternatives. 
4'. Axiom 4: Forevery u1, u 2 E U, 'Vv ~ E, if 3 n + I numbers a, 131 > 0, 
- · ---{3 r:>-O, ... ;. f3 ~ ->O- such:::tfiaL"Vcie:N,antl _'V'a=e'E:-'CI1:(a;.::.<:1)_==~=t-~1~:~a,--.,cr)~~~~~~~~~~=~~~~ 
then C(v, u 1) = C(v, u2). · ··- · 
This axiom states that if the numbers used to represent a ranking within 
any one criterion are rescaled by a "positive linear transformation" con-
sisting of multiplying the original numbers by some positive number or 
of adding the same number to each of the numbers or both, there will 
be no change in the outcome of the choice function over any set of po· . 
tential alternatives, v. For example, suppose that a composite MCAT 
score is one of the criteria for making decisions between candidates for 
admission to medical school. If axiom 4 applies, the choice will be un-
affected if the MCAT scores are rescaled by a positive linear transforma-
tion. In other words, the choice will not depend on whether the original 
MCAT score is used or each MCAT score is multiplied by the same posi-
tive number, f3, and then increased by the same number, a. 
This arabic numbered axiom follows from axiom IV in text.2il Axiom 
IV allows "quarternary comparisons" between the degree of preference 
266. See pp. 720-21 supra. 
267. See p. 721 supra. 
268. See pp. 768-69 supra. 
269. See p. 721 supra. 
270. See id. 
271. See pp. 721-22 supra. 
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under any single criterion. Thus one can make a comparison like "alter-
native a is preferred to alternative b under criterion two by five times as 
much as alternative c is preferred to alternative d under the same cri-
terion." What axiom IV does not permit is a process that combines such 
comparisons into a choice by using a set of absolute weights,21 2 by trans-
lating each comparison onto a single absolute scale,273 or by assigning 
importance to a criterion not on the sole basis of the relative size of pref-
erences under the criterion but by reference to the score on an absolute 
scale. 2 i4 If axiom IV holds, then the choice will be unaffected if the num-
bers representing the ranking under any criterion are rescaled by a positive 
linear transformation since the size of preferences under one criterion will 
not be linked to the size of preferences under any other criterion by ab-
solute weights or by a common scale. Only the relative size of preferences 
under any criterion, as· opposed to some absolute score for the criterion, 
will affect the choice. 
5. Axiom 5: 3 a complete binary relation, R, that rationalizes C. (A re-
lation, R, rationalizes a choice function if 'r:/v £ E, C(v) = (x £ v: 'r:/y e v, 
xRy); R can be thought of as "is at least as desirable an alternative as.") 
The first part of axiom 5, stating that there exists a complete binary 
relation, is merely a technical statement of the first half of axiom V in 
text.2i5 The existence of a complete binary relation means that between 
272. Suppose that a medical school admits students on the basis of two criteria: a 
0 to 100 score on an aptitude test and a 0 to 4 college grade point aYerage. Assume the 
school uses absolute weights to combine the two criteria by adding 25 times grade point 
average to the aptitude scores and choosing the candidate with the highest aggregate 
score. If the school were to scale down the aptitude test scores by <lidding them by 
~~~~~~~~~~~~,;.,1'"'"00""'· ''"""g!e<1ter __ Rro.mine11ce _\\:ould be .J~laced ()!)...,,.g,1:a.de~P-QtnLaJ.:crage.,_so~tha.womc~choiccs,~.~~~~~~~~~=~~~~~~ 
-·between~ possi ble--ca ndida tcs-woultl-·-be··-ch anged~--·-Speci f icall y;·-aftcr--thc ---•'seal ing----down~" ___________ .. ____ _ 
a 0.04 difference in grade point a\'erage would compensate for a JOO-point difference 
in Lest score while preYiously a 0.04 difference in grade point a\'erage would only ha\'e 
compensated for a one-point change in test score. 
273. Translating each comparison onto a single absolute scale is equi\'alent to using 
absolute weights. By using absolute weights, differences in scores under different criteria 
become directly comparable. The weights translate the point differences under one cri-
terion into equh'alent point differences under others. One could choose the scale of 
quarternary comparison units under any one criterion and use the weights to translate 
differences under any other criterion into units of that scale. The net result would be 
a common absolute scale. 
274. Suppose that academic potential is one of the criteria for admission to medical 
school and that aptitude test scores are used to rank applicants under that criterion. 
If the absolute difference between candidates' scores has significance for the importance 
of the criterion, then rescaling the aptitude test scores might affect whether or not a 
particular applicant is chosen. On the other hand, if only relati\'e differences between 
candidates matter, then rescaling should ha\'e no effect on any outcome. Consider the 
case in which A has a score of 800, B a score of 750, and C a score of 725. If an admis-
sions committee weights the criterion against others by reference to absolute differences, 
then a rescaling in which the scores become 800, 790, and 785 respectively would dilute 
the impact of the criterion. Yet if only relative differences were considered, then the gap 
between A and B would still be twice as much as the gap between B and C after the 
rescaling, and the choice process would be unaffected. 
275. See pp. 722-23 supra. 
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an)' two alternatives the relation indicates that one is more desirable than 
the other or that the two are equally desirable.2 7u 
The second part of axiom 5 states that R "rationalizes" the choice func-
tion, C. This means that for any set of alternatives, v, if x is an alternative 
that is in the subset chosen under the choice function, then the relation 
xRy will hold for all alternatives y in the set v. "xRy" can be read as 
"alternative x is at least as good as alternative y." 
The second part of axiom 5 follows from the second part of axiom V 
in text and from axioms l and 7.277 The second part of axiom V states 
that from any two alternatives, the most desirable alternative must be 
chosen if one is more desirable than the other. Axiom 5 goes beyond the 
case of two alternatives to state that the choice function will select an 
alternative that is at least as desirable as all the other possible alernatives. 
To see how that axiom follm1·s from axiom 1, axiom 7, and the second 
half of axiom V, consider a series of pairwise comparisons of alternatives 
using the choice function: the first and second alternative are compared 
and the winner is compared to the third alternative, the winner of that 
comparison is compared to the fourth alternative, amt so on until a final 
choice emerges from a comparison involving the last alternative. Axiom 
l guarantees that each pairwise comparison will have a single winner, and 
axiom 7 implies that the order in which the elements are set up for pair-
wise comparison will not affect the outcome. Suppose alternative F is the 
outcome. F could then be designated as the first element in the sequence 
for pairwise comparison. F would then be compared sequentially to each 
other available alternative. But by the second half of axiom V, F would 
have to be at least as desirable as any other available alternative in order 
to survive as the winner of such a sequential pairwise comparison with 
~~~~~~~~~~~-·a1Lthe~0Jhei:,__alle:i:::rrn1h:es_.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
6. Axiom 6: 3 no i such that \ta, b £ E, u(a, c1) > u(b, c1) implies that 
C((a, b), u) = a where u is the function chosen to scale rankings under 
each criterion. 
This axiom states that there is no one criterion such that the outcomes 
on that criterion determine the choice between any two potential alterna-
tives. The axiom is a technical restatement of axiom VI in text.278 
n 
7. Axiom 7: \tv f_ E, given n subsets, v1, of v such that U v1 = v, then 
i=l 
n 
C(v, u) = C( U C(vi> u)). 
i=I 
This axiom states that the outcome of a choice process will not depend 
on whether a choice is made from the entire set of alternatives or is made 
from a subset of "winners" chosen by applying the choice function to 
subsets the union of which is the entire set. The axiom is equivalent to 
axiom VII in text. 2 70 
276. See p. 722 supra (explaining "complete binary relation"). 
277. See pp. 722-23 s11f1ra. 
278. See p. 723 supra. 
279. See pp. 723-24 supru. 
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8. Axiom 8: 'riv~ E, if a, b c v and if u(a, c1) > u(b, c;) 'r/i then b I/. C(v, u). 
This axiom states that if a is superior to b under every criterion then 
b cannot be chosen when a and b are both alternatives. The axiom is a 
technical restatement of axiom VIII in text.280 
9. Axiom 9: ';/a, be E, 'r/u1 e U, if w, z c E and u 0 e U such that 'r/c1 e N, 
u 1(a, c1) = u0(w, c1), and 
uI(b, c1) = u0(z, c1) 
then if z t C((w, z), u0) then b t C((a, b), ul). 
This axiom states that if a has the same categorical rankings as w, and 
b has the same categorical rankings as z, then if b is not chosen over a, 
z will not be chosen over w. The axiom is equivalent to axiom IX in 
text.281 
Appendix C: Proof of the Inconsistency of the Nine Axioms 
Two tasks are performed in this appendix. First, the nine axioms in 
Appendix A are used to derive the single condition of Arrow's general 
possibility theorem, independence of irrelevant alternatives, that is not 
already incorporated in one of the axioms.28:.? Lemmas I and 2 provide 
groundwork for the derivation of independence of irrelevant alternatives 
as Lemma 3. The second part of the appendix, Lemmas 4 and 5 and a 
final theorem, provides a proof of Arrow's general possibility theorem. 
A. Deriving the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
----~~~-~~~~-~--~I.~bem-ma~J~R, --th~binary~relation~t11.:l!-:r.'!t'i:C>.11'1:li~f:!~tl1~=c:l:r<JfC:f:!.:::fuJl~=~ •.............. -·--··· . ··--·------ ·-·----· -··--ti o ri~-2 sa--·is-----·~··- ---------- -- ---···----·-- ---·-----------·--·----·-- · --
(i) unique 
(ii) total ('r/x, y e E, xRy or yRx)m 
(iii) reflexive ('r/x c E, xRx) · 
(iv) transitive ('r/x, y, z c E, xRy and yRz => xRz). 
Proof:2S5 
(i) Uniqueness: Uniqueness follows directly from the single-valuedness 
of the choice function postulated in axiom ).:.?Su For any two potential 
280. See pp. 724-25 supra. 
281. See p. 725 rn/Jra. 
282. See pp. 765-68 su/Jra (explaining both imlcpendence of irrcle1ant alternatiws 
and use of Arrow's general possibility theorem in Appendix C proof that nine axioms 
used in text cannot all apply simultaneously to MCCP). 
283. See pp. 770-71 m/;ra (axiom 5). 
284. R signifies the relation between altcrnatin:s. xRy can be thought of as "x is at 
least as good as y." 
285. The bulk of this proof is taken from Plott, Path l11clc/1rnde11a, Ralio11ality twcl 
Social Choice, 41 ECONOMETRICA 10i5, 1086 (19i3). 
286. See pp. 768-69 rn/Jra (axiom 1 ). Henceforth in this appendix, no cross-references 
will be made to arabic-numbcrc<I axiom~ when the axiom m1mbtT is stated in the tl'Xt 
of the appendix. All of these axioms arc scl out in Appendix B, pp. 768- i!! s11 Jna. 
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alternatives, x and y, the choice function must choose one of them if they 
are the only two potential alternatives considered. Suppose that x is chosen, 
i.e., C(x, y) = x. Then it must be true that xRy and -yRx since otherwise 
the choice function would not be single-valued.287 Examining the out-
come of the choice function for each pair of potential alternatives will 
define the unique relation, R, between each pair of potential alterna-
tives that rationalizes the choice function. 
(ii) Totality: Axiom 3 postulates that the choice function is defined for 
all sets of potential alternatives. Axiom 5 requires that the relation R ra-
tionalize the choice function. As a result, it must be that xRy or yRx for 
all potential alternatives x and y. 
(iii) Reflexivity: Under a relation R of the type "is at least as good as," 
an element is at least as good as itself so that for any potential alterna-
tive x it must be the case that xRx. More formally, axiom 2 requires that 
a potential alternative must be chosen if it is the only alternative avail-
able. Thus for any potential alternath·e x, C(x) = x so that it must be 
the case that xRx. 
(iv) Transitivity: Consider a set of three potential alternatives {x, y, z} = 
v. Suppose x = C{x, y}, y = C{y, z}. Axiom 7 ~ x = C{x, y} = C{C{x}, 
C{y, z}} = C{C{x, y}, C{z}} = C{x, z}. Axiom 5 ~ R rationalizes C. 
Therefore, we have 
(1) xRy, -yRx, yRz, -zRy ~ xRz, ,....,zRx. 
But single-valuedness under axiom I ~ [\ia, b e E, aRb ~ -bRa]. 
Therefore reduces to 
(2) 
and 
2. Lemma 2: For every u 1, u2 e U, \iv~ E, if 3 2n numbers a 1, ... , an, 
/31 > 0, ... , /3n > 0 s.t. 'Vci e N and \ia e E 
u 1(a, c1) = a; + {3iu 2(a, ci) then 
C(v, ul) = C(v, u2). 
Proo/:288 Choose arbitrary u 1 e U; a 1, ... , an; {31 > 0, ... , f3n > 0 and con-
struct u0 e U s.t. 'Vz e E, 'V ci e N, u0 (z, ci) = ai + f31u1(z, ci). We must show 
C(v, ul) = C(v, u0), 'Vv ~ E. Construct uz e U s.t. 'Vz e E and 'V ci e N, 
u2(z, ci) = I + /3'iu 1(z, c1) where {3'1 is defined by: 
(i) pick arbitrary B < minJ £ ::-;{aJ}2so 
(ii) /3'1 = /3l 
CX1 - B 
287. See pp. 768-69 supra (choice function must be single-Yalued); pp. 770-71 supra 
(definition of "rationalizes" and requirement that R rationalizes choice function). 
288. This proof is taken from D'Aspremont & GeYers, Equity and the Informational 
Basis of Collective Choice, 44 Rrv. EcoN. STUD. 199, 205 (1977). 
289. The expression mini£ N {ai} means the smallest value from the set of all the 
numbers a1• 
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Now, by axiom 4 
(B) 
C(v, u 2) = C(v, u 1), 'Vv h E. 
u 1(z, c1) = [u2(z, c1) - I] [ ai;;: 9 J 
u 0(z, c1) = a1 + {31u 1(z, c1) 
= a1 + /31 [ ai/3~ 9 J [u2(z, c1) - I] 
= a1 + (a1 - 9) [u2(z, c1)] + 9 - a1 
= 9 + (a1 - 9) [u2(z, c1)]. 
C(v, u 0) = C(v, u 2) 'Vv h E. 
Now, putting (A) and (B) together we get C(v, uo) = C(v, ul) 'Vv h E. 
3. Definitions: 
Definition: for each Ci. "f/uk e V, 'Va, b e E, 
aRk1b <:> uk(a, c1) ;::: uk(b, c1). 
Q.E.D. 
4. Lemma 3: Given ui, uk e V, 'Vv e E s.t. v has at least two elements, if 
'Va, b e v and 'Vc1 e N it is true that aRk1b <:> aRi1b then C(v, uk) = 
C(v, ui). 
Proof: Pick arbitrary a, b e v, a =I= b. Assume we have any v e E and any 
u 1, u 2 e U with 'Vx,y e E, xR11y <:> xR21y, 'Vc1 e N. We must show 
C(v, ul) = C(v, u2). 
We will first show C({a, b}, u 1) = C({a, b}, u 2). Assume, without loss 
of generality, that aR1b (which => C({a, b}, u 1) = a). Now we know from 
the definition of Rk1 that u 1(a, c1) ;::: u 1(b, c1) <:> u 2(a, c1) ;::: u 2(b, c1) since 
aR11b <:> aR21b. 
Say 
u 1(a, c1) = m11 
u 1(b, c1) = m12 
u 2(a, c1) = n11 
u 2(b, c1) = n12 
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Construct u3 by setting290 
Now define u3 (x, c1) = o:1 + f31u2(x, c1). By Lemma 2, C(v, us) = C(v, u2), 
't:/v. Specifically, for v = {a, b}, C({a, b}, ua) = C({a, b), u2). Note, how-
ever, that we can show u 3 (a, ci) = mi1 and uS(b, c1) = mi2 : 
ua(a, ci) = 
case I: n\ = ni2 then uH(a, ci) = O'.i + f31u 2 (a, c1) = 
m\ - n11 + n11 = mi1· 
u 3 (b, ci) = 
case I: ni1 = n 12 then u3 (b, c1) = O:i + {3iu2(b, c1) = 
mi1 - ni1 + n12 = m11· But n11 = n12 <=>- m\ = m12,291 
so u3 (b, ci) = m11 = mi2 • 
.. . . case-2: n1r:P n12:.=tnen-u<l(b; c;r=~~CXi-+ {31\.i!!-(o, c1)r:··~·=--=·-:···:·:·-----~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
mil m12 m11 - m'2 
m11 - n11 + n12 = 
n11 n12 n11 - n12 
mi1 + (ni2 - nl1) [m11 - m12 J -mi - (m11 - m'2) = mi2· 
n11 - n12 - i 
Now by axiom 9 and the single-valuedness of the choice function postu-
lated under axiom I, C( {a, b}, uH) = C( {a, b}, u 1) since the values of ui 
for each of the choice functions are the same for all alternatives and for 
all criteria. But we constructed ua so that by Lemma 2, C({a, b), u
3
) = 
C({a, b), u~). As a result,- it must be that C({a, b), u1) = C({a, b}, u2). 
I I I I m11 - m'" . l I 
290. Note that [m 
1 
> m , ¢> n 1 > n .] => 1 1 • > 0 1f n 1 =f:. n ,. n 1 - n • 
291. By definition, aRk
1
b ¢> uk(a, c1) ~ uk(b, c1). See p. 774 supra. So if n
1
1 = 
n' .. then it must be the case that aR" 1b and bR' 1a. But, by the assumptions of Lemma 3, 
xR',y ¢> xR'
1






a). By the definition at the beginning of this note, [aR1 ,b and bR
1
1a] implies that 
m', = m', since m', = u'(a, c
1
) and m', = u'(b, c1). So we have shown in this note that 
n11 = n 12 <=> m
1
1 = m 1!?. 
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By axiom 7 any choice over a set V can be decomposed into a series of 
choices between pairs of alternatives without affecting the overall choice. 
As a result, C({a, b}, u 1 ) = C({a, b}, u2) for any two elements of any sub-
set of E with more than two elements => C(v, ul) = C(v, u?) \;:/v e E with 
more than two elements. 
Q.E.D. 
B. Proof and Application of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem202 
I. Definitions: 
Definition: A set of criteria, C, is almost decisive for x against y if 
[xP1y \;:/c1 e C and yP1x \;:/c1 ~ C] => xPy.203 
Definition: A set of criteria, C, is decisive for x against y if 
[xP1y \;:/c1 e C] => xPy. 
Definition: D(x, y) means cl is almost decisive for x against y. 
Definition: !S(x, y) means cl is decisive for x against y. 
Note that !S(x, )') => D(x, y). Also, C(v, u) can be written C(v; R 1 , ... , Rn)· 
2. Lemma 4: If any criterion, cl, is almost decisive for an arbitrary or-
dered pair, x, y, then the choice process violates axiom 6. 
Proof: Assume 3x, y e E s.t. D(x, y). By axiom 3 we can pick z e E, 
z -=!= x, z # y, and let i index all criteria, ci, other than the criterion, cj, 
(l) Assume xPJy & yPJz and 
yP1x & yP1z. 
Note that [D(x, y) & xPJy & yP1x] => xPy. Also [yPJz & yP1z] => y = 
C({y, z}; R 1, ... , R 0 ) => yPz, by axiom 8. Next xPy and yPz => xPz, from 
Lemma I. By Lemma 3, the independence of irrelevant alternatives, the 
choice between x an<l z, C({x, z}; R 1, R2 , ... R 11) must not be affected by 
changes in the rankings under criteria for other pairs of alternatives. Hence, 
the assumptions concerning the rankings between x and y and between 
y and z under various criteria can be changed without affecting the fact 
that x will be chosen over z. The only assumption with respect to the 
pair x, z was that xPJz. Thus xPJz => xPz, i.e., D(x, y) => !S (x, z). 
(2) Suppose zPJx & xPJy and 
zP1x & yP1x. 
292. The proofs of Arrow's general possibility theorem are taken from A. SE:-;, supra 
note 3, at 41-46. 
293. The relation P means "strictly preferred to." So xPy is equivalent to [xRy and 
NyRx] where R is the relation "is al least as good as." 
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Now [zP1x & zPJx] => zPx. Further [D(x, y) &: xPJy & yP1x] => xPy. 
Lemma 1 => zPy. 
By similar reasoning to (I), zPJ)' => zPy, so that D(x, y) => D(z, y). 
(3) By interchanging y and z in (2), we obtain: D(x, z) => D(y, z). 
So 
(4) In (1) replace z with x, y with z an<l x with y to obtain: D(y, z) => 
!S(y, x). 
(4') Using (1), (3), and (4), we get D(x, y) => D(x, z) => D(x, z) => 
D(y, z) => D(y, z) => D(y, x). 
(5) D(x, y) => D(y, x). 
Note that D(x, y) => D(y, x) as an immediate result. Hence D(y, x) => 
[!S(y, z) & !S(z, x) & D(x, y)] by interchanging x and y in (1), (2), and (5). 
By combining this with (4') we get 
D(y, x) => [ !S(y, z) & D(z, x) & D(x, z) & D(z, y) & D(x, y) & D(y, x)] 
which means cJ is decisive for any ordered pair from the set {x, y, z}. 
This implies cl is decisive for any a, b e E. To see this, note that, for any 
pair a, b e E there are three cases: 
case 1: a and b are the same as x and y. Then, by the result above, cJ 
is decisive for a against b. 
case 2: if only one of a and b is the same as x or y, (say a = x without 
loss of generality) then take y and form the three element set {a, b, y}. By 
the argument above, D(a, b). 
~~ase-3:-ne-iihera~nor-l::>-is-ihe-same-as-x~--or-=y.-=First,fofrn-{x;-y,a}.:We__ ___ _ ___________ _ 
know D(x, y) => !S(x, a) => !S(x, a). Now form {x, a, b}. We know 
D(x, a) => D(a, b) & D(b, a). Hence, given D(x, y) for some arbitrary 
x, y => 'v'a, b e E, D(a, b) (& D(b, a)). But this means aPJb => aPb which 
=> a = C({a, b}; R 1 , ... , Rn), which violates axiom 6. 
Q.E.D. 
3. Lemma 5: It must be the case that some criterion, cJ, is almost decisive 
for some pair, x, y. 
Proof: Axiom 8 implies that for any pair of applicants, x and y, the set 
of all criteria, { ci} for i = 1, 2, ... , n, is decisive because the axiom estab-
lishes that an alternative that is preferred over another one under every 
criterion will be chosen over that other one. From among the set of sets 
of criteria that are decisive between some pair (not necessarily the same 
pa.fr) choose one of minimal size. Call this set 6 and let it be decisive, and 
therefore almost decisive, for x against y. If we can show that there is only 
one criterion in 6, then the Lemma is true. 
Assume there are two or more categories in 6. Now divide 6 into 6 1 
(containing one criterion from 6) and 6 2 (containing all the other criteria 
in 6). Let 6 3 be the set of all criteria not in 6. 
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By axiom 3, the choice process can operate on alternatives with any set 
of rankings under the criteria, i.e., we can choose any ui e U. By axiom 2, 
there is at least one potential alternative other than x an<l y. Call that al-
ternative z and consider the following set of rankings: 
(1) 'v'c1 £ 6 1 , xP1y & yP1z 
(2) 'v'cJ e 6 2, zPJx & xPJy 
(3) 'v'ck £ 6 3 , yPkz & zPkx. 
Since 6 = 6 1 U 6 2 is almost decisive for (x, y), xP01y 'r/Cm £ 6 & yPkx294 
'v'ck e 6 3 => xPy. 
Consider the pair of alternatives (y, z). Now zPJy 'r/cJ £ 6 2 and yPmz 'r/Cm 
e 6 1 U 6 3 • If zPy, then 6 2 is almost decisive for (y, z). But since 6 was 
chosen to be of minimal size and 6 2 is smaller than 6 by one element, 
6 2 cannot be almost decisive. Therefore by the single-valuedness of the 
choice function under axiom I and by axiom 5, it must be that yPz.20° 
Now, xPy & yPz => xPz, by transitivity under Lemma I. However, 'r/c1 
£ 6 1 , xP1z while 'v'cm £ 6 2 U 6 3 , zPmx. Hence, the single criterion in 6 1 is 
almost decisive for (x, z). However, this is contrary to the assumption that 
6 is of minimal size and contains more than one criterion. Therefore 6 
has only one criterion in it. 
Q.E.D. 
4. Theorem: Axioms 1-9 cannot be simultaneously satisfied. 
Proof: By combining Lemmas 4 an<l 5, axiom 6 must be violated. 
:!\ote that axioms I-IX in the text imply axioms 1-9 so that the theorem 
demonstrates that one of the textual axioms must be violated by any 
i\1CCP.:rno Note also that although the theorem is stated here in terms I. 
---~=~-~~~=~...;o"':!f';-;;a~x~io""· m~s~l..::.!:LancLno.Lin=tei:ms~of'._.the~wnd-itions~for~.Arrowis~gene_~t:p.:QS~:'._~::_=~~._~ ___ -_~ ___ ~ .. _~_=. __ ~ __ ~ .. ~~~~~-·~: ... \ 
::.;;ibiifty theorero;-the--theorem-liere-isessentially-Ar1:0w's --theorem. The 
only difference is that axioms 1-9 were used to obtain as Lemma 3 the 
single condition of Arrow's theorem that is not already expressed in one 
of the axioms or in the definition of MCCPs.297 
Appendix D: List of the Nine Axioms Used in Text 
This appendix lists the nine axioms that are used in the text of the 
article: 298 
1. Axiom I: The MCCP chooses one alternative from a pool of 
alternatives. 
294. yP.x follows from [yP.z and zP.x] since the preferences under each criterion are 
transith·e by assumption. See p. 765 supra. 
295. See pp. 772-73 and notes 287 & 292 supra. 
296. See Appendix B, pp. 768- 72 supra (demonstrating that each arabic-numbercd 
axiom is restatement of or follows from roman numeral axioms in text). 
297. See pp. 765-66, 767-68 supra. 
298. For an explanation of the meaning of the axioms, see pp. 720-25 supra. 
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2. Axiom II: There are at least three "potential alternatives," each 
of which would be chosen if available and if no better alternative 
were a possible choice. 
3. Axiom III: The choice process can consider any conceivable 
"potential alternative" regardless of its particular characteristics. 
4. Axiom IV: The MCCP uses no absolute scales or absolute weights 
to combine categorical rankings into a choice. 
5. Axiom V: Given any two alternatives A and B, A will be a 
more desirable alternative than B, or B will be a more desirable al-
ternative than A, or A and B will be equally desirable alternatives. 
The more desirable of the two must be chosen if one is more de-
sirable than the other. 
6. Axiom VI: No one criterion totally dominates the MCCP. 
7. Axiom VII: For any set of alternatives, the choice process will 
have the same result whether the choice is made directly from the 
entire set or is made from a set of preliminary winners chosen from 
subsets comprising the entire set. 
8. Axiom VIII: For every possible set of alternatives, if one mem-
ber of the set ranks higher than a second member in every criterion 
used in the choice process, then the second member will not be 
chosen. 
9. Axiom IX: For any two alternatives, A and B, construct their 
comparative categorical rankings. If there are any other two alter-
natives, C and D, where C has the same comparative rankings rela-
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